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Abstract 
This study is motivated by two paradoxes in transition economies. The first is 
the contrast between the rapid economic growth in China and the deep output 
decline in Eastern European and former Soviet Union Countries. China's rapid 
economic growth occurred in the absence of several conditions that are 
deemed necessary for economic growth. The second paradox is posed by the 
contrast between the rapid economic growth and the deterioration of 
enterprise performance in China. By focusing on the study of Chinese 
enterprise performance and enterprise behaviour, this study tries to shed 
lights on these two puzzles. 
While most of the studies of Chinese enterprise performance have focused on 
whether it has improved or not, this thesis investigates first the impact of 
enterprise reform and increased competition on enterprise efficiency, and then 
looks beyond the `within-firm' effects of economic reform and market 
competition, investigating whether economic reform has facilitated a dynamic 
competitive market selection process. 
Methodologically, this study applies Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to 
evaluate the impacts of economic reform on firm efficiency, utilizes Baily et al. 
(1992) methods of productivity growth decomposition to analyze the dynamics 
of firm's entry, survival and exit, and then employs a Hazard model to analyze 
firm exit behavior in the context of China. To my knowledge, neither of these 
latter two methods has been applied in the context of transition economies. 
This study finds that that there is a divergence of technical efficiency from 
technology frontier rather than a convergence of technical efficiency to 
technology frontier as is expected in a more competitive market. This study 
has also discovered that efficiency differences between State Owned 
Enterprise (SOEs) and non-SOEs may have resulted from their different 
speeds in `catching up' with the technology advance. 
By analysing the dynamic process of firm's entry, survival and exit, and 
decomposing productivity growth into the contribution of each, the study finds 
that the competitive selection process is taking shape in China. While 
productivity growth mainly comes from new entry, and exits are playing an 
increasing role. By applying a hazard model to analyse firm exit behaviour 
specifically, this study establishes that the exit threat as a corporate 
governance mechanism has not been set up effectively for SOEs, while non- 
SOEs are increasingly subject to the discipline of market forces, indicating 
that competitive selection process is not, as yet, providing a sufficient 
substitute for corporate governance mechanisms based on ownership. 
Therefore, this study suggests that more radical reform, based on ownership 
and property rights, is needed. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
China's historic economic reform in the year of 1978 marks the beginning of the 
transition from former centrally planned socialist economies to market 
economies. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, transition has spread to 
socialist economies in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the former Soviet 
Union (FSU) countries. The transition is possibly one of the two largest economic 
experiments the last century witnessed, providing a unique opportunity for the 
economic researcher to get an insight into the operation of the market system. 
While both China, CEE and FSU countries have all been experiencing transition 
from centrally planned socialist economies to market economies, one difference, 
however, is fundamental: China's reform is characterised by an experimental, 
gradual and `dual track' strategy. Indeed, only since 1993 has the idea of "setting 
up a market economy' been formally endorsed; the transition in CEE and FSU 
has been both comprehensive and rapid. However, a decade after the beginning 
of transition in CEE and FSU countries and two decades after the beginning of 
China's transition, China's economic reform has been deemed largely 
successful, while the transition experience in CEE and FSU has been considered 
far less satisfactory (Stiglitz, 2000; Fischer, 2001). How to explain this difference 
convincingly remains a challenge for academic researchers. The view adopted in 
this thesis is that, firms are the real entity on the supply side of markets, 
responding to market signals and policy initiatives. Hence the explanation for this 
difference lies with understanding firms' behaviour during transition in the two 
contexts. 
Focusing on the experience of China's transition at the microeconomic level, this 
thesis examines how firms have responded to China's gradual and experimental 
economic reform, considering to what extent this experimental and gradual 
reform has set up an effective market mechanism. In view of that, this thesis also 
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attempts to shed some light on the sources of China's economic growth, and why 
China is different in terms of its transition strategy and economic performance. 
1.1 Motivation and Objectives 
This study is motivated by two puzzles within transition economies: the first 
puzzle is the rise of China and the fall of Russia; and the second rests with 
Chinese economy in particular, the continuous growth of the macro economy, 
and the decline of enterprise financial performance at the microeconomic level. 
1.1.1 The Rise of China and The Fall of Russia 
Since the beginning of its transition, China has achieved an annual 10% average 
growth of GDP for the past two decades or so (See Fig 1.1). For the period 
between 1978 and 2001, China's GDP has increased by nearly 7 times, and 
GDP per capita has increased by nearly 6 times. Meanwhile, the living standard 
of ordinary Chinese people has improved significantly. For the period between 
1978 and 2001, the rural and urban household incomes per capita have 
increased by 4 times and 3 times respectively. 
2 
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Fig 1.1 Selected Economic Growth Indicators in China 
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At the same time, China has gradually transformed itself from a closed centrally 
planned economy to an emerging market economy. China's foreign trade has 
grown from $20.64 billion in 1978 to $509.8 billion in 2001. The ratio of import 
and export to GDP has increased from 9.8% in 1978 to 44.0% in 2001. Currently 
there are more than 200,000 foreign companies and joint ventures in China, 
investing $875 billion by 2001. 
China's economic reform has been deemed largely successful (World Bank, 
2001) despite both the initial pessimism and the recent slowing down of GDP 
growth since 19971. Its extraordinary economic performance, regarded as a 
`miracle' (Lin et al., 1996), is considerably more impressive when compared with 
that of other transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the 
countries of the former Soviet Union (FSU), which have all experienced large and 
rapid declines in GDP in the initial stage of transition since 1990, ranging from 
1 For the period between 1997 and 2002, China's GDP has been growing at a slower yet still 
impressive rate of 7.5% annually. 
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20% to 60% (World Bank, 2001). The two largest economies in transition, China 
and Russia, have clearly exemplified this difference (see Figure 1.2). 
Fig 1.2 GDP in China and Russia (1989-2002) 
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For the period between 1989 and 2002, China's GDP more than tripled, but 
Russia's GDP more than halved. In 1990, China's GDP was only nearly half of 
that in Russia, but in 1998, Russia's GDP was less than half of that in China. A 
central paradox of the impressive record in China is that its achievement is a 
"puzzle" according to Nolan (1994), with the absence of a number of factors 
commonly deemed to be essential for a successful transition. These include 
reasonably complete market liberalization, large-scale privatisations, secure 
private property rights, and democracy (Chow, 1997). 
1.1.2 Declining Enterprise Financial Performance 
The second puzzle of the Chinese economy relates to performance at 
microeconomic level. While the macro economy has been growing rapidly, the 
4 
financial performance of many firms has been deteriorating despite the claims 
that economic reforms have improved enterprise performance (see Fig 1.3). 
Fig 1.3 Falling State Owned Enterprise Profitability (%) 
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While the macro economy grows continuously, the enterprise profitability, 
especially that of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), has been plummeting, as we 
can see from Fig 1.2. Pre-tax profit-asset ratio of SOEs declined from around 
25% in 1978 to 9.8% in 1993, which was even lower than the interest rate; the 
pre-tax profit-asset rate declined further to 6.5% in 1996. Similarly, the profit 
share in Gross Industrial Output declined from 25% or so in 1978 to 10% in 
19962. At the same time, the numbers of loss-making SOEs, and the amounts of 
those losses, have been increasing. In 1985, there were only 10% of SOEs 
making losses; this figure rose to 23% in 1993, and by 1997 this figure had risen 
to 50%. It is not just SOEs who were making losses - in 1995 nearly 40% of 
foreign-funded enterprises were in deficit. 
2 The decline of profitability may also due to the decreasing return of capital (Wolff, 2003). 
However, this is not the case in Chinese SOEs, as their trend of profit-asset ratio is similar to that 
of profit-output ratio, indicating that the capital productivity has almost been constant since 
1978. 
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1.1.3 Objectives: Performance, Ownership, and Competition 
The key questions are: why China's macro economy performs well while its 
microeconomic entity - firms - perform less well, whether the current impressive 
economic growth can be sustained, and whether an effective market mechanism 
has been set up to drive forward significant economy growth. 
Resolution of these puzzles is important when assessing the role of current and 
future reforms, especially given the increasing concerns for the sustainability of 
China's economic growth (Sachs, Woo and Yang3,2000; Borensztein and Ostry4, 
1996), amid the recent slowdown of economic growth and the deteriorating 
financial performance of firms, which lend credence to these concerns. 
As firms, in my view, are the real entities in the markets - responding to market 
signals and to reform policies - and enterprise reforms have always been the 
focus of China's economic reform, the resolution of these puzzles lies with the 
analysis of firm behaviours. Hence this thesis will focus on the firm, in particular 
how firms have responded to economic reform, and it will examine whether 
economic reform has facilitated the functioning of market mechanisms - in 
particular the dynamic competitive selection process - rather than simply 
examining whether economic reform has improved firms' performance. 
My basic argument is that China's SOE reform, characterised by gradually 
expanding managerial autonomy, has been relatively successful in providing 
3 Sachs et at. (2000) expressed concern that in the absence of constitutional transition, the dual 
track approach to economic transition adopted in China may generate very high long-term cost 
that might well outweigh its short-term benefit, hence the current rapid economic growth might not 
be sustained. 
4 Borensztein and Ostry (1996) suggest that without further reform in SOE and financial sectors, 
benefits from economic reform might be exhausted, and the pursuit of high growth rates may 
generate serious macroeconomic problems. 
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short-term incentives to improve enterprise performance. However, it has also 
released the agency problem that the central planning system had managed to 
constrain, which has limited the further improvement of enterprise performance. 
On the other hand, encouraging the entry of non-state firms and the consequent 
increased market competition, further significant components of China's 
enterprise reform, has to some extent provided effective monitoring and long- 
term incentives for enterprises. However, the functioning of market competition 
has not been effective owing to the slower pace of SOE reform, especially in the 
pace of ownership-related reform. 
1.2 Two Stages in China's Economic Reform 
China's "reform and opening up" policy proposed in the Third Plenum of The 
Eleventh Chinese Communist Party Congress (CCPC) on December 18-22 1978 
marked the beginning of China's reform era. At the beginning of reform, China's 
policy makers had reasonably clear objectives relating to increases in 
productivity and improvements in living standards (CCPC, 1978). However, at 
that time, even in western countries, deregulation and privatisation remained 
controversial topics, let alone in socialist countries. Hence there was no obvious 
model for the purposes of institutional emulation. The reforms therefore 
proceeded by using an experimental methods, which established reforms in a few 
sectors and in a few cities, before implementing them at a national level. In this 
stage, the reforms are characterised by gradually loosening state control and 
bureaucratic restrictions, introducing incentives at both the enterprise and local 
government levels, gradually aligning price determination to the underlying 
supply and demand through the "dual track" price system, opening up to the 
outside world, and encouraging the entry of non-state economic forces. In 
particular, enterprise reform in this stage includes the promotion of Township and 
Village Enterprises (TVEs), allowing them to enter into industries that were 
5 This is described as "crossing the river by groping for stones". 
7 
previously served only by SOEs, and expanding managerial autonomy and 
granting profit sharing directly to SOEs. 
The next key landmark was 1992, when the Fourteenth CCPC met in September. 
At this meeting, for the first time, the "socialist market economy" was endorsed 
as a description of the nature of China's reform goal (CCPC, 1992). This meeting 
thus established a rather rough breakdown into stages of the reform process as a 
whole. The initial stage from 1978-1992 was characterised by the retention of the 
dominance of the planning mechanism, while trying to establish a balance 
between planning and the market. Official ideology vacillated between the idea of 
"planning supplemented by market" and that of a "planned commodity economy". 
The second stage, from 1993, involved an explicit goal of establishing a "socialist 
market economy" to replace the old planning system. In this stage, the reforms 
recognized that the phase of dual track development might have reached its 
conclusion, and the reforms had comprehensive, coherent and radical features. 
Enterprise reform, in this stage, introduced some significant changes with regard 
to establishing a modern company system. Furthermore, the privatisation of 
small and medium enterprises was introduced on a large scale from 1996. 
Two key questions are how enterprises have responded to these two stages of 
reforms, and whether the acceleration of economic reform since 1992 has had 
any impact on firms' behaviour. 
1.3 Data 
This thesis is based mainly on firm level empirical study. The data set used in the 
study is from Liaoning, a North Eastern Chinese Province, covering around 
20,000 to 30,000 enterprises. These enterprises include various ownership 
forms, administration structures and sizes, and are distributed in various 
industrial sectors in the period 1987-1996. This is a period for which we have 
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data and when the economic reform gradually moved from `crossing the river by 
groping for stones' to establishing a market economic system, and when the 
SOE reform gradually changed from expanding managerial autonomy and 
allowing profit sharing to establishing a modern enterprise system and the large 
scale privatisation of small SOEs. 
Liaoning Province is the sixth largest Province in China in terms of GDP, and is 
an area in which the central planning system has perhaps been most deeply 
rooted. It used to be the centre of China's manufacturing industry, its industrial 
output accounted for more than one tenth of the total industrial output in China, 
and the number of large and medium sized State Owned Enterprises in this 
Province accounted for one tenth of the number of large and medium state 
owned enterprises in China as a whole. The foundation of Liaoning's industrial 
structure was laid down in China's first five-year plan period (1952-1957), and 
was characterised by heavy industry and huge SOEs. In fact, before 1979, gross 
industrial output from heavy industry accounted for more than 80% of the 
provincial gross industrial output, and gross industrial output from large and 
medium enterprises accounted for more than 60% of provincial gross industrial 
output. The most famous example of a large SOE in Liaoning is Anshan Steel 
and Iron Company, which had long been the biggest enterprise in China prior to 
1995, and its workforce typically accounted for 15% of the 1.5 million urban 
population of Anshan city, where the company is located. 
Historically, to some extent the economy in this Province is a snapshot of the 
entire Chinese economy. Compared with China in general, Fig. 1.4 shows that the 
GDP growth rate in Liaoning Province has experienced similar ups and downs, 
although it has been more volatile. 
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Fig. 1.5 shows the SOE share of gross industrial output in both Liaoning Province 
and China as a whole. The SOE shares of gross industrial output in both 
Liaoning Province and China as a whole have shown a similar declining trend, 
decreasing from more than 80% in 1975 to less than 30% in 1997. 
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Figl. 4. GDP Growth in China and Liaoning Province 
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Liaoning Province has been a pioneer in several reform initiatives, for example 
the first case of bankruptcy and the first example of a Shareholding Company 
both occurred here; recently, the reform of the social security system has been 
tested on a large scale in this Province as well. This Province has 14 cities, 5 of 
which are coastal cities; one of the latter - Da Lian - was one of the earliest cities 
to be opened up to the outside world. It is here that the problems of state owned 
enterprises have been the most serious, and it is here that the Chinese 
Government wants to make a breakthrough in the reform of State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs)6. 
In the process of reform, this Province has also shown some marketisation 
characteristics common to the whole economy. Table 1.1 below shows the 
6 In fact, in a visit to this Province in 1998, China's former Premier Zhu Rongji remarked that 
"Liaoning is China's key ageing industrial base, subject to many problems left over from history, 
where the job of reforming and getting large and medium state-owned enterprises out of their 
difficulties is harder. So, if Liaoning can meet on schedule the goal of reforming and getting state- 
owned enterprises out of their difficulties, the whole nation can certainly do so too. " 
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similarity between the provincial marketisation and that of the national economy. 
The table gives a few indicators of the degree of marketisation in China's 
regions. 
Table 1.1 Selected Data from China's Regions in 1995 
Output Multinational 
State 
owned 
Import Wage Tariffs Share Share Share Premium 
Beijing 1909 0.215 0.555 0.075 0.366 0.413 
Tianjin 2094 0.240 0.284 0.430 0.522 0.306 
Including "Open Coastal Cities" or SEZ (Group II) 
Liaoning 4975 0.042 0.389 0.022 0.475 0.227 
Hebei 3996 0.066 0.327 0.007 0.360 0.289 
Shandong 8456 0.054 0.274 0.007 0.308 0.282 
Jiangsu 11813 0.102 0.176 0.008 0.353 0.223 
Shanghai 5129 0.290 0.294 0.080 0.452 0.163 
Zhejiang 8088 0.075 0.082 0.010 0.270 0.240 
Fujian 2801 0.270 0.068 0.035 0.387 0.298 
Guangdong 9535 0.271 0.000 0.075 0.330 0.215 
Guangxi 1666 0.065 0.357 0.014 0.357 0.252 
Hainan 193 0.204 0.054 0.348 0.436 0.172 
Average 5665 0.144 0.202 0.061 0.373 0.236 
Not including "Open Coastal Cities" or SEZ (Group III) 
Average 17361 0.0351 0.551 0.0281 0.4181 0.214 
Notes: 
1. This Table is extracted from Branstetter and Feenstra (1999) 
2. SEZ: Special Economic Zone 
3. Output is measured in 100 million RMB, where 8 RMB. $1. Multinational share, State owned 
share and Import shares are the shares of domestic spending on multinational, state owned 
enterprises and imports. The wage premium equals wages paid by multinationals minus that 
in urban collectives, divided by that in multinationals. 
From this table, we can also see that the degree of marketisation is on the 
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national average. It has the lowest multinational share, the highest state-owned 
share and the highest wage premium among provinces with open costal cities or 
special economic zones (SEZ), and its import share and tariff level are below the 
group average. However, compared with the averages in provinces not including 
"open coastal cities" or SEZ, the multinational share and wage premium are 
higher, the state owned share and tariffs are lower, and the import share is 
smaller than those of only three other provinces in this group. 
Arguably, therefore, the enterprise reforms in this Province, especially the reform 
of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), are representative of the enterprise reform 
in China's manufacturing sector more generally. 
1.4 Overview of Thesis Chapters 
Chapter 2 explores the concept of transition and identifies the two fundamental 
components of transition: reallocation and restructure. Then it compares the 
progress that transition economies have made so far in market building, resource 
reallocation, and enterprise restructuring, and then the macro causes of variant 
transition performance, in particular the contrasts between China and other 
transition countries, are investigated. There are two schools of thought in 
explaining why China's transition performance is different from that of CEE and 
FSU countries: the gradualist school and the "Big Bang" school. While the 
gradualist school gives credit to the evolutionary and experimental nature of 
China's reform, the "Big Bang" school emphasizes China's favourable initial 
conditions as a developing East Asian country. However, neither of these two 
schools of thought can explain China's experience convincingly, and neither of 
them has actually dealt with how firms have responded to market mechanisms, 
and how markets have evolved through firms' participation. Neglecting the micro- 
foundations of transition is thus established as a limitation of these two schools of 
thought. 
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In light of the conclusions drawn from Chapter 2, Chapter 3 focuses on China's 
enterprise reform. In more detail, Chapter 3 illustrates the two primary elements 
of China's enterprise reform: the decentralisation of SOEs through separating the 
state from SOEs, and promoting reform by encouraging the entry of non-SOEs. 
The enterprise reform process is therefore depicted as a process driven forward 
by these two elements. However, the effects of enterprise reform upon SOE 
performance, as we have surveyed, are inconclusive. One school of economists, 
based on the improvement of TFP, claim that reforms have improved SOEs' 
performance. Another school of economists, based on the decline of SOE 
profitability, claim that the performance of SOEs has not been improved, and that 
SOEs have actually become a destabilizer of the whole economy. However, 
neither productivity nor profitability is a good indicator of firms' performance in the 
context of transition economies. For example, improved productivity could mean 
greater allocation distortion, when firms are not profit maximizers, which is 
common in transition economies. Moreover, the decline of profitability can be the 
result of increased competition, the latter being a desirable result. Therefore, an 
appropriate indicator for enterprise performance is needed. 
As efficiency improvement is a major objective of economic reform, and is 
considered a survival condition for firms in a competitive environment and is 
central to firms' long term growth (Bain, 1969), Chapter 4 attempts to evaluate 
enterprise efficiency directly by applying the technique of Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA). Chapter 4 also attempts to estimate the impacts of enterprise 
reform and increased competition upon enterprise efficiency. We expect to see 
that both enterprise reform and increased competition will have positive effects 
on enterprise efficiency. Furthermore, we expect to see that increased 
competition will also facilitate a dynamic market selection mechanism, which 
drives enterprises to catch up with the technology frontier. Consequently, 
enterprise efficiency will tend to converge towards the technology frontier. 
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Diverging enterprise efficiency from technology frontier would mean that the 
market selection mechanism is not effective. 
Chapter 5 specifically looks into this dynamic market selection process by 
investigating micro dynamics of entry, exit, and productivity growth in Chinese 
manufacturing in the process of transition to market economy, in particular 
looking for changes resulting from the latest stage of reform. This dynamic 
process may be becoming increasingly important for the continuing growth of 
manufacturing, as the agricultural sector as a source of surplus labour begins to 
decline. We expect to see that as a market economy is gradually taking shape in 
China, the pattern and characteristics of firms' entry, and their subsequent 
survival and exit, would be increasingly consistent with those of firms in an 
advanced market economy. Due to the gradual nature of China's economic 
reform, we also expect to see that while the old firm is still an important 
stabilizing element in determining the trend of the economy, it is new entries that 
have contributed the most to productivity growth. Exits, however, may contribute 
little to productivity growth, unlike its counterpart in advanced economies. Yet, 
the acceleration of economic pace since 1992 may have increased the pace of 
exit. 
Chapter 6 studies one specific aspect of the competitive market selection 
process: firm exit. By applying the hazard model to estimate the effects of 
various factors upon the propensity of firms to exit, this chapter aims to 
investigate what determines a firm's exit in the context of China's transition, what 
barriers a firm might be facing in making an exit decision, whether the exit threat 
has been established as an effective corporate governance of SOEs, and 
whether the reform since 1992 has any effect on a firm's exit behaviour. Chapter 
7 concludes the thesis. 
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Chapter 2. A Comparative Analysis of Economic 
Transition and Transition Performance 
The beginning of China's economic reform in the year 1978 probably marks 
the beginning of transition. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, transition 
has spread to all former socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE) and the Former Soviet Union (FSU). One difference, however, is 
fundamental: while China's reform is characterised by an experimental, 
gradual and `dual track' strategy, and was greeted initially with doubts and 
pessimism, the transition in CEE and FSU has been both comprehensive and 
rapid, and has raised "enormous expectations" (Klaus, 1999). However, a 
decade after the beginning of transition in CEE and FSU countries, and two 
decades after the beginning of China's transition, China's economic reform 
has been deemed largely successful (World Bank, 2001), despite the initial 
and continuing doubts and pessimism (one example of such pessimism is 
represented by Chang's (2003) The Coming Collapse of China), while the 
experience of transition in CEE and FSU has proved to be more painful, 
difficult and lengthy than had been expected (Stiglitz, 2000; Fischer, 2001; 
Kornai, 2000a). 
While China's GDP has been growing at an annual rate of 10.1% since 1978, 
all the CEE and FSU countries have experienced large and rapid declines in 
GDP in the initial stage of transition since 1990, ranging from 20% to 60% 
(World Bank, 2001). Moreover, there is a wide variation in recovery thereafter 
within CEE and FSU, despite the fact that they inherited similar socialist 
legacies and faced the common challenge of transition from a centrally 
planned system to a market economy. In CEE, after a few years' decline, all 
the countries began to recover, and by 2000, all CEE countries except 
Romania and Bulgaria had recovered to their 1989 GDP level. For FSU 
countries, the decline is more serious, and it was only by 1997 that most of 
the FSU countries began to show signs of recovery, and by 2000 most of 
them had not reached their GDP level of 1989. The three largest economies 
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in transition, China, Russia and Poland, have clearly exemplified this 
difference (see Figure 2.1). 
Figure 2.1 GDP in China, Poland and Russia, 1989-2002 
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The search for the explanation of these variations in economic performance 
has sparked enormous interest from both economists and policy makers, and 
the literature has been piling up. Indeed, how to explain in a convincing way 
the differences in transition strategies and transition performance is now seen 
as one of the main challenges facing those studying transition economies 
(e. g. Blanchard, 1997). While initial interest focused on the effects of transition 
strategies and the speed and sequence of transition strategy implementation, 
the recent focus has been on the institutional and behavioural underpinnings 
of transition economics (e. g. EBRD, 1999; World Bank, 2000). Although there 
has been growing agreement on many issues, and near consensus on some 
issues, there remain important disagreements among economists on many 
transition issues; one such example concerns China's differential experience. 
In this chapter, I will first describe the concept of transition and consider the 
progress made so far by the transition economies; then the macro causes of 
variant transition performance will be investigated. The limitations of this 
approach will be established, and the importance of an approach which 
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emphasizes the role of firms in establishing markets and in providing an 
explanation of variation in transition performance will be presented. 
2.1 The Concept of Transition 
2.1.1 Transition: Definition 
Transition refers to the process by which former socialist economies are 
transforming themselves into market economies, moving from a "more or less 
planned socialist system to a private market economy, one in which private 
ownership predominates and most resources are allocated through markets" 
(Fischer and Gelb, 1991). "The process of transition begins when society 
shifts away from the fundamental characteristic of the socialist system", 
summarised by Kornai (1992) as "undivided power of the Marxist-Leninist 
Party", "the dominant position of State (and quasi-state) enterprises" and "the 
preponderance of bureaucratic coordination". It finishes when society 
reaches the configuration characteristics of capitalism: "political power 
friendly to private property and the market, dominant private property and 
preponderance of market condition" (Kornai, 2000b). The main features of 
each system and the process are illustrated in diagram 2.1: 
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Communist Party 
Control 
Central Planning 
System 
Dominance of State 
Owned Enterprises 
Socialist System 
Transition 
Political power 
friendly to private 
property and market 
Market Co-ordination 
Dominance of Private 
Ownership 
Capitalist System 
Diagram 2.1 Socialist System, Capitalist System and Transition 
China's reform of 1978 was construed initially as introducing market 
mechanisms into a socialist framework to improve the efficiency of the 
economy in order to achieve rapid economic growth and to improve people's 
living standards (CCPC, 1978). However, there were no clear ideas as to how 
to achieve these objectives and where this reform would lead. "Economic 
reform is the biggest experiment", hence "the river should be crossed by 
groping for stones" (Deng, 1985). However, in a second phase dating from 
1993, building up the "market economy" has been set up as the primary 
objective of economic reform (CCPC, 1994). 
Countries in CEE and FSU started their transition 10 years later; however, 
their objective was explicitly set up as establishing the structure of society to 
resemble - at least in its main features - the most highly developed capitalist 
countries (e. g. Lipton and Sachs, 1990a; Kornai, 1995; Klaus, 1995). In the 
words of the leaders of transition economies, it was " returning to Europe"' 
' Essentially the leaders of Eastern Europe's revolution of 1989 stressed their countries' place 
in the mainstream of European history, politics, arts and economy, which had been deprived 
them by the "artificially imposed division of Eastern and Western Europe" (Lipton and Sachs, 
1990a). 
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(Lipton and Sachs, 1990a) and jumping "from the grey, stagnating, totalitarian 
past into a bright, rich and civilized future" (Yeltsin, 2000). In the post-1992 
account of transition objectives, the goal of creating an effective institutional 
framework also emerged (Aslund, 1997). At this stage it needs emphasising 
that while the objectives of transition were relatively clearly defined, the 
precise model of capitalism toward which the transition economies were 
aiming was much less clear. 
Countries categorised as transition economies are listed in the following box: 
Box 2.1. Transition Countries 
Transition economies in Europe and the Former Soviet Union 
CEE Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, FYR Macedonia, 
Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia 
Baltic States Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania 
CIS Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Ukraine, Uzbekistan 
Transition economies in Far East Asia: 
Cambodia, China, Laos, Mongolia, Vietnam 
2.1.2 Why? The Initial Conditions 
Despite clear social, cultural and geographical differences, the key underlying 
similarity between transition economies is that they all began transition with 
the following common characteristics: 
Communist Party Control. However, we should note here that while the 
Communist party in Soviet Union had been in power since 1917, the 
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Communist Parties in other transition countries commenced their period of 
control only after 1945 . 
A Central Planning Mechanism with Common Biases. In all these 
countries, state-led industrialization (Gerschenkron, 1952; Sachs, 1996) was 
strategically biased towards the rapid establishment of a "heavy-industrial 
base" (e. g., Nove, 1977) - i. e., towards raw materials, energy and capital 
equipment. In addition, resource allocation was achieved through a planning 
administration that organized both production and exchange (Gerschenkron, 
1952; Lin et al., 1996). Essentially, the market was considered as 
representing the existing pattern of demand which was, as such, inimical to 
socialist development (Feldman, 1928; Domar, 1957). As a result of this 
strategic bias, extremely high rates of capital accumulation were actually 
achieved in industrial sectors, which consequently led to a relative over- 
development of heavy industry and the underdevelopment of services (e. g., in 
distribution) compared with market economies (Kornai, 1992; Sachs, 1996; 
and Roland, 2000). Table 2.1, for example, shows clear differences in these 
respects. 
Table 2.1 Sectoral Allocation of Labour in the OECD and Centrally 
Planned Economies (% Of Total Labour Force) 
Agriculture Industry Service 
OECD, 1991 
Eight Richest Countries 5.5 29.8 64.7 
Eight Middle Countries 5.9 30.4 63.9 
Eight Poorest Countries 17.9 29.5 52.6 
Socialist Economies, 1989 
GDR 10.0 44.1 45.9 
Czechoslovakia 11.6 46.8 41.6 
Hungary 17.5 36.1 46.4 
Poland 27.2 36.3 36.4 
USSR (1986)a 19.0 38.0 43.0 
China (1981)b 72.0 16.3 11.7 
Vietnam (1983) 70.9 11.1 d 18.0 
Source: Roland (2000), China Statistics Yearbook (1983), ADB Statistics Database and Slavic Research 
Centre Library 
a Soviet History Archive, Slavic Research Centre Library; b From China Statistics Yearbook (1981); 
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From Asian Development Bank Statistics Database; d This figure does not include the share of construction sector. 
The Dominance of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). In order to keep the 
economy running as it was planned, SOEs were set up to work as 
subordinates to implement economic planning (Sachs, Woo and Yang, 2000; 
Lin et al., 1996; Gerschenkron, 1952). The share of the public sector in 
socialist economies was much higher than that in capitalist economies. In a 
typical advanced capitalist economy, the share of the public sector was 
generally less than 20% of GDP. In socialist economies, it was generally 
higher than 70% (See Table 2.2). 
At the enterprise level, the SOEs were established by the state with unlimited 
liability, and operated under direct control of the government. The government 
drew up production plans; government ministers exercised their power over 
SOEs and took any measures that were necessary to ensure the targets were 
met. Enterprises structures were characterised by the absence of financial 
discipline and accountability. Enterprise incentives were characterised by 
bonuses for fulfilment and over-fulfilment of the planned output (Roland, 2000; 
Nove, 1958). Big firms were favoured, partly because this made it easier to 
plan output and monitor managers' behaviour (Roland, 2000). While share of 
employment in industry by firms with 500 staff and over in socialist economies 
was typically more than 80%, in capitalist countries this share was generally 
less than 70% (see Table 2.2). 
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rable 2.2 Share of State and Public Sector (%) 
Year Share of 
Public 
Sectors 
Share of Employment in 
Industry by firms with 500 
staff and over 
Socialist Countries 
Czechoslovakia 1988 99.3 96.5 
East Germany 1988 96.4 87.9 
Hungary 1988 92.9 79.3 
Poland 1988 81.2 80.4 
Romania 1980 95.5 
Soviet Union 1990 95.0 
China 1978 79.0 
Vietnam 1987 71.4 
Capitalist Countries 
Austria 1978-79 14.5 
France 1982 16.5 52.6 
Greece 1979 6.1 
Italy 1982 14.0 40.4 
Spain 1979 4.1 
United Kingdom 1978 11.1 
United States 1983 1.3 
West Germany 1982 10.7 62.0 
Source: Kornai (1992), EBRD (1997), and China Statistical Yearbook 
a This figures refer to the percentage of national income in the case of socialist countries and 
to the percentage of GDP in the case of capitalist countries 
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2.1.3 Why Transition? Problems of Socialist Economies 
When socialism first became a reality in Russia in 1917, a protracted debate - 
running from the 1920s to the 1940s - was initiated concerning the feasibility 
of socialism , and 
it included the well-known contributions of von Mises and 
Hayek, Lange, Lerner and Schumpeter. This main criticism of the socialist 
system focused on information and incentive problems. Mises (1920) and 
Hayek (1935) argued that due to the absence of a price system, a socialist 
economy did not have the ability and incentive to collect and process the 
information needed for the calculation required to make rational decisions 
even under the specific form of market socialism proposed by Lange (1938) 
and Lerner (1936,1937). 
In fact, the central planning system did produce rapid industrialization after 
World War II (see Figure 2.2). 
Figure 2.2 Growth Rate of NMP in the Soviet and Eastern 
Europe (%), 1950-1990 
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In the 1950s, the Soviet bloc countries achieved 4.5% annual growth rate in 
per capita GNP, exceeding the 3.7% rate of growth of a comparison group of 
market economies. Indeed, as Figure 2.2 shows, it was only in the 1970s that 
stagnation began to be felt. Unsurprisingly, strong economic growth in the 
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Soviet Union and other socialist economies in the early post World War Two 
period left this initial debate languishing. Only more recently did stagnation re- 
ignite discussion about the endemic properties of socialism as such. This 
introduced or developed a number of themes, with no immediate presumption 
as to cause and effect, but of importance in the development of this thesis. 
Here I discuss the concept of the soft budget constraint, the role of chronic 
shortage, and stagnant economic growth. 
Soft Budget Constraint and Low Efficiency 
The concept of the Soft Budget Constraint (SBC) was first coined by Kornai 
(1986) to refer to the phenomenon that in a socialist economy, when an SOE 
incurs losses, the government will provide it with additional funding, such as a 
tax cut, or other forms of compensation, without the expectation of future 
repayment. This is essentially because the government is unwilling to accept 
the social consequences of its closure. Therefore many firms may survive 
despite sustained or continued losses. The existence of SBC was attributed to 
the government's "parentalism" (Kornai, 1986) or alternatively to SOEs' social 
objectives other than profit maximization (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). 
Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) explain SBC as a more general commitment 
problem. In their model, SBC arises due to central planners' inability to 
commit to not refinancing a failing firm ex post. In fact, the distorted price 
system made the problem of the SBC worse, as profit could not be used to 
evaluate SOEs' performance effectively. 
A major problem arising from SBC at the enterprise level is the low efficiency 
of SOEs. For example, compared with typical capitalist countries, energy and 
steel consumption per US $1,000 in socialist countries are much higher (see 
Table 2.3). 
25 
Table 2.3 An International Comparison of Efficiency: Energy and Steel 
Intensity 
Energy Intensity in kg/Coal 
equivalent Consumed per 
1,000 US Dollars of Output, 
1979 
Steel Intensity in kg/Steel 
equivalent Consumed per 
1,000 US Dollars of 
Output, 1980 
Socialist 
Countries 
East Germany 
Poland 
Six CMEA 
Countries 
China (1980) 
Capitalist 
Countries 
France 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
West Germany 
1356 
1515 
1362 
2779 
502 
655 
820 
565 
88 
135 
111 
147 
42 
79 
38 
52 
Source: Kornai (1992), Chinese Statistics Yearbook (1981), Chinese Energy 
Statistics Yearbook (1986) and Chinese Iron and Steel Industry Statistics Yearbook 
(1985) 
Since the ex post possibility of bail out reduces the ex ante incentives, SBC 
leads to ex post inefficiency (Roland, 2000; Kornai, 1993; Dewatripont and 
Maskin, 1995). In order to bail out failing firms, resources have to be extracted 
from good firms to subsidise bad firms, which leads to a ratchet effect, 
providing disincentives to both good and bad firms, and leading to lower 
efficiency (Dewatripont and Roland, 1997). 
SBC has also been blamed for the final demise of the socialist regimes, 
because the centrally planned economies lack the capacity to innovate due to 
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their inability to screen innovation projects ex post in the same way as a 
market economy (Qian and Xu, 1998; Maskin and Xu, 2001). 
Shortage, Monetary Overhang and Repressed Inflation 
A further pervasive problem in the socialist economy was that of chronic 
shortage (Kornai, 1980). Under socialism, shortage phenomena could be 
found in every sector of the economy. It was frequent rather than exceptional 
and sporadic, and it was `intensive' and `chronic' (Kornai, 1992). Perception of 
shortage led to all sorts of behaviour, such as hoarding (Weitzman, 1991), 
including the hoarding of labour, resulting in overstaffing in SOEs, or `forced 
substitution' (Kornai, 1992), i. e., the substitution of an available input or 
material for an unavailable one, leading to possible quality deterioration 
(Roland, 2000). If forced substitution is not acceptable, forced saving takes 
place, the buyer's setting aside the unspent money awaiting a supply to match 
his demand. As money accumulates through forced saving, a `monetary 
overhang' is generated, expanding across the sphere of consumer goods and 
services (Kornai, 1992). 
The causes of chronic shortage are attributed to the distorted price system 
and SOEs' SBC. As lower than market equilibrium prices discourage supply 
and encourage demand, that leads to the full range of economic shortage, 
and SBC leads to increased demand for inputs (Kornai, 1980,1992). 
However, shortage reduces the benefits the firm with SBC gets from 
refinancing (Qian, 1994). Therefore as the shortage is removed, SBC will 
probably be worse. The causes of chronic shortage also combine to create 
and sustain a propensity towards inflation, with resultant government price 
controls creating repressed inflation (Kornai, 1992). Turning repressed 
inflation into open inflation will not eliminate shortage as long as firms' 
budgets are soft - shortage and inflation will remain since it is the distortion to 
relative prices that is the root of the problem (Kornai, 1992). 
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Slow Technology Progress 
It is widely accepted that rapid economic growth after World War II was 
achieved initially through a high level of investment rather than through 
technological progress (Kornai, 1992; Ofer, 1987). One indicator of slow 
technological progress is the low contribution of TFP growth to index 
compared with typical capitalist economies (see Table 2.4). 
Table 2.4 Share of TFP in the Growth of Output: International Comparison 
Average Annual 
Share of TFP Growth Rate (%) 
Period Growth in Output 
Total Factor 
Output Growth 
Productivity 
Socialist Countries 
China 1952-75 6.0 0.3 5.0% 
1975-81 5.9 1.0 17.0% 
1978-95 8.2 3.5 42.7% 
Czechoslovakia 1960-75 3.0 1.0 33.3% 
1976-80 2.2 0.7 31.8% 
1981-88 1.4 0.1 7.1% 
Poland 1960-75 5.1 2.4 47.1% 
1976-80 0.7 -0.6 -85.7% 
1981-88 0.8 0.2 25.0% 
Soviet Union 1960-75 4.6 1.2 26.1% 
1976-80 2.3 0.5 21.7% 
1981-88 1.9 0.5 26.3% 
Capitalist Countries 
France 1960-73 5.8 3.9 67.2% 
1973-79 2.8 1.7 60.7% 
1979-88 1.9 1.5 78.9% 
Japan 1960-73 10.8 6.6 61.1% 
1973-79 3.6 1.8 50.0% 
1979-88 4.1 1.8 43.9% 
UK 1960-73 2.9 2.2 75.9% 
1973-79 1.5 0.5 33.3% 
1979-88 2.2 1.9 86.4% 
Source: China's data is from World Bank (1985,1997), data for others are from Kornai (1992) 
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In the Soviet Union the share of TFP in the growth of output was 33% during 
the period 1960-1975. This figure dropped to 13% during the period 1981-88. 
In the UK, this figure was 76% during the period 1960-73, and 95% during the 
period 1979-88. With slow technical advance, the potential for high returns on 
investment eventually exhausted itself, and the decline of rate of growth 
accelerated from the mid-1970s (Ofer, 1987; Bergson, 1991; Weitzman, 1970, 
1972). In fact, in the years preceding the transition, the deceleration of growth 
turned into absolute decline in NMP. 
Sachs (1996) and Sachs, Woo and Yang (2000) have provided an additional 
explanation, which is quite relevant to the current debate on the long-term 
growth prospects of transition economies. They argued that state-led 
industrialisation by Soviet bloc countries - as latecomers - could mimic the 
efficient pattern of division of labour generated gradually by capitalist 
developed countries. This generated the impressive economic growth at the 
beginning. However, in the absence of a capitalist infrastructure, and as the 
potential for imitation was exhausted, the intrinsic costs of central planning 
would outweigh its short-term benefit, which explains the stagnation in the 
later stage of socialism. 
2.1.4 Effecting Transition: Reallocation and Restructuring 
The stagnation and the decline of communist economies, and the consequent 
relative decline in living standards, created expectations that by moving to a 
market economy, the centrally planned economies would generate more rapid 
economic growth and gradually catch up with middle income developed 
countries (Poznanski, 1995). After the unsuccessful market socialism 
experiment in CEE and FSU countries, further such attempts for market 
socialism, the `third way', were dropped (Lipton and Sachs, 1990a; Klause, 
1991). Capitalist market economy, especially the American and Western 
European style capitalist market economy, became the ultimate goal of 
2 Klaus (1991) claimed that the "The third way is the fastest way to the third world". 
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transition: in the words of the leaders of transition economies, it was "returning 
to Europe" (Lipton and Sachs, 1990a) and jumping "from the grey, stagnating, 
totalitarian past into a bright, rich and civilized future" (Yeltsin, 2000). 
To achieve the transition objectives, it has been generally acknowledged that 
transition processes involve four key changes: 
" Political changes. "The biggest challenge of any economic reform is the 
political one" (Laffont and Qian, 1999). Political changes are required to 
make the transition feasible (Fischer and Gelb, 1991). 
" Change from central planning to market co-ordination, i. e., correcting the 
distortions of socialism through the introduction of flexibility in relative 
prices and the creation of a competitive market environment open to the 
world economy, `moving from a sellers' market to a buyers' market' 
(Kornai, 1994). 
" Change to novel incentive mechanisms by enforcing a hard budget 
constraint via privatisation and by eliminating various government support 
mechanisms such as budget subsidies, directed low cost credits, and tax 
exemptions (Kornai, 1994). Privatisation is a key component of such 
change, but so is encouraging the entry of new private firms and the 
creation of an entrepreneurial class. 
" Change from an institutional framework for a socialist economy to an 
effective institutional framework for a market economy. The invisible hand 
of the market depends heavily on the support of a thick `glove' of rules, 
norms, and institutions, including government (Fischer and Gelb, 1991; 
Stiglitz, 1999; Florini, 1999; North, 1997). 
While the first three changes have been acknowledged since the beginning of 
the transition, the fourth one has been recognised only recently, or at least it 
has not been emphasized from the beginning (Fischer and Gelb, 1991). 
These changes generate two fundamental components of transition: 
reallocation and restructuring, which to a large extent shape the process of 
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transition (Blanchard, 1997). Reallocating resources from old to new activities 
via closures and bankruptcies, combined with the establishment of new 
enterprises and restructuring within surviving firms via labour rationalisation, 
product line change and new investment, constitute the core of the process 
that Schumpeter (1943) termed `creative destruction'. 
Reallocation 
As we have discussed previously, compared with advanced capitalist 
economies, the centrally planned socialist economies were characterized by a 
high rate of accumulation of physical (and human) capital and by a pattern of 
production bias in favour of the industrial sector and a relative neglect of 
service sectors. Moreover, within the socialist economies, chronic shortage is 
pervasive and production is inefficient. It is believed that after price 
liberalisation and the replacement of central planning by the market, the 
change in relative prices will eliminate economic shortages, induce a 
reallocation of resources, and improve economic efficiency. The simplest 
general equilibrium view of reallocation is illustrated in Diagram 2.2 
X 
( 
ÄF 
1', ', 
X, 
Diagram 2.2 The Allocative Shift of Liberalisation 
31 
0 ,ýý., BD 
The production of the service and agriculture sectors is measured along the 
vertical axis (X2) and the production of industrial output is measured along 
the horizontal axis (X, ) . The production possibility curve AB describes all the 
combinations of X, and X2the economy is capable of producing given the 
resources of land, labour and capital available to it and the state of technical 
knowledge. 
CD represents the budget constraint in the context of a closed economy, and 
FG represents the consumer preferences in the form of a community 
indifference curve. Prior to the transition, the economy is at point P, which is 
away from the possible production P' due to perverse economic inefficiency. 
Price liberalisation in both factor markets and product markets, coupled with 
appropriate incentives for profit maximization and a competitive environment, 
are meant to bring the economy from point P under central planning to point E 
after price liberalisation. Liberalisation should induce an allocative shift with an 
increase in the production of goods 2 from XZ to XE and a relative decrease 
in the production of goods 1 from XIP to XIE. Elimination of production 
inefficiency should also bring the economy to the productive frontier. 
Liberalisation should thus bring about a substantive sectoral reallocation 
together with an improvement in economic efficiency. According to this static 
general equilibrium view of reallocation, the transition should be 
instantaneous. However, in reality such a reallocation cannot be 
instantaneous, due to the existence of frictions of various kinds; one such 
example is labour market frictions. This raises the question of the optimal 
speed of sectoral reallocation. 
In the context of the labour market, Blanchard (1997) has described the 
mechanism of reallocation in a two-sector model. The basic idea of this model 
can be illustrated in Diagram 2.3. The pre-transition equilibrium is point A, 
where the real wage is w and there is no unemployment. The elimination of 
subsidies to the state sector shifts the labour demands from SS to SS, while 
the demand for labour in the private sector is unaffected. Therefore, at a given 
real wage iv, the result is a decrease in state employment, no change in 
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private sector employment, and hence an increase in unemployment. As long 
as the real wage does not decline to w', transition leads to an initial increase 
in unemployment, which will consequently lead to decline in output. At a given 
real wage, restructuring may also lead to an increase in unemployment by an 
increase in productivity and output. After the initial adjustment, the high 
productivity in the private sector leads to the creation of private employment. 
The pace of private employment creation depends upon the installation of 
new capital, new expertise, and the real wage. 
Diagram 2.3 Employment after Liberalisation 
a) 0) 
ca Zt 
a) 
W 
WI I 
State Employment Unemployment Private employment 
Source: Blanchard (1997) 
Restructuring 
Restructuring SOEs to improve economic efficiency has been a main theme 
of transition (for example in Lipton and Sachs (1990a, 1990b), and Fischer 
and Gelb (1991)), and indeed has been playing an increasing role over time 
(Blanchard, 1997). 
As the main problem of SOE's has been expressed in the literature in terms of 
Soft Budget Constraints arising from the significant separation of ownership 
and control under socialism, the meaning of restructuring can be analysed by 
an application of Laffont-Tirole's (1986) model of the contract between an 
33 
agent - the manager - and a principal - either the planner or the firm's owner. 
In this model, the firm's productivity depends on both the manager's ability 
and efforts. However, information asymmetries ensure that the principal can 
observe neither effort nor ability but only the level of the firm's profit, putting 
the principal at a bargaining disadvantage. In order to induce the manager to 
make the firm more productive, the principal can offer the manager incentives, 
such as making pay depend upon the firm's profit. 
According to this model, the firm's inefficiency comes from four aspects. 
Firstly, the principal's aim may be at odds with maximising profit; secondly, 
the informational costs arise from the separation of ownership and control; the 
third source of enterprise inefficiency is the manager's ability; the fourth arises 
from the government's inability to commit to not bail out failing firms and to 
extract profitable firms, with the former leading to the firm's soft budget 
constraint, and the latter to the ratchet effect (Kornai, 1992; Roland, 2000). 
Hence, the model suggests that restructuring can be achieved by providing 
managers with better incentives, flattening the organisational hierarchy, and 
by selecting a better manager. These can all be done through privatisation. 
However, efficiency improvement can also be achieved by giving managers 
performance-contingent contracts, granting more managerial autonomy, and 
by selecting better managers. Market competition in the capital market, 
product market and managerial market may all help to reinforce the internal 
discipline based on performance contingence incentive contracts (McMillan, 
1997). These will be further discussed in Chapter 3. 
2.1.5 Effecting Transition: Transition Policies 
The above simplifications do not do justice to the continuing sharp debates on 
how to implement transition in practical contexts. One school of thought 
advocates broadly the elements of the so-called Washington consensus 
(Williamson, 1990), including the view that more rapid and earlier 
implementation is generally better (to varying degrees, with Sachs (1996) at 
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the extreme end). A second school of thought argues that transition can occur 
quickly, which will, however, cause more costly disruption than beneficial 
restructuring and therefore risk undermining the will to continue. Aghion and 
Blanchard (1994), Blanchard and Kremer (1997), and Roland and Verdier 
(1999) exemplify the theoretical work along these lines. Stiglitz (1999) - with 
whom the former do not necessarily agree- argues with hindsight, that 
excessive speed was indeed a problem in practice and that it explains the 
dramatic failures of privatization and the lack of recovery in many transition 
countries, including, for example, Russia. A third school of thought focusing 
on institutions argues, as does Murrell (1992), that stabilization and 
liberalization are needed but that they will not have the intended results if the 
institutions of market operations are inadequately developed. 
Policy Components 
Despite the apparent significance of the differences, it needs to be stressed 
that there was a wide consensus regarding the variety of policies which 
needed to be implemented. These key policies include: 
" Macroeconomic stabilization. 
" Liberalisation. 
" Privatisation and restructuring. 
" The creation and shaping of market institutions. 
It has been argued that the liberalization of trade, production and price is the 
prerequisite of a market system. However, the liberalisation of trade and 
prices will also turn the two chronic problems of socialism - monetary 
overhang and overstaffing - into unemployment and open inflation, and falling 
output will ensue. Therefore there exists a necessity for macroeconomic 
stabilization as a precondition for successfully starting the process of 
transition (Lipton and Sachs, 1990a; Berg and Sachs, 1992; Fischer and 
Gelb, 1991). 
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The necessity of enterprise reform, including the imposition of financial 
discipline, definitions and changes of ownership, and the reform of 
management, has also received considerable attention. Whereas private 
ownership has been regarded as the foundation of a market system, 
privatisation, especially the necessity for large-scale privatisation, is often 
taken for granted as synonymous with enterprise reform. However, a point of 
contention concerns the mechanisms involved. Privatisation is said to be able 
to eliminate government intervention, as well as to provide better incentives, 
thereby improving enterprise efficiency; moreover, politically, large-scale 
privatisation can give rise to the irreversibility of the reform (Boycko et al., 
1995; Dewatripont and Roland, 1992,1995). 
Institution-building, providing a framework for the efficient functioning of the 
market, has attracted attention recently (Havrylyshyn and van Rooden, 2000; 
Stone, Levy, and Paredes, 1996; North, 1997; Stiglitz, 1999). Institutional 
reforms include changing both the formal and informal rules that structure 
human interaction. However, institution-building, especially institution 
enforcement and the changing of informal institutions, is a gradual process 
(North, 1997), as the formal rules can be changed overnight, informal rules 
and the enforcement of new institutions evolve slowly. 
Despite the consensus on the elements of transition policy, the priority given 
to each element has varied among economists. For Lipton and Sachs 
(1990a), repressed inflation is a "fundamental factor in many of the deepest 
economic problems of the Eastern European economies" (Lipton and Sachs, 
1990a), including problems such as chronic shortage. Therefore, they 
suggested "the first step must be to end excess demand" by "a strong dose of 
macroeconomic austerity" (Lipton and Sachs, 1990a). Aslund (1991) and 
Balcerowicz (1994) are other authors who have attached a very high priority 
to macro-stabilization policies. 
For Fischer and Gelb (1991) "macroeconomic measures can help to reduce 
budget and trade deficits", but their results would be conditioned by the size of 
the market and the restructuring of microeconomic behaviour. Indeed, they 
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suggested that enterprise reform, which "requires the imposition of bottom-line 
discipline, definition and change of ownership, and reform of management", 
should instead be at the heart of the transition process. 
For Dewatripont and Roland (1997), transition is `a process of large scale 
institutional change', and "relates to the necessary large-scale institutional 
changes: the creation and development of markets", "the institution and 
enforcement of property rights" and "political changes". Therefore, institution- 
building should be given a high priority. 
Sequence of Transition: "Big Bang" vs. Gradualism 
More important policy disagreement emerged at least in the initial stage of 
transition in terms of how and when to implement these policies, the 
sequencing of transition. This debate is often put into the framework of `Big 
Bang' versus `gradualism'. The `Big Bang' strategy tries to implement all the 
policy elements simultaneously in `one stroke' (Kornai, 1990), while the 
`gradualist' strategy tries to achieve its objectives through a gradual `trial and 
error' process and the policy elements are implemented sequentially 
(Dewatripont and Roland, 1997). 
The Case for a "Big Bang" Strategy 
The `Big Bang' strategy was first proposed by Kornai (1990) in his book The 
Road to A Free Economy, and was characterized by its comprehensiveness 
and simultaneity. This strategy involves the rapid liberalisation of prices, and 
rapid privatisation of SOEs, together with the speedy elimination of the 
government's budget deficit. He and other advocates of this approach believe 
that in the transition from a central planning socialist system to a western-type 
market economy, these processes are highly interdependent, forming a so- 
called `seamless web' (Lipton and Sachs, 1990a) in which the necessary 
reform measures are conditional on each other (Kornai, 1990). Therefore, the 
transition needs both radical and comprehensive `shock therapy' in which all 
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elements constitutive to the market economy are introduced simultaneously 
(Lipton and Sachs, 1990a). 
The economic rationale behind this strategy is that structural reform could not 
work without a working price system. However, the price liberalization will 
transform the two problems of overstaffing and excess demand in a socialist 
economy into unemployment, falling output and open inflation. Therefore a 
working price system cannot be put in place without a tight macroeconomic 
policy ending excess demand and creating convertible currency; reciprocally, 
tight macroeconomic policy cannot be sustained unless prices are rational. A 
more subtle belief is that once the government has dealt with the essential 
issues and got out of the way, private markets would allocate resources 
efficiently and generate robust growth (Williamson, 1997). Accordingly, as has 
been suggested, a series of laissez-faire policies should be implemented "at 
one stroke" (Kornai, 1990). Politically, the advocates of `Big Bang' argued that 
early "windows of opportunity" or periods of "exceptional politics" should be 
exploited to push reforms through as fast as possible and to create 
irreversibility of reform (Balcerowicz, 1994). 
From the point of view of the Big-Bang strategists, gradual and partial reform 
was criticized as both `inconsistent and sluggish' as well as `ambiguous' 
(Kornai, 1990). Such an approach would disorganize the economy (Murphy et 
al., 1992), and it may even be impossible to implement given the likelihood of 
political frictions. For advocates of `Big Bang', the potential contributions of 
existing institutions are dismissed, and the over-riding strategic objective is to 
take decisive steps to ensure that existing structures and interests cannot 
derail reform (Murrell, 1993). 
In fact, the transition process in Central and Eastern Europe and Russia was 
to a large extent based on the above ideas, which formed the foundation of 
the so-called `Washington Consensus' (Williamson, 1997). The Big Bang 
packages usually consisted of macro-stabilization by tightening monetary and 
fiscal policies, rapid liberalisation of prices, trade and exchange rates, and 
mass privatisation (Lavigne, 1995; Lipton and Sachs, 1990a; Fischer and 
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Gelb, 1991). Realistically, however, it is impossible to implement all policies in 
one go, and hence the sequencing and the speed of transition were 
extensively discussed (Fischer and Gelb, 1991). A general consensus was 
reached on the point that stabilization coupled with liberalization should 
precede restructuring, and in order to make the transition credible, a quick 
move to privatisation and de-monopolization were also recommended 
(Fischer and Gelb, 1991; Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1995). 
Poland and Czechoslovakia were the first two countries to implement the `Big 
Bang' approach. Poland established its programme in January 1990. It 
consisted of macro-stabilization, price liberalization, trade liberalization, 
promotion of the private sector, and the mass privatisation of state owned 
enterprise (Lipton and Sachs, 1990a; Klaus, 1993). Czechoslovakia's "Big 
Bang" was launched in January 1991, and was considered the most radical 
and in many ways the yardstick of "shock therapy" (Klaus, 1992). Similar 
packages were later devised for other countries, for example with Russia 
implementing its `Big Bang' in 1992. 
The Case for a "Gradual" Strategy 
Reforms in China and Vietnam are gradual and experimental compared with 
their counterparts in CEE and FSU countries. The `Gradual' reforms were 
implemented while the Communist parties were still dominant. Here the goals 
of reform are achieved by a "dual-track system", in which the elements of a 
new system are developed side by side with the old unreformed system, and 
if things go well, reforming the old system in line with the positive 
developments emerging from the new components of the economy. It reduces 
central planning slowly rather than eliminating it completely, permitting the 
coexistence of the planning and market mechanisms, and a two-tier price 
system (Gao, 1993; Naughton, 1995; McMillan and Naughton, 1992). 
For gradualists, it is not only impractical to implement many necessary 
changes simultaneously but also highly undesirable. They argued that 
privatisation couldn't be achieved instantaneously, (here as we have seen, 
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even advocates of `Big Bang' acknowledge that it is impossible to privatise in 
this way (e. g. Kornai, 1990, Lipton and Sachs, 1990a)). Consequently, the 
whole fabric of the economy cannot be changed too much, as it is still the 
unreformed SOEs that respond to the liberalized prices and the macro 
stabilization policies, which could lead to further social welfare loss (Kornai, 
1992; Qian, 1994)3. In practice, therefore, the lag in enterprise reform 
represents the biggest `seam' in the so-called `seamless web'. Rapid 
liberalization will result in an inefficient rise in laid-off production factors, both 
of labour and capital, which cannot be moved instantly from old state owned 
firms to the new private sector (Aghion and Blanchard, 1994; Castanheira and 
Roland, 2000). Too-tight monetary and fiscal policies will reduce firms' 
demand for credit and decrease firms' investment at a time when human and 
physical capital improvements are necessary. 
Contrary to the idea that a gradual approach is costly, adherents argue that it 
is easier to initiate and allows for flexible experimentation, because it gives an 
additional option of early reversal at a lower cost. Additionally, a gradualist 
strategy may be a less costly way of overcoming the bias towards the status 
quo as it does not need to give up too much in rent, while a "Big Bang" may 
have to give away too much (Laffont and Qian, 1999)4. The strong 
complementarities however do not necessarily postpone and reverse the 
reform process, but may, on the contrary, give it an additional advantage by 
building constituencies for further reform (Dewatripont and Roland, 1992). 
Gradualists have also stressed that transition is a process of large-scale 
institutional change (Dewatripont and Roland, 1995). The creation and 
development of markets, the enforcement of property rights, and other related 
3 According to Qian (1994), shortage is an optimal mechanism to curb SBC in socialist 
economies. Therefore as shortage is eliminated due to price liberalisation and reduced 
governmental control, the SBC problem can become worse. 
4 Laffont and Qian (1999) argue that in order to make economic reform acceptable, people in 
power need to be bought out. However, compensation is limited by the lack of commitment 
and liquidity, which makes simultaneous reform in all sectors and regions not feasible 
politically because people in power cannot be compensated at the same time. 
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legal and political changes, are also very important aspects of economic 
transition within a gradualist framework. With limited institutional 
infrastructure, the new markets cannot emerge fully-fledged. However, 
institution-building, especially institution enforcement and the changing of 
informal institutions, is a gradual process as stressed by North (1997), Stiglitz 
(1999) and Kolodko (2000). 
This short discussion of the debate that has surrounded transition processes 
needs to be complemented by a discussion of economic performance in the 
economies involved. The focus in doing this is to draw out some stylised facts 
regarding the relationship between performance and the strategies involved, 
with particular reference to the comparative performance of `Big Bang' and 
more `gradualist' strategies. 
2.2 The Comparative Performance of Transition Economies 
There have been significant variations in transition performance; as we shall 
see, this is most evident when comparing three groups: China and Vietnam, 
the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEE), and those countries in 
the Former Soviet Union (FSU). In CEE and FSU, initial moves towards the 
market economy were greeted with euphoria and a degree of triumphalism. 
To some extent this was fuelled by the experience of structural adjustment 
encountered in distorted market economies elsewhere (for example in Bolivia, 
Israel, etc. ), leading some to believe that the process of building market- 
oriented economies would be both simple and short, and the consequent 
rising living standards and economic growth would be rapid and strong 
(Gaidar5 as quoted in Zagalsky (1994); Kornai6,1990; Shatalin Program7, 
5 Gaidar (as quoted in Zagalsky (1994)), who was First Deputy Chairman of the Council of 
Ministers of the Russian Federation for the Economic Reform and behind Russia's 'Big Bang', 
went even further promising that people would "feel the improvement" very soon, "almost next 
month". 
6 Kornai (1990) suggested that the reforms could be put in place in a year. 
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1990). As a result, transition was simply taken as a short-term policy issue, 
and was implemented in the belief that transition would deliver both sure and 
efficient gains (IMF et al. 8,1990; Kornai, 1990; Lipton and Sachs9,1992). 
Although the costs involving transition, such as a drop in GDP in the short 
term, were acknowledged (Lipton and Sachs, 1990a; Kornai, 1990), they were 
considered an affordable price to pay to achieve efficient market mechanisms. 
However, output declined rapidly in both CEE and FSU countries at the 
beginning of transition, and recovered sluggishly thereafter especially in FSU, 
which surprised both economists and policy makers. Moreover, a fully-fledged 
market economy was slow to emerge. Even 10 years after the transition, 
"almost everyone is surprised that its dismantling is not fast enough and that it 
actually takes time to replace it with a fully-fledged market economy" (Klaus, 
1999). As a result, even some of the most determined advocates of Big Bang 
have now acknowledged that the transition to a market economy is complex, 
painful, and cannot be done in one fell swoop (Yeltsin, 2000; Kornai, 2000). 
By contrast, the gradual reforms in China and Vietnam were greeted initially 
with doubts and pessimism. No economists, including some the currently 
devoted advocates of gradualism, anticipated that the partial and hesitant 
reforms initiated in the late 1970s would lead to significant economic growth - 
at least in the absence of some of the allegedly necessary conditions for 
economic growth. Indeed, some feared that partial reform could lead to a 
reduction in total output (Murphy et al., 1992). However, economic growth in 
both China and Vietnam has been substantial in the post-reform era, a fact in 
stark contrast to the experienced of CEE and FSU countries. Indeed, China's 
economic reform has been deemed the most successful, and China has 
The Shatalin program (1990) drawn up under Gorbachev, and upon which the later Russian 
transition package was based, envisaged the completion of the transition in 500 days. 
8 It was predicated that "the benefits of sustained economics are likely to be very great", 
output would start climbing "within two years or so", "the growth in productivity and output 
would likely exceed that of most mature market economies". 
9 Lipton and Sachs (1992) suggested that an enormous increase in average living standards 
would occur within "a few years". 
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already been referred to as a market economy (Gardner, 1998; Gregory and 
Stuart, 1999). In some perspectives, China and Vietnam are considered more 
advanced than the transition economies in CEE and FSU (Nuti, 1997). 
In order to compare performance in detail I propose to discuss a number of 
yardsticks. In the next section, I will first describe progress toward a market 
economy - using the objectives of transition as a yardstick. 
2.2.1 The Progress of Transition 
Table 2.5 gives a rough overview of the speed and sequencing of reforms in 
selected transition countries. It shows both differences and similarities in the 
transition strategies in various countries. An immediate impression derived 
from this table is that Vietnam has followed a Big Bang-style transition, and 
Hungary and Slovenia have followed a gradualist strategy. However, one 
fundamental aspect of the transition separates them: in China and Vietnam, 
the economic reforms have not brought about significant constitutional 
change, the transition in CEE and FSU has. Additionally, in Vietnam, by the 
time of rapid liberalisation the private sector already accounted for more than 
60% of GDP (Roland, 2000). 
As liberalisation is considered the prerequisite of a market system and will be 
conducive to the creation of a market system, I will present the progress of 
liberalisation. 
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Liberalisation 
Almost all the transition countries in CEE and FSU embraced the "Big Bang" 
style of liberalisation, although the process in Hungary and Slovenia was 
comparatively gradual. Prices were quickly liberalised (with the exception of a 
number of key prices), the institutions governing trade with the Soviet Bloc 
were abolished, and many countries opened up rapidly to international trade. 
However, the CEE and Baltic countries were more successful in promoting 
trade liberalisation than were CIS countries (See Figure 2.3), which shows the 
EBRD liberalisation index1o 
4.5 
4.0 
3.5 
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Price Liberalisation " Trade Liberalisation 
Source: EBRD (2001) 
In CEE and FSU countries, a big drop in trade-flows followed the liberalisation 
due to the dislocation of traditional domestic and international links and the 
collapse of regional trade (Rodrik, 1992; Lavigne, 1995). Between 1991 and 
10 EBRD constructs annual transition indicators covering enterprise, financial sector, legal, 
and market and trade reform. Individual indicators range from 1 to 4 +, with 1 representing 
little or no change from the previous regime and 4+ indicating the most progress in reforms 
as measured against the standards of industrial market economies. 
45 
Figure 2.3 Price and Trade Liberalisation 
Index In CEE and FSU By 2000 
1993, the CEE countries' exports to the rest of the world declined by 12%. For 
the same period, the FSU countries' exports to the world declined 37% and 
their imports from the rest of the world declined more than 60%. 
However, the volume of international trade began to accelerate in 1993. The 
EU has replaced the FSU as the major partner for all the CEE. As of 1994, 
some 70% of all exports of the Visegrad countries - the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic - were going to Western Europe. 
By 2000,74% of CEE countries' exports were going to Western Europe. The 
growth rate of exports to the EU was highest for the Czech and Slovak 
Republics, followed by Bulgaria and Poland. 
In China, dual track prices were first introduced in 1984, and had almost 
ended by 1993, with `plan track' accounting for only 5% of retail sales (Qian, 
1999). Policies for expanding foreign trade were first introduced in two 
provinces, then rolled out to the whole country. In Vietnam, complete price 
liberalisation was introduced in 1989, but trade liberalisation was introduced 
only gradually. In any event, exports have been a leading force in both China 
and Vietnam's growth. For example, China's foreign trade has grown from 
$20.64 billion in 1978 to $474.3 billion in 2000. China's exports in 2000 were 
$249 billion, which is 24.1 times higher than that in 1978 and ranks the 10th in 
the world. The ratio of the value of trade (import plus exports) to GDP 
increased from 17.2% in 1983 to 49% in 2000. Foreign trade in Vietnam has 
also been growing rapidly, rising from US$2.13 billion in 1983 to US$ 29.51 
billion in 2000, and the ratio of the value of trade to GDP increased from 
11.9% in 1983 to 109% in 2000. 
Macroeconomic Stabilization 
After liberalisation was introduced, nearly all the transition economies, 
including both China and Vietnam, experienced high inflation. However, the 
FSU economies fared the worst. All FSU countries experienced annual 
inflation of more than 1,000% in the year of maximum inflation. In the two 
countries worst affected - Armenia and Ukraine - the inflation rate reached 
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more than 10,000% in the year of maximum inflation. In CEE countries, 
inflation rates were lower. Even so, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic 
and Hungary were the only three countries in which annual inflation remained 
below three digit rates in the year of maximum inflation. 
Starting with Poland in 1990, stabilization packages had been put in place by 
1995 in all CEE and FSU countries except Turkmenistan. Such packages 
normally include both fiscal and monetary discipline imposed through 
increases in taxes and cuts in government spending, increases in interest 
rates, and the direct regulation of bank lending. By 1995, most of the CEE 
countries had brought down their inflation rate to less than 30%, but the 
inflation rates in most FSU countries were in still in three digits. By 2000, 
inflation rates had been brought down to single digits in all CEE countries 
except Romania, which was still 35% in 2000. In most FSU countries, inflation 
rates had been brought down to less than 30% by 2000 (all figures from 
EBRD, 2000). 
Compared with the CEE and FSU countries, inflation in China and Vietnam 
has been more moderate, although the initial hyperinflation in Vietnam has 
been similar to that in CEE and FSU. In China, inflation has never been more 
than 30% since 1978. The first serious increase in inflation occurred in 1980, 
when consumer prices rose by 7.5 percent. The second surge of inflation 
started in 1985, when the consumer price index (CPI) rose by 9.3%, and this 
surge of inflation peaked in 1988 and 1989, when the CPI rose by 18.8% and 
18% respectively. The period between 1993 and 1995 witnessed another 
surge of inflation, peaking in 1994 at 24%. 
In Vietnam, the monetary-reform plan introduced in late 1985 initiated 
unprecedented inflation, which increased from about 50% in late 
1985 to 
700% by September 1986. Through the imposition of state regulations and 
the reintroduction of price subsidies, inflation in Vietnam was brought 
down to 
two digits in 1989. By 1992, it was brought down to fewer than 20%, and to 
less than 5% in 1996. 
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Privatisation 
Remarkable differences also exist in the progress towards the privatisation of 
large and medium sized firms across countries. Table 2.6 shows the methods 
and the progress of the privatisation of large and medium sized firms in 
selected CEE and FSU countries. 
Estonia, Hungary and the Slovak Republic have progressed privatisation 
surprisingly effectively through direct sale of individual state owned enterprise 
to outsiders as their primary privatisation method; by 2000 up to 75% of 
former state owned enterprise assets had been privatised. Poland and 
Slovenia moved slowly in privatising state owned enterprises. However, they 
relied heavily on the creation of new private firms and the "commercialisation" 
of state owned enterprises: in the case of the latter, firms remained state 
owned but were run by independent appointed supervisory boards rather than 
directly by the state. Russia and Ukraine have opted for rapid mass 
privatisation through subsidized management employee buyout as their 
primary privatisation method. Czech Republic and Lithuania carried out equal 
access voucher privatisation1', which created a widely dispersed ownership 
(Lieberman, 1997; EBRD, 1997). The extent of privatisation that has taken 
place in transition countries is unprecedented. Nellis (1999) estimated that 
around 60,000 large size and medium size enterprises were privatised in the 
transition economies. 
" The idea of Czech republic's voucher privatisation came from Vaclav Klaus and the think 
tank he gathered into his federal Ministry of Finance in early 1990. As originally conceived, 
everything would be exchanged for vouchers in a single, rapid process. Voucher privatisation 
was included as a possibility in the government's conception of economic reform, debated 
and agreed in September 1990. Implementation took place over two 'waves' starting in 1992 
and completed at the end of 1994, disposing respectively of 12% and 5% of the country's total 
fixed assets. 
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By 1999, the private sector in most of the CEE and FSU countries already 
accounted for more than 50% of GDP. In some of the more advanced 
transition countries, such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, the share 
was even larger, at 70%. The development of private sector shares of GDP in 
selected transition countries is shown in Figure 2.4. 
Figure 2.4 Private Sector Shares of GDP in 
Selected CEE and FSU Countries 1990-2000 
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Source: EBRD (2001) 
The development of the non-state sector in China and Vietnam has been 
achieved by encouraging the entry of new non-state enterprises. For example, 
in China, the numbers of industrial enterprises have been increasing from 
about 3 million in 1980 to 7.34 million at the end of 1995. Most of these new 
entries are non-state firms. By 1998, China's private sector had produced 
32% of GDP, up from negligible levels in 1980, and the share of state sector 
in industrial output had declined from around 80% to less than 25% in 1998 
(all figures from the Chinese Statistical Yearbook). In Vietnam, the number of 
private registered enterprises increased from 770 in 1990 to nearly 26,000 in 
1997. In fact, by 1999 non-state sectors had accounted for 53% of industrial 
production. Recent statistics (Vietnam General Statistics Office) show that in 
year 2002, the number of non-state enterprises accounted for 47% of the 
total, and nearly 60% of the industrial production (Vietnam General Statistics 
Office). 
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Legal System Reform 
Legal system reform is another key element in the process of transition, yet 
the progress of transition countries in this respect is not identical either. The 
countries that have made the greatest progress in establishing a functioning 
legal framework are CEE and Baltic countries. No countries in CIS have 
succeeded in rapidly developing a legal system and institutions that would be 
highly conducive to the preservation of private property and to the functioning 
market economy (EBRD, 2001). Figure 2.5 shows two legal system reform 
indices devised by the EBRD since 1996 describing the extensiveness and 
effectiveness of the financial legal framework being developed. 
Figure 2.5 Legal System Reform Index In CEE 
and FSU by 2000 
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The EBRD's measure of the legal system's "extensiveness" attempts to 
measure how closely legal rules affecting investment follow international 
standards, and the "effectiveness" measure attempts to capture how 
commercial laws are being "enforced and administered. " The data is obtained 
from a survey of lawyers in the region. 
According to these indices there was significant difference between the 
countries: for example in terms of the legal effectiveness index, the best 
countries in Eastern Europe scored 4+, the laggards in Eastern Europe and 
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CIS CEE Baltics 
Russia scored 3, while Ukraine and much of the former Soviet Union scored 2 
or less. Moreover, for CIS countries, although international standard laws 
have been put in place, their effectiveness is still lagging far behind. 
In addition, despite the significant improvements in legal system reform that 
have been made, transition countries are still lagging behind in combating 
corruption (see Fig 2.6). 
Figure 2.6 Transparency International Corruption 
Perception Index 2002 
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Source: Transparency International 
Transition Index 
In order to compare the transition progress in different countries more 
comprehensively, we have constructed an annual liberalisation index for each 
country based on a methodology put forward in De Melo et al (1996) and data 
from Transition Report (various years). The liberalisation index is the weighted 
average (with weights12 of 0.3,0.3,0.4 proposed by De Melo et al. (1996)) of 
0 to 1 rankings of liberalisation in the following three areas: 
12 The weights used in aggregating the components of the index are notional estimates of the 
relative impact of price liberalization, trade liberalization and the changing ownership of fixed 
assets. 
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" Price liberalisation, 
" Trade and Foreign Exchange Liberalisation 
" Privatisation (privatisation of large and small scale enterprises, and 
banking reform) 
As the corresponding data are unavailable for Asian Transition countries, the 
liberalisation index is calculated for only CEE and FSU countries. Figure 2.7 
below shows the progress of transition: 
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Figure 2.7 Cumulative Transition Index 
(1989-2000) 
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Sources: EBRD and Own Calculation 
It appears that the Transition countries in CEE and the Baltic States have 
achieved a higher level of liberalisation than have the CIS countries; however, 
the pace of transition in CEE is not faster than that in CIS although they 
started with relatively favourable initial conditions. Meanwhile, although the 
Baltic States started with similar initial conditions to those in CIS, they quickly 
caught up with CEE countries; by 1994 they had already achieved the same 
liberalisation level as that in CEE. 
At the level of the individual economy, the CEE countries have shown a 
continuous increase in liberalisation as shown in Figure 2.8. By 2000, 
Hungary had achieved the highest liberalisation level, followed by Poland, 
Slovenia, and Czech Republic. Albania achieved the lowest score within CEE. 
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The path of liberalisation in CIS countries has been more diverse however. 
Most of the countries in CIS have showed continuous progress in the level of 
liberalisation. Yet Russia from 1997, as well as Belarus from 1995, and 
Uzbekistan from 1996, began to reverse their liberalisation processes. 
Figure 2.8 Cumulative Transition Index in Selected 
Transition Countries (1989-2000) 
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China is already being referred to as a market economy (Gardner, 1998; 
Gregory and Stuart, 1999). Indeed from some perspectives, both China and 
Vietnam are considered more advanced than the transition economies in CEE 
and FSU. Nuti (1997) observed that "both countries (China and Vietnam) have 
gone further than a reformed Soviet-Type economy" and that China "may be 
ahead of even some transition economies" at least in terms of market 
competition and the building of financial institutions (as quoted in Kolodko 
(2000)). 
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2.2.2 Macroeconomic Performance 
The Evolution of GDP 
After having reviewed the differences in the progress of transition across 
countries, it is useful to look at the difference in terms of macroeconomic 
performance. There are three patterns of GDP performance. 
Both China and Vietnam have experienced a continuous, smooth and strong 
growth after liberalisation (See Figure 2.9). For example, during the period of 
1978 to 1999, China's average annual GDP growth rate was 9.7%, which is 
much higher than the growth rates of most countries in the world during the 
same period. Over the same period, the GDP per capita in China grew by 
8.3% annually. GDP growth in Vietnam has been significant as well, 
averaging 7% annually since 1987. 
Figure 2.9 GDP Growth in China and Vietnam 
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By contrast, a larger than expected initial sharp decline in output immediately 
followed the transition in both CEE countries and FSU countries, especially 
the latter (See Fig 2.10). The magnitude and the duration of the transition 
recession were comparable to that of developed countries during the Great 
Depression, and for most of them it was much worse (Roland, 2000; Boettke 
55 
and Leeson, 2003). Compared with their GDP levels in 1989, GDP declined 
by around 18% in Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic, 25% in Slovak 
Republic, 26% in Romania, and 27% in Bulgaria. The worst GDP decline in 
CEE occurred in Albania, 40% compared with 1989. The output decline was 
far steeper in the FSU countries. All the FSU countries, except Estonia and 
Uzbekistan, declined by more than 45% in GDP after liberalisation. The two 
largest economies among FSU countries, Russia and Ukraine, declined by 
47% and 63% respectively before they began to show signs of recovery, and 
the worst GDP decline (75%) occurred in Georgia. 
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Figure 2.10 GDP Growth in Transition Economies 
(1989=100) 
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However, while the output decline in CEE was followed by a fast recovery, the 
output decline in FSU countries has proved both lengthy and stuttering (see 
Table 2.10). All the CEE countries started to recover after 3-4 years of 
recession; by the year 2000, all the CEE countries except Romania and 
Bulgaria had surpassed their GDP levels of 1989. The best example among 
CEE countries is Poland, whose recession lasted only 2 years, and its 
recovery has been strong and steady. By 2000 Polish GDP was 28% higher 
than its GDP level in 1989. In contrast, the recovery in FSU countries has 
been sluggish. Most of them have experienced at least 5 years of recession. It 
was only in 1996 or 1997 that recovery began to occur in this area. By 2000, 
all the FSU countries except Uzbekistan were still a long way from recovering 
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their 1989 GDP levels, with Russian and Ukrainian levels at just 2/3 and 40% 
of their 1989 figures. More detailed information is contained in Table 2.7. 
Table 2.7 Evolution of GDP in CEE and FSU Countries 
Years of Output Did GDP Average Annual Rate of GDP Real GDP in 
Output Decline (%) fall after Growth 2000 
Decline some 1990- 1994- 1998- 1990- (1989=100) 
growth 1993 1997 20 00 2000 
China and Vietnam 
China No No No 10.1 10.4 7.6 9.5 271.6 
Vietnam No No No 6.7 8.9 5.3 7.1 213.3 
CEE 
Albania 3 40.0 Yes 7.5 4.6 9.2 1.4 103.0 
Bulgaria 4 27.0 Yes -5.2 -3.7 3.2 -2.7 69.3 
Croatia 4 37.0 No -8.8 3.6 2.9 -1.4 79.5 
Czech Republic 3 17.5 Yes -4.4 4.4 1.5 0.4 102.5 
Hungary 4 18.0 No -4.0 2.4 4.6 0.7 103.0 
Poland 2 17.8 No -0.2 6.3 4.5 3.8 127.8 
Romania 3 26.4 Yes -5.2 2.3 -0.7 -1.4 80.4 
Slovak Republic 4 24.6 No -6.7 6.2 2.4 0.4 103.1 
Slovenia 3 17.2 No -2.8 3.6 4.6 1.7 112.2 
FSU 
Armenia 4 67.0 No -22.7 3.5 4.8 -7.2 43.8 
Azerbaijan 6 62.0 No -12.3 -6.4 8.7 -5.3 51.0 
Belarus 6 37.5 No -4.7 -2.9 3.5 -2.0 78.8 
Georgia 5 74.7 No -24.4 2.8 4.7 -8.3 36.7 
Kazakhstan 6 47.3 No -8.3 -4.7 5.2 -3.8 67.5 
Kyrgyzstan 5 49.0 No -10.3 -3.2 4.9 -4.2 68.0 
Moldova 8 65.7 Yes -12.9 -12.0 -0.2 -10.2 33.8 
Russia 7 47.0 Yes -9.2 -3.8 5.7 -3.7 67.4 
Tajikistan 7 61.0 No -12.5 -8.8 5.6 -7.1 47.0 
Turkmenistan 8 57.0 No -5.1 -14.2 15.4 -3.8 66.0 
Ukraine 8 63.0 No -10.1 -12.4 2.2 -8.5 39.5 
Uzbekistan 4 14.8 No -3.7 -0.8 3.6 -0.8 96.6 
Estonia 5 34.5 No -8.8 4.0 3.4 -1.3 86.3 
Latvia 4 52.0 Yes -16.2 3.9 4.3 -4.2 63.6 
Lithuania 5 62.0 No -18.2 0.3 1.3 -7.3 44.7 
Output Decline durin g the Great Depression 1930-1934 
France 3 11 N/a. 
Germany 3 16 N/a. 
United kingdom 2 6 N/a. 
United States 4 27 N/a. 
Sources: EBRD, China Statistical Yearbook, and ADB 
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The Evolution of Industrial Output 
Given the strategic bias irk the former socialist economies towards industry, it 
is interesting to note the impact of reform on industrial output. Output in the 
manufacturing and other industrial sectors of the transition countries has 
shown an even greater diversity among transition countries. In CEE and FSU 
countries, while activity declined in nearly all sectors after liberalisation, the 
decline in industrial production was much larger than that of aggregate output, 
followed in turn by a weaker recovery. 
Figure 2.11 Gross Industrial Output (1990=100) 
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In Poland, industrial gross output declined 30%; in Hungary, it declined 26%; 
in Czech Republic and Slovenia, the figures are 35% and 33% respectively. 
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Figure 2.12 Gross Industrial Output Growth In 
CEE (1989=100) 
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The FSU countries have seen an even larger decline in industrial output. 
Gross industrial output declined 55% in Russia, 51% in Ukraine, and the 
declines lasted 9 years for both of them. 
Figure 2.13 Gross Industrial Output Growth 
in Selected CIS Countries (1990=100) 
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Although the declines in industrial output are steeper, the recovery that 
followed has also been weaker, a pattern not normally observed following 
recession in advanced capitalist economies. By 2000, in CEE countries, only 
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Poland and Hungary had recovered their industrial gross output level of 1989, 
Bulgaria and Romania were still at around only 40% of their 1989 level of 
industrial output, and in Russia and Ukraine, the levels of industrial gross 
output were still 47% and 43% respectively below their 1989 levels. 
As a result of the faster decline and weaker recovery in industrial output, in 
most CEE and FSU countries the share of industrial output in GDP had fallen 
to less than a third. This indicates an important aspect of transition: 
reallocation, as the centrally planned economies had too large a 
manufacturing sector, and too small a service sector. Therefore part of the 
adjustment took the form of reallocating activities from manufacturing to the 
service sector. Boeri (1996) showed the degree of resource reallocation by 
constructing the "Lilien index"13, a measure first introduced by Lilien (1982) to 
estimate the extent of structural change by calculating the standard deviation 
of annual rates of change in employment across sectors for each year. 
According to his calculation, the Lilien index since the beginning of transition 
has been 20.9% for Czech republic, 14.2% for Slovak Republic, 20.3% for 
Poland, and 9% for Poland. 
In sharp contrast to the above experience, in both China and Vietnam 
industrial output (as illustrated in Figure 2.14) has been growing at an even 
faster rate than that of GDP. 
13 The "Lilien index" (Lilien, 1982) is constructed according to the following formula: 
_ [ý 
X (0logxi, -AlogX, )-]/2 
where .\i, 
is the number of employees of industry i at time t; and 
Xt is its equivalence of whole industries. Lilien computes this measure as 
a proxy for the size of sectoral shocks and investigates 
its relationship to the unemployment rates. 
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Figure 2.14 Industrial Value Added Index in China 
and Vietnam (1989=100) 
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Over the past 20 years, China's industrial output14 has been growing at an 
average growth rate of 11.6%. However, this does not mean an increasing 
share of the industrial sector; in fact the share of the industrial sector in GDP 
has been relatively stable. In Vietnam, industrial output has been growing at 
an average growth rate of 9.6% for the period between 1985 and 2000, and 
its share of GDP has been relatively stable as well until 1997. However, this 
stability disguises a significant reallocation process within the industrial sector. 
In order to capture this reallocation effect, we constructed a Lilien Index for 
the Chinese economy. From 1978 to 1999, the Lilien index for China was 
32.7% (deconstructing the economy into 16 sectors), which is rather 
significant even when compared with advanced transition countries, such as 
Poland and Czech Republic. 
Unemployment 
The transition has also brought about significant unemployment in transition 
countries. This is true even in China and Vietnam, a phenomenon unknown 
14 Industrial value added 
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before the transition. As shown in Figure 2.15, unemployment rates rose most 
rapidly in CEE and the Baltic States. 
Figure 2.15 Unemployment Rate In Transition 
Countries (%), 1990-2000 
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Within two years of the beginning of transition, the unemployment rate rose to 
double digits in most of the CEE countries. By 1993, for example, the 
unemployment rate in Bulgaria and Poland reached 16%, 14% in Hungary 
and Slovakia, 10% in Romania and 9% in Slovenia. The highest 
unemployment rate occurred in Albania (24%), and the lowest unemployment 
rate occurred in Czech Republic (3.5%). The rise of unemployment rates 
reflected high rates of inflow into unemployment as firms laid off workers, and 
the relatively low outflow rates from unemployment. 
In the FSU countries, unemployment rates rose more slowly compared with 
the CEE countries, as firms were slower to lay off workers and used wage 
reductions and payment in arrears as devices to hold onto workers (Svejnar, 
2002). By 1993, none of the FSU countries had more than 10% 
unemployment rate with the exception of Azerbaijan. The unemployment rate 
was 6% in Russia, and 0.6% in Ukraine. 
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Over time, the patterns of unemployment in CEE have shown variation. The 
Czech Republic's unemployment rate had gradually increased to 9.9% by 
1999. All the other CEE countries managed to reduce their unemployment 
during the period 1994 to 1998, yet in the period since 1998 the 
unemployment rate has bounced back. The Slovak Republic, Romania and 
Bulgaria have even reached their highest unemployment rates of the whole 
transition period. 
At the same time, all the FSU countries experienced increases in 
unemployment as their transition proceeded. By 1998, the unemployment rate 
was 13.3% in Russia, 3.7% in Ukraine, and 9.9% in Estonia. This trend may 
have begun to reverse since 1999 in some countries, at least in Russia, 
where the unemployment rate was reduced to 9.7% by 2000 from its peak of 
13.3% in 1998. Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have seen significant increases 
in unemployment after 1993. 
Rather than experiencing declines in employment, employment in China and 
Vietnam was increasing up until the mid-1990s. However, since then, 
unemployment has begun to rise. In the case of China, employment has been 
increasing from 398.6 million in 1978 to 705.9 million in 1999. A decline in 
employment has occurred in the manufacturing sector only since 1995 due to 
the restructuring of SOEs; however, the unemployment rate has been 
moderately stable at around 3%. 
Living standards and Quality of Life 
Another key indicator of performance outcomes in transition economies is that 
of measuring living standards. In CEE and FSU countries, the transition has 
witnessed declines in such measures. For example, the number of people 
living in extreme poverty has increased sharply. In 1998, one in every 20 
people in CEE and FSU countries had an income below US $1a day, up 
from less than one in 60 a decade earlier (World Bank, 2000). Even in the 
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most successful country, Poland, poverty rates15 were still higher in 1998 than 
in 1991 (EBRD, 2000; World Bank, 2000). 
Poverty increased not just because of falls in output, but also because of 
greater inequality in the distribution of income. The increase in inequality has 
been more modest in the CEE countries (World Bank, 2000). Figure 2.16 
shows the increase in inequality in transition countries. In Hungary, the Gini 
coefficient rose from 0.21 in 1987 to 0.25 a decade later. In Poland, it 
increased from 0.28 in 1987 to 0.33. In FSU countries, the increases have 
been extremely significant. In Russia, the Gini coefficient increased from 0.26 
in 1987 to 0.47 in 1998. In Armenia, it increased from 0.28 to 0.61 in the same 
period (World Bank, 2000). 
Figure 2.16 Increase In Inequality: Small In Central 
Europe, Larger in FSU Countries 
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Another phenomenon in CEE and FSU countries is the decrease in life 
expectancy. This is clearly the case in Russia and Ukraine where life 
15 Poverty is defined as the population living on less than US$1 per person a day. 
64 
expectancy decreased from around 70 years in 1989 to 67 years in 1997, and 
to some extent the case in Romania and Bulgaria. 
Once again, China and Vietnam offer a contrast. The economic reforms in 
both China and Vietnam have greatly improved people's living standards. In 
1980, two years into China's reform, per capita income in rural and urban 
households increased 39% and 27% respectively (see Fig 2.17). In 1988, ten 
years into the reform, per capita income in rural households had tripled, and 
the figure for urban households had nearly doubled. By 1998, per capita 
income in rural household had been quadrupled, and per capita income in 
urban household had more than tripled (Chinese Statistical Yearbook). In 
Vietnam, Per Capita GDP has increased from $123 in 1990 to $400 in 2000 
(ADB Database). 
Figure 2.17 Rural and Urban Household Per Capita 
Income In China (1978=100) 
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Source: Chinese Statistical Yearbook 
The increased income significantly reduced the number of people living in 
poverty. According to Chinese official statistics, the number of persons living 
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below the national poverty line16 in China was reduced from 250 million at the 
start of its reform process in 1978, to 80 million by the end of 1993, and to 
29.27 million by 2001 (Chinese Statistics Yearbook). 
China's market-oriented reforms also saw substantial improvements in other 
indicators of human development, such as the adult literacy rate and the 
infant mortality rate. However, China's economic reform has also significantly 
increased inequality in the distribution of income. The Gini index for 
household income has increased from 36% during the period 1987-89, to 42% 
for the period 1993-97 (Chinese Statistics Yearbook). 
In Vietnam, the population living in poverty has also been reduced 
substantially during the past two decades. According to World Bank statistics, 
the percentage of people living below the poverty line fell from over 70% in 
1985 to 10% in 2000. 
2.3 Understanding Comparative Performance in Transition 
The different transition strategies and the consequent differing economic 
performance have, of course, sparked enormous interest from both 
economists and policy makers. The search for explanations has concentrated 
on three fundamental questions: How to explain the sharp output fall in 
CEE and FSU countries, how to account for the different recovery 
performance within CEE and FSU countries, and why China is different. 
Indeed, Blanchard (1997) has suggested that the problem of explaining 
convincingly the difference in terms of transition strategy and transition 
performance between CEE countries, FSU countries and China has become 
one of the challenges facing those studying transition economies. In this 
16 The present poverty line in China was set in 1986, which took into account the basic need 
for existence and our social capability to provide assistance. It is measured in terms of 
income. If in a household, the annual income level is below RMB$206 per capita (measured 
in the price level of the year 1985) or RMB$625 per capita (measured in the price level of the 
year 1999), then it will be considered as being below the poverty line. 
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section, we will briefly review various explanations of the three questions 
above. 
2.3.1 Liberalisation and Output Fall 
The extent of the sharp and rapid decline in output after the inception of 
transition in CEE and FSU came as a surprise to both academic researchers 
and policy makers (EBRD, 1999), and triggered the search for an explanation 
of the output collapse. Initial studies of the output fall were conducted in the 
framework of neo-classical economics, and focused mainly on the role of 
exogenous shocks on aggregate demand and supply. However, more recent 
research has been conducted within the framework of property rights theory 
and new institutional economics. 
Macroeconomic Explanations of Output Fall 
In the early literature, macroeconomic explanations are focused primarily on 
four demand- side mechanisms: 
Firstly, it has been suggested that, as price liberalisation turned the repressed 
inflation typical of a `shortage economy' into `open inflation', the process 
soaked up the unspent purchasing power (or so-called `monetary overhang" 
(Nove, 1993)). The resultant declines in the real value of purchasing power 
consequently led to a demand-side explanation of the output decline. Yet, 
there is evidence that the rate of increase in prices was strongly correlated 
with the rate of change in the monetary supply, whereas the rate of change in 
output was not (Koen and Marrese, 1995; Popov, 2000; Aslund et al., 1996). 
This suggests that high inflation was largely of monetary origin and was 
caused mostly by demand-pull factors rather than cost-push factors. 
Secondly, it has been argued that the `excess stabilisation' in combating 
hyper-inflation further held back aggregate demand, as government 
purchases of arms, energy and housing as well as government 
investment 
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were all generally reduced (Rosati, 1994; Berg and Blanchard, 1994). The 
contraction in aggregate demand carried over into a contraction in supply, as 
the lack of investment induced a shift in the aggregate supply curve (Kolodko, 
2000; Berg and Sachs, 1992). A problem with this view is that the initial output 
falls were not correlated with the initial macroeconomic stabilization (e. g., 
Allsopp and Kierzkowski, 1997). For example, the output fall was as large in 
Hungary and the Czech Republic, which had only moderate initial inflation, as 
that in Poland which had been experiencing hyperinflation, and it is difficult to 
say that Russia experienced excess stabilization in 1992, the year of its 
biggest output fall (Roland, 2000). Moreover, from the experience of Western 
economies, stabilization policies leading to depreciation or low real interest 
rates are thought to increase output beyond its equilibrium (Blanchard, 1997). 
Thirdly, the collapse of the CMEA together with the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union and Former Yugoslavia are suggested as exogenous demand shocks, 
leading to the collapse of the many formal and informal bilateral agreements, 
and increasing trade barriers between former members (Blanchard, 1997), 
which have consequently caused a big drop in demand because of the 
dislocation of traditional- domestic and international links and the collapse of 
regional trade (Rodrik, 1992; Djankov and Freund, 2000). Notably, however, 
the output fall in Poland in particular came before the collapse of CMEA. 
Fourthly, the deflationary overdose, or excessive contraction in aggregate 
demand, aimed at removing hidden inflation was the major cause of the 
excessive recession, and "the failure in government management of the state 
sector" should be blamed (Kolodko, 1993,2000). While the first three 
explanations all see the disruption of economy "in part the inevitable price of, 
and in part a condition for" transition which might be welfare enhancing (e. g. 
Gomulka, 1991), the fourth explanation tends to see the recessions as 
excessive and avoidable rather than a normal price exacted by 
macroeconomic mismanagement (Portes, 1993; Kolodko, 2000). 
The demand side by itself clearly cannot provide a satisfactory explanation. 
Indeed, the experience of developing and developed countries shows that 
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stabilization policies in themselves do not necessarily lead to sharp output 
falls (e. g., in Israel), and may in some cases lead to increases in output 
(Kiguel and Liviatan, 1992). 
On the aggregate supply side, there is no shortage of explanations either. 
Here, explanations have been based on the most conventional approach to 
transformational recession, such as the collapse of investment, the reduction 
of employment, the decline in TFP, and the slow pace of sectoral reallocation 
(De Broeck and Koen, 2000; Berkowitz et al., 1997). Yet, they cannot provide 
convincing explanations without serious microeconomic underpinnings 
relating to the institutional context of transition (Roland and Verdier, 1999). 
The most obvious aggregate supply side explanation is the collapse of factor 
inputs. It is argued that the decline in output reflected the reductions in 
employment and investment (De Broeck and Koen, 2000), which was 
amplified by a downward shift in the production function due to the lack of 
corporate governance (Bofinger, 1993; Stiglitz, 1999). 
As the command economy was characterized by an artificially-created 
employment shortage (Kornai, 1992), it is therefore argued that the removal of 
this high excess employment leads to an inevitable drop in natural output and 
employment together with a reduction in real wages (Bofinger, 1993). 
However, the reduction in employment was also supposed to improve 
economic efficiency, which would be conducive to economic growth, and in 
the case of former Soviet Union countries, the degree of reduction in 
employment has been moderate. 
From the perspective of investment, as the socialist economies were 
characterised by their extensive growth nature, it is argued that putting in 
place the stabilization policy and strengthening financial disciplines eliminated 
firms' subsidies and contracted the aggregate investment, which consequently 
led to the decline in output (Winiecki, 1990). Moreover, the investment 
collapse had additional negative effects, as it made worse the obsolescence 
of capital stock due to the absence of replacement investment (Akopian, 
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1992). However, Wolf (1999), Havrylyshyn et al. (1998), and Campos and 
Coricelli (2002) all conclude that investment has not been a significant 
determinant of growth. Furthermore, investment was supposed to increase, at 
least from foreign investors, as former socialist economies committed to a 
market economy, and the elimination of subsidies was supposed to harden 
budget constraints, and consequently improve efficiency. 
The structural adjustment following price liberalisation is another supply-side 
explanation for the output decline in transition. It is argued that transition 
economies inherited from the centrally planned economy structural distortions 
such as high militarization, over-industrialization, underdevelopment of the 
service sector, etc. Price liberalisation led to the change in relative prices, 
energy prices increased as a result, which, coupled with the overly tight 
credits, did not allow firms to pay for their inputs and forced them to contract 
supply. The change in relative prices also necessitated structural adjustment, 
which requires a transition period to allow the factors to be allocated to their 
most efficient uses. During this period, the process of structural change is 
supposed to associate with output decline, as the decline of products in less 
demand cannot be offset by the increase of supply in greater demand due to 
the presence of significant adjustment cost and uncertainty (Popov, 2000). 
However, such sectoral shifts take place in other economies, and do not 
necessarily lead to such steep output declines. Moreover, evidence did not 
show a strong sectoral shift taking place directly after liberalisation (Finglton et 
al., 1996), which was supposed to be quick and welfare-enhancing. 
It has also been argued that the collapse of the CMEA and the USSR came 
as a shock to the aggregate supply, as this collapse destroyed the institutional 
and technological links of the Soviet centrally planned system, and disrupted 
the supply of inputs for production, which led to the decline in output. Yet 
again, Poland's output decline occurred before the breakup of CMEA. 
Micro-foundations of Output Fall 
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As neither aggregate demand nor aggregate supply can provide a satisfying 
explanation, it is important to have micro-foundations for such a fall. Four 
possible micro explanations have been identified; these will be discussed in 
turn. 
Transformational Recession 
Gomulka (1992) and Kornai (1994) have provided explanations of the output 
fall as being related to price liberalisation. The basic idea is that by moving the 
sellers' market towards the buyers' market, price liberalisation would lead to 
changes in relative prices, which in turn would lead to the change in economic 
structure and the eventual elimination of the shortage. While the supply of 
goods in greater demand usually cannot be increased easily, because it takes 
time, the supply of the goods in less demand is reduced quickly (Gomulka, 
1992; and Kornai, 1994). This produces an overall fall in output immediately. 
The output fall reduces incomes and may have a further reducing effect on 
output. This process was termed by Kornai `transformational recession' 
(Kornai, 1994). 
If this were the case, one would expect a decline in shrinking sectors, and at 
best no growth in sectors experiencing rising prices. However, as pointed out 
by Rosati (1994), the sharp drop in output usually occurred in all economic 
sectors rather than simply in the sectors producing goods in less demand, and 
was steeper than had been expected. 
Credit Crunch 
The second micro explanation is the `credit crunch' hypothesis put forward by 
Calvo and Coricelli (1992). It held that as stabilisation policies were put in 
place and high real interest rates were imposed on enterprises, in conjunction 
with a hardening of budget constraints, enterprises significantly reduced their 
demand for credit which was urgently needed to accommodate necessary 
enterprise restructuring and resource reallocation, thereby reducing their 
output levels (Calvo and Coricelli, 1992). Indeed, evidence shows that 
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following the monetary contraction, the amounts of real credit and the explicit 
subsidies to enterprises drastically declined in many transition economies 
(Poznanski, 1993,1995; Thompson, 2000). 
Even though this explanation seems to be important, it cannot be the whole 
story. As it has been noted, in response to the decline in bank credits, inter- 
enterprise barters, enterprises trading with one another without the use of 
money, and inter-enterprise arrears, have been rising simultaneously 
(Schaffer, 1998; EBRD, 1997; Carlin et al., 2000). Bartering and arrears help 
to maintain production by creating a deal-specific collateral that softens the 
liquidity squeeze (Marin et al., 2000). The chains of inter-enterprise arrears 
thus created tend to reduce the credibility of a no-bailout policy and to soften 
the budget constraints (Perotti, 1998). Furthermore, evidence shows that state 
banks have been unable to limit credit supplies to financially defunct state 
owned enterprises (Coricelli and Rocha, 1991). 
Monopoly Behaviour after Liberalisation 
Another explanation for the output fall is based on monopoly behaviour by 
enterprises after liberalisation. After the dismantling of central planning and 
centralised organisation of production, monopolistic and vertically 
interdependent enterprises in the chain of production begin to pursue their 
own monopoly profits by either passing on price increases to the buyers of 
their outputs or by restricting output and inter-firm trade to increase their 
monopoly to the detriment of the economy as a whole (Li, 1999; Samonis and 
Hunyadi, 1993; Blanchard, 1997). This would cause output to fall, as each 
enterprise in the chain would face an upward shift in its marginal cost curve. 
This partly explains the rise of inflation and the sharp decline in output. The 
problem with the monopoly argument is twofold. Firstly, the fall in output is 
associated with unwanted outputs, making it hard to believe that the cause is 
restricted production. Secondly, the assumption of monopoly power is 
debatable. Whilst it is valid that production links were tightly organized, this 
does not necessarily mean that potential competition was absent, especially 
foreign competition. 
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Disorganisation 
The most interesting explanation for the output fall is related to the 
disorganising effect of liberalisation on existing production links (Blanchard 
and Kremer, 1997; Roland and Verdier, 1999). 
As the pre-transition economies were organised around a central plan rather 
than around markets, and production in the state sector was organized 
around bilateral relations between state firms, firms quite often had only one 
supplier (Blanchard, 1997; Qian et al., 1999), and had little information about 
alternative suppliers (Ickes and Ryterman, 1995). This highly specialised 
production and trading pattern has been extended to all the Eastern European 
and Former Soviet countries through CMEA (Bevan et al., 2001). While the 
collapse of communism destroyed the co-ordinating central planning system, 
however, market co-ordination did not follow immediately and automatically 
(Brada, 1995). In fact, there is a `no-man's land', where bureaucratic co- 
ordination no longer applies and market co-ordination does not yet apply 
(Kornai, 1994). 
The elimination of the central planning system forced enterprises to bargain 
directly with other enterprises, with little or no expectation that the links would 
be long term. Due to incomplete contracts and asymmetric information, there 
is bargaining inefficiency (Blanchard and Kremer, 1997). When the bargain is 
not successful, they have to search for new partners. The problem of search 
friction and investment specificity will also lead to disruption of output 
following liberalisation (Roland and Verdier, 1999), as relation-specific 
investments can only take place after a new long-term partner is found. 
Therefore, aggregate output will fall because of the failure of enterprises to 
replace obsolete capital with a consequent fall in investment demand. 
These two models are interesting to the extent that they do not assume that 
markets already exist at the time of liberalisation or that they are created 
instantaneously. However, bargaining inefficiencies, search friction and 
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investment specificity are not peculiar to transition economies. Actually, what 
both these models take for granted - the removal of the central planner as co- 
ordinator of these bilateral relationship between firms - is the most 
fundamental problem that makes bargaining inefficiency, search friction and 
investment specificity more serious during transition. The speedy removal of 
state control leads to the vacuum in economic organisation necessary for the 
co-ordination of a high level of division of labour (Yang, 1997). However, the 
concept of `disorganisation' in this sense has not been modelled. 
2.3.2 Explanations of the Recovery and Growth Difference in CEE and 
FSU 
While theoretical explanations have been suggested to account for the output 
fall, a large empirical literature on the impact of the pace of reform on 
economic performance has been generated, including works by Aslund, 
Boone and Johnson (1996), Berg et al. (1999), de Melo, Denizer, and Gelb 
(1996), Selowsky and Martin (1997), Fischer, Sahay and Vegh (1996), 
Fischer and Sahay (2000), and Wolf (1999). These studies focus mainly on 
the effect of four sets of factors, primarily the first two sets of variables, (i) 
differences in initial macroeconomic conditions; (ii) the policies followed in the 
field of stabilization, liberalization and privatisation; (iii) the availability of 
external finance; and (iv) exogenous shocks (such as the breakdown of the 
central planning system, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, wars and civil 
strife) (World Bank, 2002; Fischer and Sahay, 2000; Berg et al., 1999). 
One approach to the econometric evaluation of the source of differences in 
economic performance has been spurred by the construction of the 
cumulative liberalization index (described above) by De Melo et al. (1996), 
and the subsequent transition progress indicators published by the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Perhaps the most 
comprehensive study of this kind is the one by Berg et al. (1999). Firstly, most 
of the growth models tested in previous papers are nested in their 
specifications; second, dynamic effects of the explanatory variables are 
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explicitly introduced; finally, the authors allow for differential effects of the 
independent variables on public and private sector output. Using several 
specifications and a general to specific econometric approach, Berg et al. 
(1999) deconstruct the relative contributions to growth of initial conditions, 
structural reforms and macroeconomic variables. They find that "the driving 
forces behind the recovery are overwhelmingly structural reforms", which they 
define as price liberalisation, trade liberalisation, and the development of 
private sector. "The macroeconomic stabilization helps, but its quantitative 
impact appears relatively small" (Berg et al., 1999). They also claimed that the 
larger initial output decline in FSU is mainly explained by slower structural 
reforms and much less by more adverse initial conditions. What they find 
strongly supports a radical approach to reforms, the faster the better, even in 
the face of adverse initial conditions. 
However, these attempts to link differences in output performance to the 
cumulative liberalization index and to macro stabilization are not without their 
critics, and the results are not always convincing. Firstly, there are the 
potential problems of omitted variables, especially those reflecting geography. 
One study shows that dummies, reflecting such factors as membership in the 
Rouble zone and war destruction, are much more important explanatory 
variables than either the liberalisation index or inflation (Aslund, Boone and 
Johnson, 1996). Secondly, studies that explicitly take into account the effects 
of initial macroeconomic conditions found that initial conditions "go far in 
accounting for performance" (Fischer and Sahay, 2000). 
There are also problems in using the cumulative liberalization index (CLI) 
when examining hypotheses of the relationship between the speed of reform 
and growth. Firstly, the use of CLI glosses over the distinction between policy 
and policy changes. The liberalisation measures do not reflect changes in the 
policy stance, but rather the state of policy (Heybey and Murrell, 1999). 
Hence, countries like Slovenia and Hungary, which started reforms in the 
1950s and 1960s, had high levels of the three liberalization indices in 1989, 
even though post-socialist reforms in these two countries have not been 
particularly speedy. Secondly, the CLI cumulates the liberalization measures 
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over time, from 1989 onwards, introducing a further problem in trying to 
discern the effects of the speed of reform. While communism fell in some 
countries in 1989, it lasted until 1991 in others. Since communist regimes 
severely limited the scope of economic reforms, one group of countries (those 
formerly in the USSR) would have a lower score on the CLI in 1995 simply 
because they were captives of communism until 1991. This makes the CLI a 
proxy for many other factors, such as being a former republic of the USSR or 
having had a less hard-line communist regime in the 1980s. Since these 
factors are plausibly related to growth performance, but none of these factors 
reflects the speed of reforms, the CLI will reflect much more than the influence 
of speed. Indeed, empirically Selowsky and Martin (1997) suggested that 
performance depends positively on the accumulated stock of reform, but 
negatively on the speed of liberalization. De Melo et al. (1997) found similar 
results. While this suggests that the level of (cumulative) liberalisation is 
beneficial, it is the cost of adjustment which is positively related to the speed 
of liberalisation, indicating that the cost of transition can be reduced by 
adopting a slower pace of liberalisation, because under such a scenario the 
transition cost can be spread over time. 
Problems with the endogeneity of reform variables have also undermined the 
robustness of these results. Berg et al. (1999), for example, consider the 
reform variables as exogenous variables. Yet, reform policy choices result 
from politically constrained processes affected by economic variables and are 
not exogenous decisions. Heybey and Murrell (1999) argue that the 
liberalization index is endogenous to economic performance, and to growth in 
particular. Actually, both Wolf (1999) and De Melo et al. (1997) conclude that 
reforms are affected by initial conditions. Taking the speed of transition as an 
endogenous variable, Heybey and Murrell (1999) find that initial conditions are 
much more important than policy changes in determining growth performance 
in the first four years of transition, and that growth affects the speed of reform 
rather than the opposite. 
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2.3.3 Why Is China Different? 
As we have seen, China's growth poses an interesting contrast to CEE and 
FSU countries. The Chinese path of reform and its associated rapid growth is 
puzzling because it seems to defy much of the conventional wisdom about 
transition. For most of the past two decades, China's reform succeeded 
without complete liberalization, without mass privatisation, and without 
democratisation (Chow, 1997). Is China an example of the argument that 
gradual reform is superior to shock therapy? Or are there other fundamental 
differences that make the Chinese example irrelevant to the CEE and FSU 
cases? What lessons can be learned from China? Broadly speaking, two 
schools of thoughts have emerged to explain the Chinese experience: the 
Gradualist school, and the Big Bang school. Generally, both schools see 
China's market reforms as unleashing the rapid growth since 1978. 
The gradualist school gives great credit to the evolutionary, experimental, and 
incremental nature of China's reforms (for example, Laffont and Qian, 1999; 
Nolan, 1994; Rawski, 1994; Dewatripont and Roland, 1992,1995,1997; Lau 
et al., 1997), where the typical features of gradualism apply. In addition to the 
advantage of a gradualist strategy, it has also been claimed that China's 
fragmented planning system has helped China's growth. It is suggested that 
the emphasis on local self-sufficiency before transition has led to an economic 
structure with low regional specialization, and large numbers of small and 
medium sized firms, which resemble the M-form structure (Qian et al., 1999; 
Qian and Xu, 1993). This heterogeneous planning and output structure have 
made possible decentralization along regional lines rather than along 
functional lines, and have encouraged a decentralized, experimental 
approach to reform (Qian et al., 1999), and to some degree have avoided the 
disorganisation that has occurred in other transition countries (Blanchard, 
1997). This has also assisted in opening up the economy to international 
trade, making it possible to introduce international trade to some contained 
and experimental areas at the initial stage. 
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Furthermore, the decentralisation of government has allowed for forms of 
competition between local government, which have been facilitated by the M- 
form structure (Maskin et al., 2000). This in turn has helped to accelerate the 
reform process, as local government competes to experiment with new reform 
initiatives. Fiscal competition, to attract foreign and private capital, can help to 
harden the budget constraints for local government, in the absence of 
privatisation, and to provide further incentives for local government to develop 
local economies (Qian, Roland and Xu, 1999; Qian and Weingast, 1997). This 
argument predicts that SOEs under the supervision of lower-level government 
would face better incentives than would SOEs supervised by central 
government. 
In addition to decentralised government, the gradualist school has also 
emphasized the role played by a strong state in enhancing the market- 
preserving mechanisms and promoting economic growth. As Murphy et al. 
(1992) pointed out, there exists a tendency for `input diversion' from plan track 
to market track in gradual and partial transition; in order for the dual-track to 
work, the state must be able to enforce the original plan and to make the 
economic agents honour their obligations under the plan. They attribute 
China's success to the central government's ability to enforce the state 
quotas. In order to preserve market incentives, a strong state is also needed. 
By analysing both China and Russia as federations, Blanchard and Shleifer 
(2000) argue that the reason why local government in China has contributed 
to the growth of new firms, and the local government in Russia on the other 
hand has hindered growth, lies in the different degrees of political 
centralization in China and Russia. They argue that transition in China has 
taken place under the tight control of the Communist Party. Therefore, central 
government is in a strong position to reward and punish local administrations, 
reducing the risk of local capture and the scope of competition for rent. In 
contrast, transition in Russia has come with the emergence of a partly 
dysfunctional democracy. The central government has been neither strong 
enough to imposes its views, nor to set clear rules about the sharing of the 
proceeds of growth. They conclude that the helpful role played by federalism 
in promoting China's economic growth lies in the centralizing role of central 
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government, and that Russian federalism fails because of political 
decentralization. 
The Big Bang school holds that China's successes are in line with the 
performance of other East Asian economies, which are based on a strategy of 
the rapid export growth of labour-intensive manufactures (see for example 
Sachs and Woo, 2000). They argued that the rapid growth was the result of a 
favourable economic structure at the commencement of reform, and that it 
occurs in spite of gradualist reform. This school puts great emphasis on 
China's unique initial conditions-- namely, a large agricultural labour force, low 
subsidies to the population -- as a major explanation of rapid growth, and 
believes that China's experience is not transferable to CEE and FSU 
countries (Woo 1994; Sachs and Woo 1994; Sachs and Woo, 2000; World 
Bank, 2002). 
The idea of this school is summarised in the World Bank (2001)'s Transition: 
The First Ten Years: 
"Despite the industrialization efforts of the 1950s and 1960s, China started its 
reform as a very poor and largely rural economy, with far greater scope for 
reallocating labour and larger room to catch up with advanced economies 
than Russia. Agriculture employed 71% of the work force and was heavily 
taxed to support industry (Lin et al., 1996; World Bank, 2000). Social safety 
nets extended only to the state sector-about 20% of the population. In 1990, 
only 13% of Russian labour force worked in agricultural sector, and around 
90% were employed in the state sector. " 
"Because the agricultural sector had been so heavily repressed in China, 
freeing it up had immediate payoffs. Between 1981 and 1984 agriculture grew 
on average by 10% a year, largely due to the shift to household responsibility. 
The increases in productivity in agricultural sector freed surplus labour, which 
allowed for the reallocation of surplus agricultural labour to new rural 
industries, which generated 100 million new jobs between 1978 and 1994. 
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Higher income from higher agricultural production provided a market for 
goods and services produced by rural industry. " 
However, neither the gradualist school nor the Big Bang school can fully 
explain China's experience. One such example is that the gradualist school is 
weak in explaining the poor performance of SOEs in terms of profitability, and 
the Big Bang school has underestimated the effect of gradual reform in 
avoiding disorganisation. Additionally, as firms are the real entities in the 
market - responding to market signals and reform policies - whether it is 
because of favourable initial conditions and a good development strategy or a 
gradualist strategy, they all need micro-foundations as well. However neither 
school has actually dealt with how firms respond to market mechanisms, how 
firms' activities foster the development of the market, and how market 
competition disciplines firms' behaviour, a dynamic process underlying 
China's economic reform. 
2.4 Conclusion: Enterprise Is Central 
In this chapter, we discussed firstly the concept of transition, and have shown 
that problems with the socialist system, such as low efficiency and low 
technology progress, shortage and monetary overhang, generally arise from 
the government and enterprise relationship under central planning, summed 
up in Kornai's term "soft budget constraint". Secondly, we have evaluated the 
progress and performance of transition, in which we have demonstrated that 
in the progress of transition, three groups of countries, namely China and 
Vietnam, CEE, and FSU, have displayed significant differences in both 
transition strategy and transition performance. Finally, explanations for such 
differences have been surveyed. We conclude from the above discussion 
that whether it be the example of China or that of European transition 
economies, the biggest flaw of the Big Bang approach is probably its 
negligence of the micro-foundations of transition, and we suggest that 
enterprises and their interaction with the market and the state should be 
central to the study of transition economies. In the next chapter, in light of the 
conclusions above, I will discuss in detail Chinese economic reform from the 
perspective of company level experiences. 
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Chapter 3 China's State Owned Enterprise Reform: 
Decentralisation, Competition, and Enterprise 
Performance 
As we have discussed in Chapter 2, the macroeconomic perspective does not 
provide a sufficient explanation for the puzzles associated with China's significant 
economic growth. In order to resolve these puzzles, we have to turn to the 
microeconomic perspective and look into the reform of China's State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs). SOEs had been the focal point of China's economic reform 
and the backbone of China's economy. Even by 1999, they still employed 58.9% 
of workers in urban areas, utilized 53.4% of national investment, and produced 
about 30% of national industrial output. It follows that successful SOE reform is 
not only the key to the success of the whole of economic reform but it is also vital 
to the building up of a market economy and the long-term development of the 
Chinese economy (CCPC, 1984,1999; Rawski, 2000). 
In this chapter, I depict SOE reform as a dynamic process of promoting market 
competition, decentralising the state and the SOE relationship, and choosing 
reform policies. This chapter is divided into 4 sections. In section 1, the theory 
relating to firms and the theoretical framework of corporate governance are 
reviewed. In section 2, the dynamic process of decentralisation, competition, and 
policy choice, which drives forward China's SOE reform, is explained; Section 3 
reviews the literature on enterprise performance and enterprise reform in the 
Chinese context; Section 4 concludes the chapter. A case study is also 
presented in the Appendix to illustrate SOE reform in a typical Chinese SOE. 
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3.1 Theory relating to Firms and the Theoretical Framework of 
Corporate Governance 
3.1.1 A Review of Theory relating to Firms 
3.1.1.1 Neoclassical theory of Firms 
Neoclassical theory views the firm as a set of feasible production plans. An 
owner-manager presides over this production set, buying and selling inputs and 
outputs in markets and choosing the plan that maximizes owners' welfare. 
Welfare is represented by profit or expected net present value of future profit 
when there is uncertainty. In fact, the neoclassical theory of the firm is the theory 
of production decision-making given the existence of the firm. The `invisible hand' 
of the price system coordinates production and exchange. 
However, neoclassical theory does not explain why the firm exists, what its 
boundaries are, how production is organized within a firm, how conflicts of 
interest between a firm's various constituencies - its owners, managers, workers, 
and consumers - are resolved, and how the goal of profit-maximization is 
achieved. It is from these aspects that economists have challenged the 
neoclassical theory of the firm. All these challenges can be categorized into three 
groups: (1) the contractual approach to the firm; (2) the entrepreneurial approach 
to the firm; (3) the managerial approach to the firm. These approaches transform 
the study of a firm's performance into a study of the internal structure of the firm 
resulting from different institutional arrangements. 
3.1.1.2 The Contractual Approach to The Firm 
Coase (1937) first suggested the contractual approach to the theory of the firm. 
Since then, Alchian and Demestz (1972), Williamson (1975,1985), Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), Cheung (1983), Grossman and Hart (1986), Holmstrom and 
Tirole (1989), Hart and Moore (1990) and Yang and Ng (1993) have contributed 
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to the contractual approach to the theory of the firm. The principal idea of this 
approach is that the firm is a "nexus of contracts" (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
However, the contract cannot be complete due to the existence of transaction 
costs (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990). Therefore, property 
rights are important, as the distribution of property rights will affect economic 
efficiency in the presence of transaction costs (Coase, 1960). Grossman and 
Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) distinguish between residual claim rights 
and residual control rights. They defined ownership as the purchase of these 
residual rights, and proved that under an incomplete contract, an efficient 
ownership allocation should require that the party whose behaviour is more 
difficult to observe and more important for the investment decision should 
purchase the residual rights. Alchian and Demestz (1972) also introduce 
transaction costs to the study of firms' internal structure. According to them, firms 
are primarily teams, and the inseparability of "team production" raises the 
problem of `shirking' in a firm. In order to reduce shirking, some members of the 
team can specialize as monitors to check the input performance of team 
members, yet in order to make monitoring efficient, monitors must be made 
residual claimants. Similar to Alchian and Demsetz (1972), Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) considered the `agency cost' as the decisive factor in a firm's ownership of 
property rights. Agency cost originates from the fact that managers are not the 
owners of the firm. 
3.1.1.3 The Entrepreneurial Approach to the Firm 
Although the contractual approach to the firm is more familiar to modern 
economists, it is the entrepreneurial approach that challenges the neoclassical 
theory of firm the most. For neoclassical economists, the firm is a production 
function; in contract theory, the firm is a nexus of contracts, but in the 
entrepreneurial approach, the firm is regarded as a personalized mechanism. 
Knight (1921) looked at the firm's existence from the perspectives of uncertainty 
and entrepreneurship. He pointed out that, under uncertainty, the primary 
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problem or function of a production activity is to decide what to do and how to do 
it. This primary function is entrepreneurship. For Knight (1921), the firm is a risk- 
sharing device through which the entrepreneur is rewarded for taking on all the 
risks while the workers are paid a fixed wage. 
Kirzner, Schumpeter, Shackle and Casson, etc., have also made major 
contributions to the theory of entrepreneurship. Kirzner (1979) consider the 
entrepreneur as a `middle-man', who not only perceives opportunities but also 
captures opportunities and makes profit. Their perception of opportunities and 
their special knowledge distinguish them from others. Schumpeter (1943) 
regards entrepreneurs as innovators, who can reform and innovate methods of 
production. Shackle's (1979) entrepreneur possesses remarkable imagination 
while making decisions. Casson (1982) extends and generalizes these views of 
the entrepreneur. He defines the entrepreneur as a person who is good at 
making rational decisions regarding the coordination and utilization of scarce 
resources, and who is a creator of markets. 
3.1.1.4 The Managerial Approach to the Firm 
The managerial approach to the firm can be traced back to the hypothesis of "the 
separation of ownership and control" proposed by Berle and Means (1932). The 
hypothesis asserts that as the ownership of shareholding companies is widely 
distributed, the control of companies is in fact in the hands of managers, whose 
interests are normally different from those of owners (Baumol, 1959; Marris, 
1964; Williamson, 1964). Baumol (1959), Marris (1964) and Williamson (1964) 
represent the three best-known theories modelling the managerial approach to 
the firm. They all keep the basic hypothesis of Berle and Means that managers' 
objectives are different from those of shareholders. However, Baumol argues that 
the objective of managers is to maximize revenue subject to a minimal profit 
target. Marris (1964) argues that the objective of managers is to maximize firms' 
growth subject to the minimal share value. Williamson (1964) suggests that 
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managers maximize utility subject to minimal profit. Typically, managers have 
information advantage over owners, which makes difficult the monitoring of 
managers' behaviour and it makes possible the encroachment upon owners' 
interest by managers under the separation of ownership and control (Vickers and 
Yarrow, 1988; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
3.1.2 The Theoretical Framework of Corporate Governance 
Corporate Governance provides a unifying concept associated with the problem 
of principal and agency problems which arise due to the separation of ownership 
and control (Hart, 1995; Mayer, 1996; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). It mainly 
concerns methods of aligning the interests of different participants and ensuring 
that firms are operated to increase the wealth of investors (Mayer, 1996). It can 
therefore be regarded as a dynamic interaction mechanism among shareholders, 
management, the board of directors, and other stakeholders such as 
government, regulators etc., in order to determine corporations' direction, 
performance, and allocation of returns (Monks and Minow, 1995). Although 
corporate governance is most frequently associated with large public companies, 
corporate governance is an issue even in small firms (Hart, 1995). In order to 
make managers' behaviour compatible with that of shareholders, there must exist 
checks and balances on managerial behaviour. A major part of corporate 
governance focuses on the design of such checks and balances (Hart, 1995). 
The issue of corporate governance has been an important one in advanced 
Western economies; it is certainly even more important in transition economies 
where the initial situation was one of state control and where adopting adequate 
corporate governance is likely to have an impact on the overall economic 
performance of these countries. Indeed, paying no attention to corporate 
governance in transition packages and a lack of proper corporate governance 
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after mass privatisation loom large as reasons for the poor performance of the 
corporate sector in Eastern European and Former Soviet Union countries 
(Stiglitz, 1999; Roland, 2000; Boycko et al., 19951 
Hart (1995) argues that the most common approaches to corporate governance 
mechanisms are the following: firstly, the board of directors. Shareholders elect 
the board to act on their behalf, and the board in turn monitors top management 
and ratifies major decisions. Secondly, proxy fights. A dissident shareholder can 
put up candidates against incumbent managers, and tries to persuade other 
shareholders to vote for his/her candidates. Thirdly, major shareholders. Major 
shareholders have the incentive to collect information and monitor management, 
and to reduce the agency cost and the problem of free riders. Yet, major 
shareholders can take advantage of their power to improve their own interests at 
the expense of minor shareholders; therefore good corporate governance also 
involves the legal protection of minority shareholders against majority 
shareholders. Fourthly, hostile takeover. In a hostile takeover, a bidder who 
identifies an under-performing company makes an offer of tender to the 
dispersed shareholders of the target firm, and takes control of the target firm if 
the shareholders accept the offer. Fifthly, corporate financial structure, 
especially the choice of debt. As management have to commit to repay the debt, 
they will not be distracted from investors' interest too much. Yet, the discipline of 
debt must be backed up by an appropriate bankruptcy procedure. 
All of the above mechanisms are useful internal checks and balances; however, 
their efficiency and effectiveness rely on the existence of appropriate legal 
protection for investors and upon competitive markets. The legal protection of 
1 Boycko et al. (1995) showed that in Russia, the weakness of corporate governance 
mechanisms leads to the substantial diversion of assets by managers of many privatised firms, 
and the virtual non-existence of external capital supply to firms. 
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investors is the prerequisite for investors to exercise their voting rights, and 
competitive and transparent markets make it possible for shareholders to 
exercise their voting rights (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
While legal protection of investors gives investors rights to vote on important 
corporate issues such as mergers and liquidations, and helps guard against 
exploitation by managers, competitive product markets and factor markets 
complement firms' internal governance structure by providing simple and 
effective information for investors in order to monitor managerial behaviour. A 
competitive product market, together with the threat of entry, provides sufficient 
benchmark information - profitability - for owners to monitor managers' behaviour 
(Hart, 1983). In a competitive managerial market, the concern for a future career 
induces efficient managerial behaviours (Fama, 1980; Holmstrom, 1999). The 
existence of the threat of `takeover' in the capital market also acts as an incentive 
mechanism that deters management from the pursuit of policies that are 
substantially at variance with the interests of shareholders (Vickers and Yarrow, 
1988; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Grossman and Hart, 1980). Financial markets 
link managers' rewards to the firm's performance and provide managers with an 
incentive to boost productivity (McMillan, 1997). 
In practice, there are two typical models of corporate governance: the bank- 
dominated German-Japan model and the shareholders'-oriented Anglo-American 
model. While the Anglo-American model relies on liquid and transparent capital 
markets, with ease of exit and lively takeover activities, the German-Japanese 
model relies heavily on major shareholders through bank ownership and 
corporation cross shareholding, with minimal takeover activities. 
3.1.3 Inconclusive Debates: State Ownership, Privatisation and 
Competition 
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While state ownership was regarded as the foundation stone of a socialist 
economy, state ownership in western economies is viewed as an instrument for 
government to overcome market failure by implementing price controls that takes 
into account the social marginal cost (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980; Shapiro and 
Willig, 1990). Half a century ago, government ownership of firms was favored by 
economists "when any market inequities or imperfections were even suspected" 
(Shleifer, 1998); state ownership in the last 20 years, however, has been 
considered less efficient than its private counterparts (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988). 
The advantages of private ownership over state ownership are believed to stem 
from a variety of reasons. Firstly, state owned firms have objectives other than 
maximising profit. For example, government may seek to maintain employment, 
to keep prices low, and to maximize social welfare rather than profits (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1994; Yarrow and Vickers, 1988). Moreover, government objectives 
may be inconsistent from one administration to the next. The inability of 
government to commit to a credible policy can reduce firms' efficiency (Vickers 
and Yarrow, 1988; Kornai, 1980). Secondly, managers do not have sufficient 
incentives, as it is difficult to assess the enterprise's performance and to tie 
managers' incentive to the returns from their decisions due to multiple objectives. 
Thirdly, there are no markets for corporate control and no hard financial 
constraints such as bankruptcy, liquidation, and the threat of takeover, etc., 
(Vickers and Yarrow, 1988; Laffont and Tirole, 1993). Finally, government can 
intervene in state owned firms' operation (Yarrow and Vickers, 1988; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1994). 
Privatisation, being broadly defined as the deliberate sale of state ownership by a 
government to private economic agents, has consequently become a legitimate 
tool in more than 100 countries since its introduction in Britain in the 1980s 
(Megginson and Netter, 2001). It is believed that privatisation will alter and 
strengthen incentive mechanisms by changing ownership from state to private, 
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and introducing the profit maximization objective into privatised enterprises. It will 
also sever the relation between government and firms, reducing government's 
involvement in firm activities, introducing hard financial budget constraints, and 
making enterprises themselves bear the commercial risks (Vickers and Yarrow, 
1988; Megginson and Netter, 2001; Shleifer, 1998). Thus, privatisation will 
eventually improve enterprise performance (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988,1991). 
However there is no conclusive empirical evidence demonstrating that 
privatisation will necessarily lead to better enterprise performance in advanced 
economies. While most literature suggests that private ownership is more 
effective than public ownership in competitive markets (Boardman and Vining, 
1989; Kikeri, Nellis, and Shirley, 1992; La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes, 1999; for 
a general review see Megginson et al. (2001) and Shleifer (1998)), other studies 
get mixed or ambiguous results (Martin and Parker, 1997; Bishop and Kay, 1989; 
Newbery and Pollitt, 1997; Kole and Mulherin, 1997), which have cast doubt 
upon the efficiency of private ownership especially in monopoly markets (Vickers 
and Yarrow, 1988). In fact, Laffont and Tirole (1993), in their book, remarked that 
" the empirical literature on the relative efficiency of the two ownership structures 
is itself currently inconclusive". Furthermore, competition and deregulation are 
argued to be more important than privatization and governance changes in 
improving firms' performance (Yarrow, 1986; Kay and Thompson, 1986; Bishop 
and Kay, 1989; Vickers and Yarrow, 1991). 
As in Western market economies, the relative efficacy of privatisation and 
competition has also been widely debated in transition economies. However, the 
empirical evidence suggesting that privatised firms perform better than state 
owned enterprises is even more ambiguous. For example, Pohl et al., (1997), 
based on data from more than 6,000 industrial firms in seven CEE countries, 
show that productivity growth in privatised firms was three to five times higher 
than that in state firms between 1992 and 1995 for which they have data. Yet, the 
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endogeneity of privatisation methods undermines the result, with arguably the 
best firms singled out first for privatisation. Frydman et al. (1999), based on a 
panel of over 200 privatised and state firms in the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland, found that not all privatised firms perform better than state firms, "the 
post-privatisation performance of companies controlled by certain types of 
owners is not significantly different from state firms" along any performance 
measurement they employed. Carlin et al., (2001), based on a survey of 3,300 
firms in 25 transition countries, recently found that there is no significant 
relationship between a firm's ownership type and its performance among firms 
established during the socialist era in terms of growth in sales, although state 
owned firms have engaged in significantly less development of new products. 
Bevan et al., (2001) has found in the context of Russia that ownership and 
performance are not well correlated. In particular, there is no strong evidence 
that outsider ownership leads to better performance or higher levels of 
restructuring activity than insider ownership, which they indicate is due to market 
imperfections and governance deficiencies. A more extreme case was in 
Mongolia, where Anderson et al., (2000) find that wholly private firms are 30% to 
70% less efficient than completely state owned firms. 
While the effect of ownership upon firm performance is inconclusive, the positive 
impact of product market competition on enterprise performance improvement 
has been largely established. For example, Djankov and Murrell (2002), using 
Meta-Analysis, pool 17 studies reporting the positive impact of competition on 
performance. Whereas for the non-CIS, both domestic and foreign competition is 
effective, for the CIS countries, only domestic competition is significant. Carlin et 
al., (2001), Angelucci et al., (2001) and Grosfeld and Tressel (2002) find that the 
effects of competitive pressure vary depending on the ownership type of the firm 
and the presence of soft budget constraints. Hong and McMillan (1996) and Pinto 
et al., (1993) provide evidence that even without privatisation, state owned 
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enterprises begin to restructure due to increased competition and improved 
financial incentives. 
3.2 The Dynamic Process of SOE Reform: Decentralization, 
Competition and Policy Choice 
3.2.1 SOEs: Logic and Problems 
China's SOEs may be regarded as the endogenous product of the heavy industry 
development strategy (Lin et al., 1996). In order to build capital-intensive industry 
in a country of low economic development and high capital scarcity, a central 
planning system was required to maintain the artificially repressed price of inputs 
and to guarantee the resources flow to favoured industries. This required that the 
private enterprises were nationalised to a great extent, so that state owned 
enterprises became the dominant forces in China's economy (Lin et al., 1996). 
Before 1978, around 80%2of the SOE investments in capital construction were 
financed by the state budget. By 1978, SOEs accounted for around 80% of 
gross industrial output. Although the development of such a system might be 
inefficient at that time (Lin et al., 1996)3, it did provide the foundation for the rapid 
economic growth since reform (Nolan and Wang, 1999)4. 
By definition, SOEs were owned by the Chinese people, but their management 
was delegated to governments and managers at various levels. Therefore, there 
2 Other than specified, data on China are all from China Statistical Yearbooks (various years) 
3 Lin et al. (1996) argued that the heavy industry development strategy was not compatible with 
the resource advantage at that time, abundant labour force and scarce capital. For example in 
1957, the profit capital ratio in light industry was 1.7 times higher than that in heavy industry. In 
1980, this figure in light industry is 2.1 times higher than that in heavy industry. 
° They claim, "large scale upstream industry and downstream industry are the Siamese twins of 
China's industry revolution" (Nolan and Wang, 1999). 
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existed a "separation of ownership and control". Moreover, managerial 
mechanisms for the state enterprise were very hierarchical, ranging from the top- 
level bureaucracy down to lower level bureaucracy, managers, and finally 
workers. This further extended the principle agent chain and made the monitoring 
more difficult and the collusion of agents possible (Tirole, 1986; Zhang, 1995). 
As external governance mechanisms, competitive product markets, competitive 
managerial markets, and competitive capital markets, were absent in China 
under central planning, the price signals were distorted and the cost of 
monitoring managers' behaviour was high. In order to constrain the high agency 
problem, tight political control became the only option. Moreover, to make 
managers' and workers' interests compatible with the heavy industries 
development strategy, managerial autonomy was scarcely warranted (Lin et al., 
1996; Zhang, 1997). SOEs worked only as subsidiaries of government, 
implementing production and investment plans. The state carried out direct 
management of SOEs by appointing managers of SOEs, fixing product prices, 
giving detailed administration targets and centrally allocating resources (Gao and 
Yang, 1999). Although superficially SOEs were defined as independent units of 
accountability, profits and losses in SOEs were not necessarily linked to 
enterprise performance. Moreover, the losses they incurred would always be 
covered by the state. Hence, their budgets were soft. They were administrated 
along both functional and regional lines (Qian and Xu, 1993; Qian et al., 1999; 
Gao and Yang, 1999). Each SOE was subordinated to one of the four levels of 
government: central, provincial, prefecture and county, and each SOE was also 
directly or indirectly subordinated to a central ministry department. 
The effects of the SOE system in place were well known as lifetime employment 
(iron rice bowl) with no risk of being laid off for workers and no risk of being 
punished for managers, and egalitarian income (big pan meal) no matter how 
well or badly you worked, which consequently resulted in low efficiency in SOEs 
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(Perkins, 1988; Lin et al., 1997; Gao and Yang, 1999). Two indicators of SOEs' 
low efficiency were high cost and large inventory. Compared with South Korea, 
the energy consumption per dollar of gross industrial output in China in 1980 was 
twice as high, and the iron and steel consumption was 21.3% higher (World 
Bank, 1985). 
In addition, as the economy developed, central planning became more and more 
complex. The number of SOEs subordinated to central government increased 
from 2,800 in 1953 to 10,533 in 1965, and the number of commodities subjected 
to central planning increased from 132 in 1958 to 579 in 1965 (Qian, 1999), with 
many more being subordinated to the control of local government. Hence the 
strength and effectiveness of central administration weakened (Zhang, 1995). 
Consequently the intrinsic deficiencies of SOEs, such as soft budget constraints 
and a lack of innovation, came to the fore. One indicator of these problems is the 
low capital utilization rate. In the early 1980s, the share of current capital to total 
capital in China was 32.7%, which was 45% higher than that of Japan in 1950s, 
and 1.6 times higher than that of the U. K in the 1970s (Lin et al., 1996). 
The growth in industry at that time was achieved mainly through the large 
amount of material input rather than technological progress. Between 1957 and 
1978, inputs in SOEs increased by 6.7 fold, yet gross output in SOEs increased 
by only 3.9 fold. The growth of labour productivity was far below that of gross 
industrial output, and TFP growth was estimated to contribute less than 10% of 
industrial output growth between 1958 and 1976 (World Bank, 1985; Chen et al., 
1988). 
3.2.2 The Dynamic Process of SOE Reform: Decentralisation, Competition, 
and Policy Choice 
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At the beginning of the reform, tight political control and the consequent lack of 
managerial and worker incentives were considered responsible for low efficiency 
in SOEs5 (CCPC, 1978). An early target of SOE reform, therefore, was to 
separate the state from enterprise management, and to make SOEs become 
"independent and energetic productive and managerial units" (Xue, 1979). 
Hence, the reform of SOEs, being considered central to the entire reform, has 
been focusing on separating the state from SOEs' management by delegating 
managerial autonomy to SOEs and allowing SOEs to share profits with the state 
(CCPC, 1982,1987; Wu and Reynolds, 1988). 
At the same time, non-state owned enterprises were encouraged initially to fill the 
market niches left by central planning and to work as a `beneficial 
complementary' to SOEs (McMillan and Naughton, 1992; CCPC, 1982,1987); 
the former have become unexpectedly the `leading engine of China's economic 
growth (IMF, 1997). The entry of non-state firms, which was fervently promoted 
by the decentralised local governments, creates competition and drives market 
development, leading to a decline in state control and monopoly. 
Figure 3.1 shows the remarkable progress made in the non-state sector. For the 
20-year period, the share of gross industrial output by non-state enterprises has 
increased from slightly more than 20% in 1978 to more than 70% in 1999, the 
share by SOEs in contrast has declined from nearly 80% in 1978 to less than 
30% in 1999. Notably, it is since 1993 that the non-state sector has begun to 
overtake SOEs. 
5 It was acknowledged in the summary report of the third plenary of 11th CCPC that over- 
concentration of political control was the most serious problem in China (CCPC, 1978) 
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Figure 3.1 SOE and Non-SOE Share of Gross Industrial 
Output (%), 1978-1999 
The delegation of managerial autonomy and profit sharing rights to SOEs, and 
the emergence of market track, on the one hand provided SOEs with incentives 
to improve productivity. On the other hand, it may have also released the agency 
problem that the old central planning system had managed to restrain, providing 
SOEs with incentives to defect from planning and compete with the state for the 
share of profits (Murphy et al., 1992). This will eventually lead to the decline in 
the share of state revenue and the encroachment upon state interests by SOEs. 
Figure 3.2 shows the share of state revenue in GDP. It is clear from this figure 
that the share of state revenue from SOEs has been declining from around 27% 
in 1978 to less than 10% in 1995, while the share of state revenue from non-state 
sectors has been stable. 
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Figure 3.2 State Revenue as a Percentage of GDP 
(%), 1978-1995 
35 
30 
25 
20 
15 
10 
5 
0- -i-i I 
In order to sustain the power of the state, the state has to ensure the stability of 
financial revenue. This implies enforcing hard budget constraints upon SOEs on 
the one hand and encouraging the entry of non-state enterprises on the other to 
increase the tax base. 
SOEs, facing increasing competitive pressures from both SOE counterparts and 
non-state owned enterprises, the relative price changes, and hard budget 
constraints, consequently reduced the profitability level (Naughton, 1991; 
McMillan and Naughton, 1992; Rawski, 1996). Figure 3.3 shows SOE profitability 
for the period between 1978 and 1996. Between 1978 and 1996, the before-tax 
profit asset ratio had declined from 25% in 1978 to 6.5% in 1996. It is worthwhile 
to note that the before-tax profit asset ratio has been lower than the interest rate 
since 1993. 
  SOEs Q Non-SOEs 
96 
Figure 3.3 Declining SOE Profitability (%), 1978-1996 
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The declining profitability levels constrain the capacity of SOEs to increase 
wages and bonuses; consequently SOEs, with improved knowledge of the 
operation of non-state enterprises, lobby governments for more managerial 
autonomy or more subsidies (Rawski, 1996). Yet as the share of government 
revenue coming from state sectors decreases, the share of SOEs in the 
economy declines, and the numbers of loss-making SOEs increase, 
governments have less finance and interests to subsidise SOEs, which leads 
governments to grant further managerial autonomy to SOEs, and eventually to 
the privatisation of small SOEs. 
Driven by the above dynamics, we may conclude the progress of SOE reforms 
has been proceeding along three lines: 
1). A gradual expansion SOEs' managerial autonomy, granting SOEs more 
contractual and residual rights. 
2). The promotion of competition between SOEs and non-SOEs through 
encouraging the entry of non-state owned firms. 
3). Fostering market competition by government. 
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The details of these three lines will be discussed in the following sections. 
3.2.3 Encouraging the Entry of Non-SOEs 
China's non state-owned enterprises consist of the Collective Owned Enterprises 
(COE) and private enterprises. COEs include urban COEs and township and 
village enterprises (TVEs) in rural areas. COEs are owned collectively by the 
members of a community. The private enterprises include individual enterprises, 
domestic private enterprises6, and enterprises with foreign investment. For a long 
time before 1978, non-SOEs existed officially only in the form of Collective 
Owned Enterprises (COEs), which were established as supplements rather than 
competitors to SOEs, while private enterprises existed only at the margin in the 
form of self-employment. The market-oriented reform in 1978 gave impetus to 
the revival of non-state business, and the local governments, functioning as a 
`helping hand' for local economic development, became intimately involved in 
promoting non-state economic activities (Frye and Shleifer, 1997; Qian and 
Weingast, 1996; Che and Qian, 1998). Moreover, the most significant of them all 
are the emergence of TVEs and enterprises with foreign investment. In fact, in 
the first 15 years of reform between 1979 and 1993, most new entries were 
neither private firms nor SOEs, but COEs, especially TVEs. 
3.2.3.1 The Development of Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) 
TVEs7 represent a form of decentralised ownership, which are typically owned by 
local communities of a few thousand people. However their property rights are 
6 Individual enterprise is defined as a business employing less than 8 employees, while domestic 
private enterprise is defined as a business employing more than 8 employees. 
Despite TVE being frequently referred as 'private' or 'quasi-private', throughout the 1980s and 
into 1990s, local governments have maintained strong ownership rights over TVEs within their 
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not clearly defined. TVEs are managed by Township and Village governments 
and the profits are shared by villagers (Weitzman and Xu, 1994; Naughton, 
1994a, b). They originated in the Commune and Brigade enterprises, and were 
among the first to benefit from economic reform. Commune and Brigade 
enterprises in rural areas existed in fact long before 1979, yet they did not begin 
to obtain the freedom to seek profits in industries other than those related to 
agriculture until after economic reform. The `household responsibility reform' of 
1978 emancipated peasants from the people's commune system, providing the 
necessary surplus labour for the development of TVEs. They were further 
encouraged in 1979 by the issue of "Regulation on Some Questions Concerning 
the Development of Enterprises Run by People's Commune and Production 
Brigades", which allowed local governments to grant tax holidays of 2-3 years to 
new commune and brigade enterprises. Meanwhile, they were no longer 
restricted to the industries that served agriculture, and were allowed to enter into 
most industries unrelated to agriculture where previously only state enterprises 
had access. They no longer used only local resources and could sell beyond 
local markets (Qian, 2000; Byrd and Lin, 1990). 
In January 1984, the government further promoted the commune and brigade 
enterprises by encouraging "peasants to invest in or buy shares of all types of 
enterprises and to pool their funds and jointly set up various kinds of enterprises 
by following the principle of voluntary participation and mutual benefits". After 
this, restrictions on bank loans to TVEs were also relaxed (Byrd and Lin, 1990), 
and previous administrative restrictions against entry of rural enterprises were 
removed from almost all industries. In March 1984, the former commune and 
brigade enterprises were renamed as "Township and Village Enterprises". 
jurisdiction (Che and Qian, 1998; D. Li, 1996). After the abolition of the commune system, 
township and village governments enthusiastically supported rural industrialisation because they 
relied heavily on the development of rural industry to generate their revenue. 
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These changes have brought about a significant growth of TVEs (See Fig 3.4). 
By 1992, the employment in TVEs increased by 2 times compared with that in 
1983. And the output increased by 16 times during the same period. The 
development of TVEs was so unexpectedly significant that Mr Deng Xiaoping 
praised TVEs during his tour to the South, saying that "[TVEs] emerged from 
nowhere like an ambushing army". Much of this development occurred as urban 
enterprises, in order to reduce production costs, increase economic efficiency 
and evade environmental protection requirements, began to shift part of their 
production to TVEs. Since 1993, the Development of TVEs was further boosted 
by China's commitment to a market economy. Between 1992 and 1999, TVEs 
employed some 130 million workers or about half of China's surplus rural labour, 
and their output had increased by 5 times. Consequently, their share of GDP 
increased to 16% by 1995, which rose to 30.5% by 2001. 
Figure 3.4 Development of TVEs (1978-1996) 
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3.2.3.2 Joint Ventures and Foreign Direct Investment 
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The entry of foreign firms has also been actively encouraged by governments in 
order to acquire foreign technology, equipment and know-how, especially in the 
designated special investment zones. China utilised a number of methods to 
attract foreign investment, including barter trade, compensation trade, processing 
arrangements, joint ventures, and wholly foreign-owned enterprises. Preferential 
treatment in the form of tax and other incentives is available to foreign investors 
in the Special Economic Zones, designated coastal cities and other special 
investment zones, as well as to approved export-oriented and technologically 
advanced enterprises. Joint ventures have been the preferred form of foreign 
investment enterprise because of the need for local involvement. However until 
1991, the amount of foreign investment was small, most of FDI came from small 
and medium enterprises in Hong Kong and were highly concentrated in 
Guangdong province. Production of foreign invested enterprises was 
overwhelmingly export-oriented and had little link with the domestic economy 
(Naughton, 1996). The take off of foreign investment, in particular Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI), took place in 1992. Beginning in 1993, China emerged as the 
largest recipient of FDI among developing countries (UNCTAD, 2003). Between 
1979 and 1999, China has attracted more than US$306 billion in foreign 
investments. Of this, 50% is in ordinary processing industries with concentration 
on labour-intensive projects, 10% is in power, oil and other basic industries, 
24.4% in real estate (OECD, 2000). Foreign investment has greatly contributed 
to the integration of China's domestic production capacity into global markets. 
During the second half of the 1980s, the share of exports by enterprises with 
foreign participation increased from 1.88% to 12.58% in 1990. By 2000, this 
share further increased to 47.93%. At present, there are over 200,000 foreign 
invested enterprises from over 170 countries and regions. 200 of them are 
among the world's 500 largest enterprises. China is only second to the US in 
terms of attracting foreign investment. 
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3.2.3.3 Individual Business 
In China, the emergence of individual businesses was even more significant than 
joint ventures although they were less proclaimed. Before 1978, domestic private 
ownership had long been a taboo in China. Yet under the pressure to increase 
employment opportunities and to improve living standards, by 1978 an 
underground private economy was already emerging quietly in the form of 
individual business. Once the shift of policy started in 1978, individual businesses 
were encouraged by local government as a quick way to respond to the mounting 
pressures of unemployment in urban areas and to soak up the rural surplus 
labour generated by the improved labour productivity under the house 
responsibility system (IFC, 2000; Chai, 1997). 
Individual businesses were normally set up by a single family, or jointly by some 
families and individuals. This was especially important in rural areas with many 
households specialized in non-agricultural activities and becoming "specialized 
households". In urban areas, it existed in the form of self-employment. At the 
beginning, individual business still had experimental features, yet they developed 
rapidly. By 1981, the number of individual businesses increased to 1.8 million 
from 0.14 million in 1978. Most individual businesses were concentrated in the 
service sector in general and in wholesale and retail trade in particular. Indeed, 
only 12% of individual businesses were engaged in industry (Chai, 1997). The 
legal status of this sector was only confirmed in 1981 by a set of State Council 
regulations. These regulations defined a new business category, Geti 
GongShang Hu, individual industrial and commercial proprietor, and limited the 
number of employees this type of business could hire to eight people. In 1983, 
the state council introduced a series of central and local regulations for the 
licensing and control of individual business. These further encouraged the 
development of individual business (See Fig 3.5). By 1985, the number of 
individual businesses has already increased to 11.71 million, employing 17.66 
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million workers. Since China's commitment to market economy in 1992, 
individual businesses have been developing even more rapidly. By the end of 
1999, the number of individual businesses increased from 15.33 million in 1993 
to 31.6 million in 1999, and the number of workers employed increased from 
24.57 million in 1993 to 38.26 million in 1999. During the same period, the 
contribution to gross industrial output of individual businesses in industrial 
sectors increased from 5.8% in 1992 to 18.2% in 1999. 
Figure 3.5 Development of Individual Businesses, 
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Domestic private enterprise began to develop as early as 1981. They developed 
either from getihu (individual proprietorship) taking more employees or through 
the leasing of state or collective enterprises to individuals. However, they were 
not officially registered as a category at that time. Most private enterprises were 
disguised as COEs in order to avoid social prejudice and government 
restrictions, as well as to gain access to the benefits of the `collective title' in the 
form of tax reductions and tax exemptions. In return they had to submit an 
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administration fee to the local government (Gregory and Tenev, 2001a). It was 
not until 1987 that private enterprises were formally recognized as a legitimate 
part of China's economy by the 13th CCPC congress. In 1988, the state council 
issued the Tentative Stipulations on Private Enterprises to govern the registration 
and management of private enterprises, which defined private enterprises as "a 
for-profit organisation that is owned by individuals and employs more than eight 
people" and identified three types of private enterprises: those under sole 
ownership, partnership, and limited liability companies. In spite of formal 
recognition, the growth of private enterprises in the late 1980s was slow because 
of social prejudice against private enterprises and numerous restrictions. The 
latter included complicated registration procedures, their banning from foreign 
trade and joint ventures with foreign firms, the imposition of various 
administrative fees on them, and the denial of credit to them by state banks 
(Gregory and Tenev, 2001 b). 
Attitudes towards private ownership have changed since Deng Xiaping called for 
further market-oriented reforms in 1992, providing private entrepreneurs with a 
more hospitable social and psychological environment. By the end of 1992, 
China had 140,000 private firms. The Fourteenth Party Congress, calling for the 
creation of a level playing field and addressing the enterprise reform in terms of 
property rights and ownership, opened the door for the privatisation of SOEs and 
COEs. Between 1992 and 1995, private firms developed rapidly, increasing in 
number from 139,600 in 1992 to 654,500, with employment increasing by 312%, 
and output by 750% over the same period (IFC, 2000). The greatest change in 
official attitude toward private ownership came at the 15th CCPC congress held in 
1997, when private enterprise was recognized as an important component of the 
economy. In 1999, private ownership was further incorporated into the Chinese 
constitution, and was placed on an equal footing with state ownership. 
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3.2.3.5 The Contribution of Non-State sectors to Economic Growth 
As a result of these moves, there was a rapid development of the non-state 
sectors. Between 1978 and 1994, new COEs accounted for about 65% of new 
entries into the industrial sector above town level, of which township enterprises 
accounted for a third. Actually, between 1984 and 1997, COEs had led the 
growth of gross industrial output and contributed 35% of gross industrial output 
growth (See Fig 3.6); private ownership played only a minor role, contributing 
less than 15% of the gross industrial output growth. 
Figure 3.6 Decomposition of Gross Industrial Output 
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Since 1997, private enterprises (including foreign owned firms, joint ventures and 
shareholding companies) began to lead the growth, contributing more than 40% 
of gross industrial output growth. Consequently, the share of the state sector has 
been declining. By 1993, the non-state sector had overtaken the state sector, 
contributing more than 50% of national gross industrial output. And by 1996, the 
non-state sectors contributed more than two third of national gross industrial 
output, of which private ownership contributing a third. 
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3.2.4 Decentralising the State and SOE Relationship 
As for SOEs themselves, reform has been achieved through decentralising the 
relationship between SOEs and the State. There are two aspects of this 
decentralisation, one aspect is that the State grants managerial autonomy and 
profit-sharing rights to SOEs, as a result the residual claimants and control rights 
of SOEs have been in effect shared by managers, workers and government 
departments in charge of the SOEs. The other aspect is that the State makes an 
effort to secure its interest as an owner, as the relaxation of political control 
releases the agency problem that tight political control prior to reform tried to 
reduce. This decentralisation of the relationship between SOEs and the State 
has been achieved in four phases, each with their own characteristics. These 
four phases are listed in table 3.1: 
Table 3.1: Stages of SOE Reform 
Period Characteristics Enacting Conferences and Directives 
First 1979-1987 Expanding The 3rd plenary of CCP's 11t Congress in 
Phase managerial 1978 
autonomy and profit 
sharing 
Second 1986-1995 Management "Provisional Regulations Concerning the 
Phase contract Contractual Management Responsibility 
responsibility System for Industrial enterprises Under 
the Ownership of the Whole People" by 
State Council (1988) 
Third 1993-1997 Corporatization and The 3rd plenary of CCP's 14t congress in 
Phase Modern Enterprise 1993 
System Reform 
Fourth 1997- Gripping the big The th Party Congress of September 
Phase ones and letting free 1997 
the small ones 
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3.2.4.1 Profit-Sharing: Profit Retention, Profit Contract, and Tax for Profit 
(1978-1987) 
During this phase, as the lack of managerial autonomy and deficiency in 
motivation were considered the main problems of SOEs, SOE reform naturally 
started from expanding managerial autonomy and providing financial incentives 
by allowing profit-sharing according to the logic of `crossing the river by gripping 
for stones'. 
The experiment of expanding managerial autonomy and profit retention rights to 
SOEs was first conducted in Shichuan province in 1978 before being rolled out to 
the whole country. SOEs were allowed to produce more than the planned quota 
and to sell products to the market after fulfilling plan quotas. They were also 
granted the authority to promote middle level managers without government 
approval (Qian, 1999). In the meantime, SOEs could retain part of the profits, 
allowing managers to strengthen workers' incentives by paying more in bonuses. 
The initial profit retention scheme allowed SOEs to retain profits at a fixed 
percentage determined through bargaining between SOEs and the government 
in such a way that the SOE could just meet its decentralised investment. By 
1980, over 6,000 SOEs, accounting for about 60% of industrial gross output, 
joined the experiment and obtained some limited managerial autonomy (Chai, 
1997). These enterprises were required to put retained profits into three separate 
funds: welfare of employees, bonuses, and development. SOEs had control over 
the use of these funds. 
From 1981, inspired by the success of contract responsibility in agriculture, the 
contract responsibility system was introduced into SOEs. Under profit contract 
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system, enterprises negotiate with their supervisory bodies for annual profit 
remittance quotas, retaining 40% to 100% of the above quotas' profits. This 
scheme aimed to provide financial incentives to SOEs, while at the same time 
attempting to ensure the steady growth of the State's financial income. By early 
1982,80% of all SOEs at county level and above had adopted the system (Chai, 
1997; Lin et al., 1996) 
Yet, the incentive effect of the increased share of profits seems to have been 
quite weak, the anticipated efficiency improvement did not materialize, and most 
efficiency indicators lagged behind their industry target in 1981 (Chai, 1997). 
SOEs' labour productivity in 1981 actually decreased by 1.8%, and increased 
only by 2.3% in 1982. At the same time, the share of loss-making SOEs 
increased to 20.4% by 1982, and losses jumped to 4.8 billion Yuan RMB in 1982. 
The profit contract system had also arguably aggravated the structural imbalance 
(Chai, 1997; Qian, 1999; Zhou, 1984; Byrd, 1983). As it was only since 1984 that 
the `dual track' price for industrial goods was officially permitted, profit therefore 
reflected planned prices rather than performance, hence encouraging SOEs with 
more financial freedom to pursue profits aggravated the existing structural 
problems, such as the shortage of raw material, energy and transports8. 
In 1983, in order to reduce the uncertainties associated with bargaining between 
SOE and the State and to ensure the steady inflow of state finance, the tax for 
profit system (Li Gai Shui) was fully endorsed by the State Council. Under this 
system, SOEs had to pay a universal 55% of profit to the State in the name of 
income tax for the use of natural resources and state-owned capital, and they 
8 For example, in 1980, the ex-factory prices of metallurgical products, coal, timber, and building 
material increased by 6.1%, 6.4%, 4.5% and 2.4% respectively, and the overall inflation rate shot 
up to 6.1 % in 1980, the first serious inflation since 1978. 
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retained a contracted percentage of after-tax profit. 
was applied to 98% of SOEs. 
By July 1983 this system 
This system did, however, apparently change the trend in declining state financial 
income, which increased by 13% and 17% in 1983 and 1984 respectively. Yet, 
this scheme encountered resistance from both local governments and SOEs, as 
it raised the enterprise burden of profits remission in the new name of income 
tax, and reduced local government share of State financial income (Lee, 1991). 
Moreover, after the rapid growth of State financial income in 1983 and 1984, 
financial income had been declining for 4 successive years beginning in 1985. 
3.2.4.2 Management Contract Responsibility (1987-1995) 
Since 1986, some local governments began to implement the management 
contract responsibility system on a one to one basis to reverse declining financial 
income and to fulfil financial targets. The management contract responsibility 
system fixed a profit submission base scheduled to grow at an agreed rate, and 
allowed SOEs to retain the excess. At the same time, the shareholding system 
was also proposed as a competing policy option. While the contract responsibility 
system seeks to restructure SOEs without addressing the issues of property 
rights, the shareholding system focuses on restructuring SOEs by clarifying 
property rights and allowing diverse ownership. Yet, the implementation of the 
shareholding system encountered various doubts and resistance due to 
ideological constraints (Lin et al., 1999; Gao and Yang, 1999), and was only tried 
in a few SOEs. The management contract system, by contrast, was endorsed by 
the state council and adopted by 90% of SOEs by the end of 1987, and was the 
primary enterprise reform approach for the late 1980s and early 1990s. Under 
this system, SOEs and the State's rights and responsibilities were legalised 
through contracts, which normally lasted for at least three years, covering not 
only profits but also production and investment targets, etc. SOEs were 
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supposed to operate independently, to be responsible for their own losses and to 
submit the contracted profit. They could retain the profits beyond the contracted 
profit, but must make up the shortfall from their own fund. The Management 
Contract Responsibility system tried to emphasize SOEs' responsibility to the 
State while giving them more managerial autonomy and profit sharing rights. 
Under this system, managers were no longer supposed to be under the party 
committee's leadership, and the practice of egalitarian bonuses was replaced by 
the internal contract system. By the end of 1987, about 80% of large and medium 
sized SOEs adopted the contract responsibility system. In 1988, the enterprise 
management contract responsibility system was put into company law. By 1989, 
nearly all SOEs had adopted it, which continued until 1995. In 1992, the contract 
responsibility system was further enhanced by "The Regulations on Transforming 
the Management Mechanism of State Owned Industrial Enterprises" issued by 
the state council. Under this regulation, SOEs' managerial autonomy was further 
expanded in 14 areas: (i) production and management, (ii) pricing, (iii) sale, (iv) 
procurement; (v) foreign trade (vi) investment; (vii) use of retained funds; (viii) 
disposal of assets; (ix) merger and acquisition; (x) labour; (xi) personnel 
management; (xii) wages and bonuses; (xiii) internal organisations; and (xiv) 
refusal to pay unauthorized charges by the government. 
Results (see Table 3.2) from three surveys on SOEs' managerial autonomy 
conducted in 1993,1994 and 1999 show that over the years SOEs had 
expanded their autonomy in all aspects, and government intervention had 
receded from all aspects, although by no means evenly. For example in 1999, 
while 96% of managers had production autonomy, only 44.6% of managers had 
autonomy in refusing extra levy and fees. 
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Table 3.2: Realization of Enterprise Autonomy (%) 9 
1993 1994 1995 1999 
Production Autonomy 88.7 94.0 97.3 96.1 
Pricing Autonomy 75.9 73.6 85.4 86.8 
Sale 88.5 90.5 95.9 92.5 
Pursuing 90.9 95.0 97.8 97.7 
Exports and Imports 15.3 25.8 41.3 66.9 
Investment 38.9 61.2 72.8 87.1 
Use of retained profit 63.7 73.8 88.3 96.2 
Dispose of asset 29.4 46.6 68.2 73.4 
Merger and acquisition 23.3 39.7 59.7 62.3 
Employment decision 43.5 61.0 74.8 88.0 
Personnel decision 53.7 73.3 74.8 81.5 
Distribution of wage and bonus 70.2 86.0 93.1 95.5 
Internal organisation design 79.3 90.5 94.4 97.4 
Refusal of extra levy and fees 7.0 10.3 17.4 44.6 
Number of Samples 2620 2756 3300 
Sources: Survey Results of managers by China Entrepreneur Survey System. 
After the implementation of the management contract system, both gross 
industrial output and labour productivity continued to grow. Between 1987 and 
1995, the average growth rate of gross industrial output was 7.6%, and the 
annual growth rate for labour productivity during the same period was 6.2%. 
However, SOEs' financial performance continued to deteriorate, SOEs' losses 
increased rapidly from 6.1 billion Yuan RMB in 1987 to 34.9 billion Yuan RMB in 
1990, then reached up to 64 billion Yuan RMB in 1995, and the share of loss- 
making SOEs increased from 13% in 1987 to 35.5% in 1995. In fact, it was 
estimated that only around 1/3 of SOEs made profits. As a result, State direct 
subsidy to loss-making SOEs rose from 18.2 billion (1.2 % of GDP) in 1988 to 
9 Percentage of top managers answered yes to each question 
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84.4 billion Yuan (2.4% of GDP) in 1993. The poor SOE financial performance 
forced the authorities to relax its stance on monetary and fiscal policy to 
reinvigorate the economy in the course of its effort to control high inflation during 
1988-1991. 
Three problems have been identified associated with the management contract 
responsibility system. The first is that the one to one periodical State and SOE 
bargaining relationship cannot ensure a rational enterprise and government 
relationship in the long term. The second problem is that SOEs were still owned 
by the State, which had indefinite responsibility for SOEs' failure, hence SOEs in 
fact share only the profit and the State takes the losses. The de facto sharing 
profit rather than losses led to widespread short-term SOE behaviours (Gao and 
Yang, 1999; Lin et al., 1999). The third problem is the existence of `insider 
control' problems, in which the `insiders', both enterprise managers and 
enterprise workers, abuse State assets for their own interests. Ambiguous 
property rights were considered the main cause of all these problems. 
3.2.4.3 Establishing the Modern Enterprise System - Corporatisation 
(1993-1997) 
During this period, enterprise reform was addressed in terms of clarifying 
property rights and ownership, rather than expanding enterprise autonomy as 
before. Transforming SOEs into "modern enterprises" with "clarified property 
rights, clearly defined responsibility and authority, and scientific internal 
management", and separating enterprises from the government, were endorsed 
as the objectives of enterprise reform in the 3rd plenary of 14th CCPC in 1993. 
SOEs were proposed to be transformed into "corporate entities and market 
competitors operating independently and responsible for their own profits and 
losses, and having the ability to keep self-restraint and to seek self- 
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development". It also proposed that central industrial departments be 
transformed into state-owned holding companies, large and medium SOEs were 
to be converted into single investor companies, limited liability companies or 
shareholding companies, and small SOEs were to be restructured through 
contracting out, leasing, and converting to shareholding cooperatives, or they 
could be sold out (CCPC, 1993). 
The expectation underlying the initiation of the modern enterprise system was 
that managers and workers in SOEs would avoid short-term behaviours and the 
encroachment of state assets once ownership was clearly defined and owners' 
interests were represented by the board of directors. Moreover, as government 
functions were separated from enterprise management, enterprises would 
become real legal entities with civil rights and obligations for profits and losses by 
establishing corporate property rights. 
Under this proposal, between 1993 and 1994 all SOEs were first transformed into 
legal entities, and SOEs' property rights were clarified. Further managerial 
autonomy was given to 10,000 large and medium SOEs in 1994. Supervisors 
were sent by the central government to 1,000 key enterprises to monitor the 
operating of state assets. In 1995,100 SOEs pioneered the corporatization 
experiment under China's Corporation Law, which became effective in 1994. The 
corporatized SOEs were required to set up a director board and supervisory 
board, and government administrative functions were required to be separated 
from SOEs' commercial functions. However, this reform had only been 
implemented on an experimental basis until 1997 owing to the debate regarding 
whether the modern enterprises system could be applied within the framework of 
socialism. 
The implementation of the modern enterprise system did not change significantly 
the internal structure of SOEs. Members of the boards of directors and the 
113 
supervisory boards were normally dominated by both government officials and 
SOE managers, and the State shareholders were generally over-represented on 
both the boards of directors and the supervisory boards (Xu and Wang, 1997, 
1999). In addition to these internal organizational problems, SOEs did not have 
the requisite external conditions for establishing an effective corporate 
governance structure, such as a developed stock market and a proper legal 
framework. Consequently, the modern enterprise system experiment did not 
contribute noticeably to improving SOEs' financial performance. In 1996, for the 
first time, industrial SOEs with independent accounts made net losses of 38 
billion Yuan, and more than 40% of large and medium SOEs made losses. As 
the losses of SOEs accumulated, the State's ability to sustain the survival of the 
loss-making SOEs was further impaired. 
3.2.4.4 Grip the Big one and Let Go the Small One 
Since early 1990s, performance of small and medium SOEs has been worse 
than that of large SOEs (see Fig 3.7). The profit of small and medium SOEs has 
been declining, while the profit of large SOEs has been relatively stable. 
Figure 3.7 Profit of Large, Medium and Small SOEs 
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After 1994, small SOEs began to make net losses, and so did the medium SOEs 
after 1995. In 1996, the losses in both small and medium SOEs increased 
significantly. Furthermore, small and medium SOEs have been playing a less 
and less important role in the state sector; their share of gross industrial output 
had been declining from 43.3% in 1993 to 33.8% in 1997. 
At the same time, SOEs' external environment was gradually tightened. The 
banking reform started in 1993, state banks became more and more 
commercialised, and the profitability and repayment capability played an 
increasing role in bank lending decisions. Consequently, the chance of SOEs 
getting soft loans from state banks was reduced. In 1994, the government carried 
out tight monetary policy, the growth of investment was reduced from 24.8% in 
1993 to 12.7% in 1994, and most of the reduction was in the State sector. State 
subsidies to SOEs were also significantly reduced from 7.5% of GDP in 1992 to 
3.9% of GDP in 1994. Yet, SOEs were still a heavy drain on state finance. The 
state's subsidies to loss-making SOEs still amounted to more than 10% of state 
revenue between 1989 and 1994 (except 1992), and SOEs were still subsidized 
indirectly and tacitly through soft bank loans. 
As most of the small and medium SOEs were subordinated to local governments, 
local governments especially felt the pressure of increased numbers of loss- 
making SOEs. The tax reform in 1994 put further strains on local governments, 
their financial income in 1994 was down by 40% as the result. Furthermore, 
SOEs' financial performance was so poor that it was not worthwhile to invest in 
SOEs, as SOEs' before-profit asset ratio had been lower than the gross interest 
rate since 1993. 
As the Chinese government acknowledged that support of all SOEs were a 
heavy drain on the economy and could not be maintained indefinitely, and that 
SOEs were so widespread that it was very difficult for the State to monitor all 
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SOEs, the new reform initiative - `Grip the Large and Let Go the Small- was 
proposed with simultaneous experiments in several cities and provinces, and 
was later formalized in the Fifth Plenary of 14th CCPC in September 1995, and 
was put into the ninth five-year plan in 1996. The 15th CCPC in 1997, in which 
State ownership was downgraded to a "pillar of the economy", private ownership 
was promoted to an "important component of the economy", and the meaning of 
public ownership was redefined to include not only State and collectively-owned 
sectors but also State and collectively-owned elements in the sector of mixed 
ownership, has further paved the way for restructuring large firms and privatising 
medium and small firms. 
Reforms in Small and Medium Enterprises: `Letting Go the Small one' 
It is not known when exactly the experiment of "letting go the small one" had 
started, yet by 1994 it had spread through China. Shunde in Guang Dong 
province, and Zhucheng in Shandong province, are two of the pioneer cities. This 
experiment consisted of contracting out, leasing, bankruptcy, merger and 
acquisition, as well as selling SOEs or transforming SOEs into employee-held 
companies or shareholding cooperatives (SETC, 1996). As usual this process 
has a characteristic Chinese name, GaiZhi, meaning changing mechanisms, yet 
by international standards, GaiZhi really is privatisation. The best-known 
example is Zhucheng city in Shandong province, which started privatising SOEs 
in 1992 when two-thirds of its SOEs were losing money or just breaking even; 
since then 210 State-owned and collective enterprises (out of a total of 288) have 
been privatised (Dong, 1999). 
In 1996, the State Economic and Trade Commission put forward the "Advice on 
Letting Free and Enlivening Small SOEs", which approved the local experiments. 
At the 15th CCPC in 1997, transforming small SOEs into shareholding 
cooperatives was officially endorsed as a primary method of "letting go the small" 
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SOEs. Under this scheme, management and workers are sold shares equivalent 
to the net assets, each worker has about the same number of shares, decisions 
are based on one worker one vote rather than one share one vote, and profits 
are shared between management and workers. By making employees 
shareholders, this approach secures their support for enterprise restructuring and 
gives them a personal stake in improving enterprise performance. According to 
recent surveys, shareholding cooperatives are by far the most popular method of 
restructuring small SOEs. 
Direct sale to private domestic or foreign investors or firms, corporatization into a 
limited liability or joint stock company, merger, leasing and bankruptcy are other 
favorite approaches (Realistic Choice, 1997). Local governments have designed 
policies to assist private purchasers, purchasers are allowed to use various 
methods to purchase related companies, and employees are encouraged to 
purchase firm shares at a discount rate. In some cases, "zero price transfer" is 
used as buyers take over control of the firm and all its debt for nothing. By the 
end of 1996, up to 70% of small SOEs had been privatised in pioneering 
provinces and about half had been privatised in many other provinces (Qian, 
2000). 
Reforms in Large SOEs: Grip the Big Ones 
While `letting go the small one' was mainly initiated from local governments, 
`gripping the big ones' was proposed by central government. The essence of 
"gripping the big" SOEs is to support and enliven about 1,000 large SOEs, based 
on the fact that large SOEs play an important role in the Chinese economy. In 
1997, the largest 500 industrial SOEs comprised just 0.7% of industrial SOEs, 
but accounted for 37% of total assets, 63% of SOE profit, and 46% of sale tax 
(Wu, 1997). In December 1995, the State Economic and Trade Commission put 
forward the measure of `gripping the big SOEs', including restructuring, R&D 
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support, and better monitoring. In the 5th Plenary of 14th CCPC in 1996, the idea 
of `gripping the big ones and letting go the small ones' was formalised. 
Thereafter, 512 large enterprises were selected for "gripping" and two major 
policies were announced to develop large enterprises. The first one was to 
establish 3 to 5 large firms among the world's top 500. In order to achieve this, 
the central government has channelled extra funds to selected large enterprises. 
The second one was to develop a modern corporate governance system in large 
SOEs. In 1996, central government announced that a main bank relationship 
would be developed in a pilot of 300 firms. At the provincial level, similar 
programme has been implemented. 
In the 15th CCPC in 1997, the restructuring of large SOEs was made explicit to 
include converting large SOEs into joint stock companies, listing better- 
performing large SOEs on stock markets, and setting up large enterprise groups 
in strategic sectors. A number of large and medium SOEs were transformed into 
joint stock companies. At the end of 1996,4300 SOEs had been transformed into 
joint stock companies. A number of better-performing large and medium 
enterprises have been listed on either the Shanghai, Shenzhen, Hong Kong or 
New York stock exchanges. At the national level, the state council is backing 57 
large enterprise groups in predominantly heavy industries such as machine 
building, metallurgy, and chemicals. A number of large enterprises and enterprise 
groups are also being developed at the provincial level as well. These enterprise 
groups are often either listed companies themselves or have subsidiaries listed 
on either domestic or overseas stock markets. 
3.2.5 Fostering Market Competition 
In China, encouraging competition is a crucial feature of what has been seen as 
a "reform from below" gradual process (Naughton, 1994b). Market competition is 
encouraged through promoting product market competition and facilitating the 
mobility of factor markets. 
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3.2.5.1 Product Market Competition 
While the significant entry of non-state firms has greatly increased competition in 
product markets, product market competition has also been facilitated by 
removing exit barriers, dismantling SOEs' monopoly in China, removing trade 
barriers, and setting up and enforcing competition law. 
The Threat of Exit 
China's first bankruptcy law was enacted in 1986. For years, it was rarely 
applied. From 1988 to 1991, there were less than 300 cases of bankruptcy, and 
all of them were small firms. The first bankruptcy case of large and medium 
SOEs occurred in 1992, six years after the enactment of bankruptcy law. In 1996, 
a new bankruptcy law, largely resembling that in market economies, was 
enacted. Currently, bankruptcy has become a realistic threat. The number of 
bankruptcies has risen sharply from 98 in 1989 to 5048 in 1997 (Li, S., 2001). 
From 1998 to 2000 the figure became stable at around 5,000 per year. In fact, 
1.5% of the total SOEs were in bankruptcy proceedings in 1999-2000 (Wang, 
2001). 
Dismantling State Monopoly 
While the SOEs in the manufacturing industry have long been facing increasing 
competition arising from the entry and growth of non-state firms, the SOEs in the 
utility industry, being considered as the last `fortress' of China's state monopolies, 
have been facing growing entry threat as well. Furthermore, their monopoly 
status has also been gradually dismantled. For example, in the 
telecommunications industry, China TELCOM, used to being the only supplier of 
telecommunication services, has had to face emerging competition from another 
three telecommunications companies in specialised areas since the early 1990s. 
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Under the recent reform initiatives, in 1999 China TELCOM was divided into four 
parts, responsible for different services. In the electricity sector, from December 
30,2002, the monopoly status of the State Power Corporation of China has been 
dismantled into 5 generating companies, 5 transmission companies, 2 
consultancy companies and 2 construction companies. Similar reforms are going 
on in other utility sectors as well. 
Removing Trade Barriers 
Through more than 20 years of opening up to the world, China's foreign trade 
regime has gradually changed from a highly centralized, planned and import 
substitution regime to a more decentralized, market-oriented and export 
promotion regime. China has been accepted as a full member of WTO, its 
general tariff level had been reduced to 12% by 2002, and China has promised to 
cut the average tariff level to less than 10 per cent by 2005. Trade liberalization 
forces firms to compete with imports. However, while opening up to global 
markets, domestic trade barriers are endemic (World Bank 1994, Young, 2000; 
World Bank, 1994; Branstetter and Feenstra, 1999). Inter-provincial trade has 
fallen from the equivalent of 37% of national retail trade in 1985 to about 25% in 
2001, while the average distance traveled by freight shipments within China fell 
to 310 kilometers in 2001 from 395 kilometers in 1978, despite the rapid 
expansion of national highways, ports and air-cargo facilities (Gilley, 2001). In 
order to dismantle the inter-provincial trade barriers, the State Council has issued 
many circulars and directives against them. In the most recent of such directives, 
issued in April 2001, central government explicitly outlaws regional blockades. 
120 
Setting up and Enforcing Competition Law 
Setting up and enforcing competition law is another way of fostering market 
competition. China's current competition law, China's Law of Anti-Unfair 
Competition, was promulgated in 1993. This law does address some of the anti- 
trust issues, such as prohibiting tie-in sales against the wishes of a buyer and 
price fixing or bid rigging. It also addresses many other issues, including bribery, 
deceptive advertising, coercive sales, etc. On average 600 cases of competition 
restriction in monopolized sectors, involving water and power supply, railroad 
transport, insurance, post and telecommunications, commercial banking and 
tobacco processing, have been detected and investigated annually. Anti-trust law 
is currently being drafted and is expected to come into being in the near future. 
3.2.5.2 Labour and Managerial Market Competition 
Massive transfer of labour from agriculture to industry in rural area has occurred 
since the reform. In 1978, rural industry employed roughly 28 million workers; in 
1995 rural industry employed 100 million workers. This wave of labour transfer 
underpins the development of TVEs, joint ventures, and private enterprises that 
make up China's dynamic non-state sector. Labour transfer occurs in urban 
areas as well. Workers and managers are gradually allowed to move from state 
sectors to non-state sectors, especially to private enterprises and foreign joint 
ventures, and to move from relatively closed interior areas to open coastal areas. 
Dismissal of regular urban workers is now commonplace in Chinese industry. In 
July 1996, the official number of laid-off employees had reached 7.5 million. 
Between 1995 and 2000, the number of industrial enterprise employees dropped 
from its peak of 109.38 million in 1995 to 89.24 million in 2000. The government's 
labour and employment bureau's central control of labour gives way to the 
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booming labour market including a large number of employment agencies, job 
centres and expertise markets. 
China has also achieved sweeping managerial turnover since reform, even 
though its firms remained un-privatized and the new managers were installed by 
the state (Groves et al., 1995). In the first decade of reform, nearly 90 percent of 
China's state firms acquired a new top manager; by 1989 the average incumbent 
had held the job for less than six years (Groves et al., 1995). These changes are 
primarily a reflection of the functioning of the market for managers: only 25% of 
turnover is the result of retirement. One of the innovative methods for uncovering 
managerial talent in China during 1980s is the auctioning of jobs, where potential 
managers could bid for jobs running state enterprise. The winning team had to 
post a bond, and would be rewarded for achieving performance targets. 
Managers are frequently fired for poor performance and in such cases often lose 
part of their security deposit. There is evidence that the auctions succeeded in 
installing competent managers (Groves et al., 1995). 
3.2.5.3 Capital Market Competition 
In China, the state budget was almost the only source of finance of both fixed 
asset investments and working capital for SOEs before reform. On average, 
between 1950 and 1979,84% of investments were financed directly by the state 
budget. The economic reforms have introduced significant changes in SOE 
finance. Since 1978, debt finance from state banks has gradually taken over 
state-budget (equity) finance as the major financial instrument of SOEs. In 1980, 
about 52% of SOE investments were funded through state finance. By 1997, only 
2.8% of enterprise investment was directly funded through state finance, the rest 
being funded through either bank loan (18.9 %) or fundraising (67.7%). State 
banks are becoming increasingly commercialised. Even though China's banks 
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continue to make `soft' loans to favourite borrowers, profitability and repayment 
capability play an increasing role in bank lending decisions. 
China's stock market was established in the late 1980s, and it has been 
developing rapidly since 1995 (See Fig 3.8). By the end of 2000, there were 
more than 1,088 listed firms in China's Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Markets, 
with total capitalisation of 4.8 trillion RMB Yuan and total turnover of 6.1 trillion 
Yuan. Chinese enterprises raised a total of 210.3 billion Yuan on the domestic 
stock markets during the year 2000, up from 9.4 billion RMB Yuan in 1992 (China 
Statistical Yearbook, 2002) 
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As the stock market has gradually become an important fund channel, the market 
for corporate control is developing. Between 1994 and 1996, changes in the 
majority shareholder have taken place in 20 listed companies (Lin and Dong et 
al., 1999). Between 1997 and 2001, changes in the majority snarenoiaer 
occurred in another 392 listed companies (Shen, 2002). However, 60% of these 
changes were not accompanied by a change in the chairman of the board of 
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directors (Shen, 2002). Most of the changeovers have been achieved through 
negotiation or free transfer rather than through hostile takeover 10(Yu, 2003), as 
most of the majority shareholders are either state shareholders or legal person 
shareholders who are not allowed to trade in the open market. 
3.3 Enterprise Reform, Competition and Enterprise 
Performance: A Review of Literature 
In the course of China's Economic Reform over the past 20 years, doubt persists 
about the dimension of China's reform achievements, and the performance 
record of state-owned enterprises is a particular focus for controversy (Jefferson 
et al., 1996; Jefferson et al., 2000; Hay et al, 1994; Sachs and Woo, 2000; Woo 
et al., 1994; Woo, 1998). This is analysed within the framework of the structure 
conduct performance paradigm and measured by the enterprise's productivity 
and profitability. 
Two contradicting views emerged from studies of China's enterprise performance 
since 1978. The first view is that China's enterprise reform is a success and there 
has been a positive productivity growth in the state sector, due to expanded 
managerial autonomy, stronger incentives, and increased competition pressure 
from the entry of non-state firms as the results of the gradual enterprise reform, 
although the productivity improvement in SOEs is less than that of TVEs, joint 
ventures and foreign enterprises (Jefferson et al., 1996; Jefferson et al., 2000; 
Hay et al, 1994; Groves et al., 1994,1995; Li, 1997). This view is empirically 
based on the estimated TFP improvement in SOEs. 
10 Between 1994 and 2001,70.3% of the changeovers were through negotiation, 22.3% through 
free transfer, and only 5 cases were through hostile takeover. 
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The second view argues that it is impossible to achieve a significant 
improvement in firms' performance due to the pervasive existence of non- 
commercial objectives, political interference, lack of incentives for performance 
and severe principal agent problems in China. Therefore where improvements 
do occur, they are small, likely to be short-lived and unsustainable, and SOEs 
have actually become a stabilizer for the whole economy (Sachs and Woo, 2000; 
Woo et al., 1994; World Bank, 1996; Fan and Woo, 1996). This view is primarily 
based on the declining profitability of SOEs. It suggests that the increase in TFP 
as estimated by the first view is due to the invalid use of output and input 
inflators, which caused overstatement of gross output and understatement of the 
inputs (Sachs and Woo, 2000). In the sections below I will discuss these two 
contradictory views in detail. 
3.3.1 Enterprise Reform and Improved Total Factor Productivity 
3.3.1.1 Improved Total Factor Productivity 
Total Factor Productivity, an indicator of innovation and efficiency, has been 
widely used in the assessment of enterprise performance in China. A majority of 
the studies based on TFP estimation show that the TFP of China's SOEs has 
been improved since reform, especially during the 1980s (Chen et al., 1988; Wu, 
1993; Jefferson et al, 1992,1996; Jefferson et al., 1999; Jefferson et al., 2000) 
The first study of this kind is Chen et al., (1988), which found a definite rising 
trend of TFP in China's state industry during 1980-1985. Their results showed 
that from 1978 to 1985, the growth of TFP ranged between 5.2 and 5.9%. 
Jefferson et al., (1992) confirmed the rising trend of TFP growth in state industry. 
They estimated that for SOEs, from 1980 to 1988, the annual average TFP 
growth was 2.4%. However, TFP growth in COEs outpaced SOEs by a 
considerable margin during 1980-1988. Similarly, Macmillan and Naughton 
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(1992) found in their study that the TFP of Chinese State owned enterprises 
increased 3%-4% annually, and Gordon and Li (1995) found that the annual TFP 
growth was 3-4% for the period of 1983 to 1987. 
In a later study by Jefferson et al., (1996), they confirmed the accelerating TFP 
growth in both state and collective sectors during the 1980s; however, they found 
a marked decline in TFP growth during 1988-1992 for the state sector. They 
suggested that the contribution of TFP growth to real output growth, having 
increased to 43% during 1984-1988, declined to 31 % during 1988-1992, while 
TFP growth within the non-state sector was about twice that of the state sector. 
In a more recent study investigating Chinese industrial productivity from 1980- 
1996, Jefferson et al., (2000) reinforced the earlier findings of long-term 
productivity growth and the recent trend of declining of TFP growth. Furthermore, 
they found that TFP in the state sector declined between 1992 and 1996 by - 
1.11 % annually. However, they attributed this TFP decline to the transfer of high 
performance firms and resources to new entities in the foreign-linked and 
shareholding sectors, and China's limited capacity to restructure failing 
enterprises by means of bankruptcy or mergers, but they did not quantify the 
contribution of these factors. Their study also confirmed that TFP in COE 
surpasses TFP in SOEs by a large margin. 
For all the above studies, estimates of TFP are based on production function and 
derived from the following function: 
TFP(t) = exp[ln DGV - ak In DNPT(t) - a, In LAB(t) - a,, In DINT(t)] 
where TFP represents total factor productivity, t indicates time, DGV, DNPF, and 
DINT are the deflated values of gross output, net industrial fixed assets, and 
intermediate purchases, LAB is the average workforce exclusive of non-industrial 
workers, and ak, a, and am are the output elasticity for capital, labor, and 
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materials obtained from production-function estimates for 1987. Hay et al. (1994) 
and Groves et al., (1994) also adopted a similar methodology to estimate the 
effect of reform upon SOEs' TFP growth. There are many other studies, using 
similar methodology but sometimes a different data set. They are presented in 
the Appendix. 
In order to estimate production function and TFP, profit-maximizing enterprise 
behaviors and competitive product and factor markets are assumed. However, 
neither of these two conditions is compatible with a reforming socialist economy. 
Li. W (1997) tried to tackle the above-mentioned problems by allowing 
productions to differ arbitrarily across enterprises. He deconstructed the rate of 
output growth as: 
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Adopting this methodology, Li used the same data set as that in Jefferson et al. 
(1992), Hay et al. (1994) and Groves et al. (1994) to measure the changes in 
TFP by comparing actual changes in output to actual changes in inputs and in 
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the institutional environment. He also found marked improvement in TFP and 
marginal factor productivity during the period 1980 and 1989. According to this 
study, the annual TFP growth was 4.68%, and TFP growth accounted for 73% 
output growth. 
3.3.1.2 Accounting for Productivity growth: Productivity and Enterprise 
Reform 
It is generally believed that productivity growth in China's SOEs is due to 
expanded managerial autonomy, stronger financial incentive and competitive 
pressure from the entry of non-state firms as the results of gradual enterprise 
reform. 
The effect of enterprise reform upon the enterprise performance of China's SOEs 
has been studied within the framework of Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP). 
The most typical works are Groves et al., (1994) and Hay et al. (1994). In the 
former, Groves and his colleagues first assessed whether the managers of SOEs 
responded to the expanded managerial autonomy by strengthening the discipline 
imposed on workers, such as proportion of wages paid in the form of bonus and 
the proportion of contract workers, during which they did find that the increase in 
managerial autonomy raised workers' income. Then they further estimated 
whether the stronger finical incentive led to significant improvement in 
productivity, and they found that productivity increased with the increase in bonus 
payments and in contract workers. Therefore they concluded that enterprise 
autonomy and profit-sharing have a positive impact on productivity. They also 
found that the increase in autonomy raised investment in enterprises as well, but 
tended not to raise remittances to the state. However, this work does not take 
into account the effect of increased competitive pressures upon SOEs. 
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In Hay et al., (1994), a range of econometric analyses of aspects of enterprise 
behaviours under the changing institutional environment, such as employment 
and wages, productive efficiency, profitability, investment, etc., have been 
conducted. They concluded that "enterprises during the period of reform began 
to behave in a `neoclassical' manner associated with enterprises in the west, 
within the constraints that continued to be imposed on them". Moreover, they 
suggest that the reforms have gone a long way to inducing state-owned 
enterprises to be more responsive to price signals in a manner which is 
consistent with a degree of profit-maximizing, cost minimizing behaviour. As far 
as productive efficiency is concerned, the main effects are related to the payment 
of bonuses from retentions. Yet, there remains a moot point whether further 
increases in bonus payments would generate equally dramatic improvements. 
Yao (1997) assessed a simultaneous model of output, bonus and retained profit. 
He confirmed that the financial incentive, such as the bonus rate, had a positive 
and sizeable impact on productivity. His results suggested that a 10% rise in the 
ratio of bonus to wage plus bonus could raise productivity by about 4.56%. By 
deconstructing the growth rate of value-added (1983-1987) into the contribution 
of capital growth, labour growth and the bonus/wage ratio, Yao's study 
suggested that the bonus/wage ratio contributed 53.8% of value- added growth, 
more than the combined contribution of labour and capital growth. This study 
does not take into account the effect of competitive pressures either. Some other 
studies have also proved the positive effects of profit-sharing and bonus upon 
productivity, such as Liu and Liu (1996). 
Although the disciplinary effect of increased market competition has been widely 
acknowledged as another important aspect of China's enterprise reform, most of 
the above studies do not take into account the effect of increased competitive 
pressures. One exception is Li. W (1997). In his study, Li estimated not only the 
effect of improved incentive, which he proxied using the increase ratio of bonus 
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to wage, but also the effect of increased competition, which he proxied using the 
decrease in the relative price of output to material inputs. He found that the 
growth of bonuses per worker had a significantly positive impact on the growth of 
TFP; a 1% increase in bonuses per worker raised the TFP growth rate by 
0.089% between 1980 and 1984 and 0.06% between 1985 and 1989. He also 
found that between 1980 and 1989 the increase in competition also contributed 
to productivity, a 1% reduction in the inflation rate of output prices relative to that 
of material input prices elicited a 0.732% in productivity growth between 1980 
and 1984, and 0.456% in productivity between 1985 and 1989. According to this 
study the improved incentives and intensified competition in product markets 
accounted for 49% of TFP growth. However, their effects declined. 
In some other studies, the effect of increased competition has been indicated 
rather than been explored. Jefferson and Xu (1992) found that enterprises tend 
to converge in TFP, and productivity for labour, capital, and materials tend to 
converge as well. The convergence is most rapid and most complete among 
enterprises that are most exposed to market forces. They attributed this 
convergence in TFP to the allocative efficiency resulting from tendency of factor 
returns to equalise across firms as factor and product markets develop and 
become more competitive. 
3.3.1.3 Critics and Concerns of TFP Accounting 
There are several concerns about the calculation of TFP. The first concern is the 
restrictions on the form of production function. Most of the studies adopted Cobb- 
Douglas production function or its variations. However, one of the assumptions 
underlying the production function is perfect market competition, which is absent 
in transition economies. For studies using aggregate data, this concern is 
especially noteworthy, as there are still strong regional and sectoral segregations 
within China even after 20 years of reform (Young, 2000). Apart from this, there 
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are other restrictions, such as the assumption of Hicks-neutral and the labour 
augmenting technical changes, etc. 
The second concern is the use of deflators for output and inputs. Actually, the 
use of proper deflators has been a hotly debated issue, on which to a large 
extent the debate between Jefferson et al (1999) and Sachs and Woo (2000) is 
based. Sachs and Woo (2000) challenged the validity of the output and input 
deflators used in Jefferson et al. (1992) and argued that the TFP growth 
estimated in Jefferson et al. (1992) is biased and miscalculated (Sachs and Woo, 
2000; Woo et al, 1994) due to the unexpected declines in the implicit price index 
for industrial value-added, and the upward bias in estimates of real output 
growth. Young (2003) in estimating the TFP growth in the Chinese economy 
suggested that the estimated TFP growth could vary between 1% and 5.6% for 
the whole economy depending on the GDP deflators used and other 
assumptions adopted. 
The third concern is the pro-cyclical feature of TFP growth. Measures of TFP are 
sensitive to economic fluctuations. Apart from the technological shocks, policy 
shocks, and changes in factor reallocation, TFP growth is also likely to be 
influenced by demand shocks or supply disruptions that cause the variations in 
capacity utilization. Li (1997) found that the growth of TFP was positively 
correlated with the fluctuations in GNP growth and the effect of incentive and 
market competition appeared to be pro-cyclical. Yao (1997) also suggested that 
economic fluctuations play an important part in deciding TFP growth. 
Fourthly, TFP growth indicates the enterprise performance over time rather than 
intra-firm performance. As we have seen from many studies, although SOEs 
have improved TFP growth, they have been surpassed by TVEs and private 
enterprises; consequently they might not be able to survive even if they have 
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achieved TFP growth. Hence, firms' comparative performance is more important 
for firms' long-term survival. 
The fifth concern is the use of average TFP growth as an indicator of all SOEs. 
All the studies used either simple arithmetic average TFP as the indicator for all 
SOEs or were based on aggregate data. However, changes in aggregate 
productivity conceal a rich variety of microeconomic behaviours. Firms enter, 
grow or decline, and exit, and large firms always tend to have more influence 
upon the whole industry. 
The sixth concern is the selection of sample. Nearly all the important works in 
this area, such as Hay et al. (1994), Groves et al. (1994), Li (1997), Liu and Liu 
(1996) and Jefferson et al. (1996), are based on the same data set, the CSSA 
survey conducted in 1988. This sample tends to be biased toward larger and 
more successful enterprises. More creditable estimates of total factor productivity 
growth should be based on populations of enterprise data. 
Furthermore, most of the above studies are based on observations in the 80s or 
at best early 90s, and studies on enterprise performance in the 90s and inter-firm 
comparative studies are scarce, especially after 1993 when China embarked 
explicitly on the transition to a market economy. 
3.3.2 Enterprise Reform and Enterprise Profitability 
3.3.2.1 Falling Profitability 
Although most of the empirical studies have concluded that TFP in state 
enterprises has been improved, there is no doubt that SOEs' financial situation 
has been deteriorating since the early 80s as we have shown in the previous 
sections. In the 1990s, it became more and more obvious. In the meantime, the 
numbers of loss-making SOEs and the amount of losses incurred have been 
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increasing. SOEs have difficulties in competing in the product market, which 
leads to a large amount of product inventory and the consequent difficulties in 
repaying bank loans. Most SOEs are operating well below full production. This 
phenomenon has been addressed by Premier Zhu Rongji as follows: "The 
current problem of SOEs are excessive investments in fixed assets with very low 
return rates, resulting in the sinking of large amounts of capital; low sales to 
production ratio giving rise to mounting inventories" (Zhu, 1996). 
The deterioration of SOEs' financial performance has increased the State's 
financial burden through two channels: the decrease of financial revenue from 
SOEs and the increase of direct and indirect financial subsidises by the state to 
loss-making SOEs. Consequently, the financial weakness of SOEs destabilised 
the economy through increasing the state budget and bad bank loans. As a 
result, SOEs were a constant source of inflationary pressure. Jin (1995) 
observed that whenever the SOEs faced increased competition, they would 
intensify their lobby for credit, and monetary expansion would result. When 
SOEs' losses could no longer be fully covered by the budget, they turned to state 
banks. Out of the concern for the safety net function and for ideological reasons, 
state banks largely ignored the financing needs of the new dynamic non-state 
sector, and focusing their lending on SOEs, leading to a high proportion of bad 
and idle debts in banks and the possibility of financial crisis (Economist, 1997). 
3.3.2.2 Accounting for the Fall in Profitability 
The deterioration of SOEs' financial performance casts doubts upon the 
dimension of China's reform achievements. In response to SOEs' failing financial 
performance, the literature has identified four possible factors as being 
responsible for disappearing SOE profits. The first factor is the emergence of 
competition from non-state enterprises (Naughton, 1995; Jefferson and Rawski, 
1994). Naughton (1995) suggested that growing competition has eroded SOEs' 
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monopoly, causing profits to decline in the state sector. His hypothesis is 
supported by the fact that profits tended to converge across industrial branches 
and is tested by Singh et al (1994) using provincial data and sectoral data. 
However, this view is challenged by Sachs and Woo (2000) and by Fan and Woo 
(1996). They showed that SOEs' profitability in sectors of industry with little entry 
of non-state firms declined dramatically as well, and their regression of change in 
the SOE profit rate on the change of SOE market share yielded an insignificant 
relation with an R2 of 0.3. 
The second factor is the problem of "insider control" caused by expanded 
autonomy and relaxed state control. It is argued that decentralizing reform, which 
gives SOEs more autonomy, has made the principal and agent problems more 
severe in SOEs and has led to "insider control" of SOEs, under which SOE 
insiders can appropriate the income and assets of SOEs. Moreover, they can 
even manipulate the account (Sicular, 1995). 
As the state's control recedes, SOEs' managers have little incentives to resist 
wage demands from insiders. Woo et al. (1994), Woo (1994) and Fan and Woo 
(1996) show that the sum of direct income and indirect income increased more 
than labour productivity growth. Bouin (1998) calculated that the marginal 
product labour of industrial SOEs increased by 5% in 1989-1993 while the 
product wage of industrial SOEs rose by 7%. Meng and Perkins (1996) found 
that SOEs were maximising income per employee like labour-managed firms. 
The increase in workers' income is also done through indirect means like better 
housing, improved transportation, etc. Direct expenditure by SOEs on social 
services for their workers is now approximately equal to the budget transfers and 
implicit financial subsidies they receive from the banking system (World Bank 
1996). 
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The third factor is the lagging behind of building a fair competition environment 
(Lin et al., 1998,1999). In recognizing the same problem of insider control and 
continued soft budget constraints, this view suggested that building an effective 
market environment is the main concern rather than privatisation. It is argued that 
the problems of insider control and soft budget constraint are caused by high 
monitoring costs under the separation of ownership and management rather than 
by the tacit definition of ownership. The separation of ownership and control is 
pervasive in an advanced market economy as well; however the existence of 
effective product markets, managerial market and capital markets lowers the 
monitoring costs and makes managers' objectives consistent with that of owners. 
The fourth one is the unfavourable competition conditions for SOEs (Lin et al., 
1998,1999). It is argued that SOEs' poor performance is to a great extent 
caused by SOE's unfavourable competition conditions, such as a heavy 
employee pension and insurance burden, irrational capital structure originating 
from the heavy industry preferred industrial development strategy, heavy debt 
burden, and a heavy fee and levy burden. Moreover, certain reform policies have 
also helped to reduce SOEs' ability to compete in the market, such as 
substituting financial grant with bank loans, etc. These unfavourable competition 
conditions in turn provide excuses for SOEs' soft budget constraints. 
3.4 Conclusion 
China's SOEs have always been the backbone of China's economy; even by 
1999,20 years into China's economic reform, SOEs still employed 58.9% of 
employees in urban areas, utilized 53.4% of national investment and produced 
about 30% of national industrial output. Since 1978, SOE reform has been the 
focal point of China's economic reform. A successful SOE reform is not only the 
key to the success of the entire economic reform but also vital to the building up 
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of a market economy and the long-term development of the Chinese economy 
(CCPC, 1984,1999; Rawski, 2000). 
Like reform in other areas, China's SOE reform has also progressed in a gradual 
and incremental way. The progress of SOE reform has been driven forward by 
the dynamic process of decentralising the state and SOEs relationship, and by 
promoting competition, and has been coordinated by the state's helping hand. 
Decentralising the state and SOEs relationship is characterised by gradually 
expanding SOEs' managerial autonomy and allowing SOEs to share profits. The 
delegation of autonomy and the granting of profit-sharing rights to SOEs have 
provided better incentives for SOEs to improve their performance. Transferring 
decision-making rights from central government to managers on the spot makes 
SOEs adapt to the markets, which is also aligned with efficiency improvement. 
On the other side, the expansion of SOE autonomy also has its costs. It has 
released the major problem of SOEs, the separation of ownership and control, 
which the old planning system tackled through central planning and highly 
suppressed enterprise autonomy. Furthermore, decentralising the state and SOE 
relationship in a dual track system carries the risk of disorganizing the whole 
economy. 
Encouraging competition is a crucial feature of SOE reform. Market competition 
is encouraged through removing entry and exit barriers, dismantling SOEs' 
monopoly and facilitating the mobility of factor markets. The most significant 
competition comes from the rapid entry of new firms, which are mostly non-state 
enterprises. The rapid entry of non-state firms has greatly reduced the monopoly 
status of SOEs, and has contributed to the rapid decline in state industry's 
relative share of industrial output. The entry of non-state firms, together with the 
setting up of managerial markets, financial markets and the necessary market 
infrastructure, has greatly increased the competition pressure that SOEs have to 
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face. SOEs, facing accelerated competitive pressures from both SOE 
counterparts and non state-owned enterprises, relative price changes and hard 
budget constraints, consequently reduced the profitability level. As a result, state 
revenue from SOEs has been falling as well. Therefore, governments have less 
finance and interests to subsidise SOEs, which makes governments grant further 
managerial autonomy to SOEs, and eventually leads to the privatisation of small 
SOEs. 
The state's co-ordination has worked through preserving SOE economic 
activities to provide the foundation for the functioning of the market track and 
constraining state monopoly and providing credible commitment in preserving 
market incentives and encouraging the entry of non-state firms. These have been 
attributed to the merits of `the two track system', which is a typical Chinese 
characteristic. Under the dual-track system, the existing central economic plan, 
and the distribution of rents under it are left intact; liberalisation is carried out at 
the margin; and economic agents have both the right and the incentives to 
participate in the free market provided that the obligations under the plan track 
are fulfilled. Consequently, the risk of "disorganisation" has been constrained, 
and the competition from non-state firms has been encouraged, which are further 
helped by the competition between local governments and the desire for local 
governments to develop local economies as results of the decentralisation of the 
central and local government relationship. Moreover, through the interaction 
between the `plan track' and `market track', the plan track has actually provided 
the foundation for the emergence of market track. 
As China's enterprise reform goes on, the effect of expanded managerial 
autonomy and profit-sharing on enterprise performance has been broadly 
studied, yet until now there is no clear cut conclusion from these studies, in fact 
two contradictory views emerged from the vast amount of research into 
enterprise performance (see Sachs and Woo (2000) and Jefferson et at. (1999) 
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for a general review of the debate). Moreover, the effect of increased competition 
has been rarely dealt with although promoting competition is another perspective 
of China's enterprise reform and its effect has been widely acknowledged. Even 
in the few studies of the relationship between enterprise performance and 
competition, "competition" is taken as a kind of market structure rather than a 
dynamic process. Moreover, how competition has worked in China during the 
transformation period, and how enterprise has responded to the increased 
competitive pressure have been rarely addressed. In fact, to study how 
enterprise has responded to increased competitive pressure is important when 
assessing the role of current and future reforms, especially among increasing 
concerns for the sustainability of China's economic growth (Sachs, Woo and 
Yang, 2000; Borensztein and Ostry, 1996) amid the recent slowdown of 
economic growth and firms' deteriorating financial performance which lend 
credence to these concerns. 
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Appendix 3.1: Enterprise Reform in WBGC: A Case Study 
In this section, I will utilise data from a typical SOE -WBGC (Wafangdian 
Bearing Group Corporation) - and the three-digit industry to which the WBGC 
belongs to illustrate the restructuring of China's SOE since 1987. Information 
on WBGC comes from its various published and unpublished annual reports. 
Background Information on WBGC 
WBGC is a state controlled company group, and is one of the 500 largest 
industrial enterprises in China. It is China's largest manufacturer of rolling 
bearings. Its predecessor is WBF (Wafangdian Bearing Factory), which was 
set up originally in 1938 and was expanded and renovated during the 1950s. 
By 1996, WBGC had about 25,000 employees and had accumulated $150 
million of fixed assets. It produced more than 4,200 varieties of bearings and 
exported to more than 70 countries (http: //www. zwz-bearing. com). Between 
1987 and 1996, WBGC's gross output value had been more than doubled, 
with an average growth rate of 11 % annually, and the labour productivity had 
been growing at 6.9% annually. 
WBF was a typical state owned enterprise, its asset was completely owned by 
the State. Since 1979, WBF and its successor WBGC have always been on 
the front of SOE reform. WBF was among the first to experiment contract 
responsibility system. In 1995, WBF was converted into state holding 
company WBGC. In 1997, WBGC's main subsidiary, Wafangdian Bearing 
Company Limited, was listed in the ShenZhen Stock Exchange. In 1999, Debt 
for Share Swap scheme was implemented in WBGC. 
Retrospectively, the reforms in WBF and WBGC have been carried out from 
four perspectives sequentially and sometimes simultaneously: profit sharing, 
contract responsibility, organisational restructuring and ownership reform. I 
will discuss them in more detail in the following. 
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Enterprise Reform in WBGC 
Performance Wages and Profit Sharing 
Responding to the reform of delegating managerial autonomy and sharing 
profit, WBF began to implement performance contingent wages and profit 
sharing schemes in 1982. Under these schemes, WBF was allowed to retain 
part of its profit contingent upon its performance. The wages of workers and 
managers changed from fixed wage to flexible wage, linked directly to their 
own output and the performance of WBF. From 1981 to 1986, the ratio of 
retained profit to its pre-tax profit increased from negligible in 1981 to nearly 
30% in 1986. The share of the bonus in total wages increased from negligible 
in 1980 to 37% in 1988. From the following figure, we can see that the growth 
of wage is positively related to the growth of sales. Yet in 1981, even when 
sales revenue declined by 15%, the total wages still increased by 5%. 
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Contract responsibility system, the primary method of SOE reform between 
1987 and 1995, was experimented in WBF before 1987. By 1987, contract 
responsibility system was made formal in WBF and had been carried out up to 
1995. Between 1987 and 1995, there were two rounds of responsibility 
contracts signed between WBF and Dalian Manufacturing Administrative 
bureau, WBF's up-layer administrative bureau. Each contract was intended to 
last for 5 years. The second contract was meant to finish by the end of 1996. 
However, at the end of 1995, intending to implement a new round of 
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enterprise reform - setting up a modern corporate system, the government 
terminated the responsibility contract with WBF. The contract adopted in 
WBF, nicknamed ShuangBao YiGua (double guarantees and one contingent), 
was mainly designed for large SOEs. Under this type of contract, SOEs had to 
guarantee the contracted profit and tax submission and to guarantee the 
completion of the planned investment and technology advance, the wage was 
contingent on the realisation of pre-tax profit. The contracted targets and 
SOEs' share of profits are usually the results of bargaining between the 
governments and SOEs. In the following, I will describe in detail the contract 
WBF signed with its local government in the second round of the process in 
1992. The details of the contract are from Xiao (1996) 
The first clause of the contract specified that WBF had to guarantee the 
submission of the contracted profit and tax, which should be rising 
annually at a rate agreed in the contract. WBF had the right to keep the 
profit beyond the contracted submission. When it failed to submit the 
contracted target, WBF had to pay the difference from its own finance. 
However, it is not defined in the contract what to do if WBF fails to meet the 
targets and cannot pay the difference from its own finances. As bankruptcy 
was not yet a likely solution for large SOEs, consequently the risk of loss is 
undoubtedly taken by the State. This feature of the contract encourages the 
managers to pursue more risky investment. Also from this term we can see 
that the firm will pursue the maximisation of retained profit rather than the 
maximisation of profit. 
The second clause specified that the contract was valid from 01/01/1992 
to 12/31/1996. 
However, this contract was terminated by the government in 1995 in order to 
implement modern corporate system reform. The relative shortness of this 
contract, compared with the 15 and 50 years responsibility contract in 
agriculture, provides the managers incentives to pursue short run interests 
rather than long-run interests. Managers had the incentives to exploit 
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maximally the existing capital rather than to invest. As the next round's 
contract would be based on the current performance, managers also had the 
incentive to conceal current profits, which was made possible by their 
expanded autonomy. 
The third clause specified the various contract targets. First, WBF had to 
invest 0.28 billion Renminbi Yuan on technology improvement in the 
next 5 year period. And the accumulative pre-tax profit should be no 
less than 0.52 billion Renminbi Yuan for the same period. Based on the 
profit and tax submitted in 1991, which was 44.55 million Renminbi 
Yuan, the submitted profit and tax should be increased by 7% annually. 
These are the targets WBF should fulfil. There are some other monitoring 
targets as well, such as sale revenues, exports, the increase of state assets, 
the increase of R&D expenditure, etc. By this clause, the government tried to 
ensure WBF's submission of profit and tax and to restrict WBF's potential 
short-term opportunism. 
The fourth clause specified that WBF's wage should be contingent on its 
pre-tax profit. The ratio of wage to pre-tax profit should be no higher 
than 80%, 95% and 100% depending on whether the ratio of profit to 
fixed assets was less than 17.6%, between 17.6% and 18%, or more than 
18%. 
It defined the upper limit of the wage, however profit is broadly defined in this 
term, including the increases of R&D expenditure, depreciation of fixed asset 
and the increase of current assets. It should be noted as well that this term 
does not mention how the wage should be paid when the firm makes a loss. 
Actually, the whole contract assumes that WBF will make a profit. In fact, 
nearly all the responsibility contracts in this period have this feature. 
The fifth and the sixth clauses specified that the welfare expenditure of 
employee should be contingent upon WBF's profit and should not 
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exceed over 38% of pre-tax profit and that the fixed assets used for 
providing employee welfare should not be over 24% of fixed assets. 
These two clauses specified how the welfare expenditure of employees 
should be funded. However, these two clauses are very difficult to monitor. As 
the material, energy and labour used in the industrial production can be easily 
transferred into welfare use. 
The seventh term emphasized that WBF should abide by government's 
standards and provisions on quality, safety, and environment. 
The eighth term stressed that WBF had autonomy to make its annual 
plan as long as it sticks to the 5 year plan agreed by the government. 
This clause specifies that WBF can only have autonomy on the annual plan if 
they commit to fulfil the central plan. Therefore, the central government plan 
still plays an important role in WBF. 
The ninth clause specifies that WBF had the right to enjoy the current 
policy on reduction and exemption of export tax and any new priority 
policies for improving SOEs' operating environment apart from policies 
changing profit and tax submission targets. 
This clause tries to ensure the stability of the profit and tax submission. 
The tenth term specified that the two sides of the contracts should abide 
by the Company Law to ensure the WBF's full management autonomy. 
In 1992, the state government put forward formally the provision that granting 
SOEs full managerial autonomy in 14 issues: producing, pricing, sales, 
procurement, exports/imports, investment, using of retained profits, disposing 
of assets, merger/acquisition, employment, personnel management, setting 
wage and bonuses, deciding the firm structure and rejecting improper fees. 
However, in two sequential surveys on SOEs' autonomy conducted in 1993 
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and 1994, it was found that SOEs were still unable to reject extra levies and 
fees, and they still had very low autonomy in the areas of exports and imports, 
acquisition and mergers, and asset management. 
The eleventh term stressed that the management of WBF would be 
rewarded or punished according to the fulfilment of the contract. 
However it had not been detailed on how the management would be 
rewarded or punished. It is more likely that the management will be promoted 
to a higher position in the government or other SOEs as a reward. But their 
wages are very rarely connected with SOEs' performance. 
The twelfth clause emphasised that all the issues not being mentioned 
in the contract would be dealt with according to the state's rule on 
contract responsibility system and the related city government's 
provisions. 
The thirteenth clause explained that the government departments 
consisted of the city bureau of machinery industry, the city taxation 
bureau, the city labour bureau, the city bureau of state asset 
management and the city economic and trade commission. 
However the state owned banks were not included in the contract, although 
they had a significant stake in WBF. 
From this contract, we can see that the Contract responsibility system 
intended to expand SOEs' managerial autonomy and to provide SOEs with 
financial incentives. However, WBF was still subordinated to its supervisory 
government bureau, which to a great extent still controlled WBF either through 
the one to one bargaining or through administration control. Second, the 
contract only acknowledged WBF's managerial autonomy in productive 
activities. It did not specify any rights for WBF in regard to the state asset. The 
contract lasted for only 5 years, this could not ensure the long term 
development of SOEs, and encouraged the managers in SOEs to pursue 
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short-term interests at the expense of long term interests. This contract also 
tried to establish a monitoring mechanism by the contracted investment 
target, profit and tax submission target. However, this contract is asymmetric, 
it is based on the assumption that WBF will make profits. It does not specify 
WBF's responsibility when it cannot meet the contracted targets. 
Organisational Restructuring 
Organisational restructuring in WBF has been conducted parallel to contract 
responsibility contract since 1987. It was deepened since 1993 when WBF 
was corporatized. The organisational restructuring implemented included: 
internal contract, chunking off subsidiaries, enterprise group and 
corporatization. 
Internal Contract 
Initially, the organisational restructuring was in the form of internal contract. 
Within WBF, the internal responsibility contract was applied to every single 
production unit. The relationships between WBF, its subsidiaries, production 
units and workers were all specified in various internal responsibility contracts. 
Based on these contracts, workers inside each production units were allowed 
to reorganize themselves in order to achieve optimal labour mix. By 1994 
around 4000 workers were made redundant from their post, yet still remained 
in WBF, and were partially paid. 
Spinning off Subsidiaries 
At the same time, in order to separate WBF's social burdens and to give its 
subsidiaries more managerial autonomy, several WBF's production 
accessories, which were set up originally to take up WBF employee's family 
members, were set aside as independent collective owned enterprises. 
Before WBF was corporatised in 1995,5 of its industrial accessories were 
spun off and made financially independent. Some other accessories, which 
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provided social welfare, such as hospitals, schools, were also made 
financially independent. 
Enterprise Group 
At the industry level, in order to facilitate the cooperation between bearing 
firms in the region, to mobilize the technology transfer and capital flow 
between the bearing firms and to save the badly performing firms, an 
industrial group was established with WBF as the centre of the group and 
several other enterprises as closely integrated affiliates and the rest as semi- 
integrated affiliates under the initiative of the provincial government. 
Corporafization 
In preparation for setting up modern corporate system, WBF was transformed 
into a legal entity in 1993. Its assets were re-examined. The assets invested 
by the state, legal persons, domestic individuals and foreign investor were 
separated. However the state was the only registered investor, this indicates 
that WBF did not invest from its own retained profits in the past. DianLian 
Machinery Administrative Bureau was recognized as the representative of the 
owner of the state assets. WBF was formally granted the right to use state 
assets and the right to have its own assets as a legal person. Under the new 
arrangement, WBF had to be responsible for the financial consequences of its 
own activities. The former top manager of WBF became WBF's legal person 
representative, the selection of which was still subject to the decision of 
DianLian Machinery Administrative Bureau. 
Ownership Restructuring 
Shareholding and Floating in the Stock Market 
In October 1995, as an experiment approved by the Liao Ning provincial 
government, WBF together with its close affiliates, such as the five 
accessories that had been made independent before 1995, was converted 
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into a State holding Company, WBGC. Its subsidiaries were converted into 
companies with WBGC as their parent company holding their majority shares. 
WBGC had a total of 551.5 million shares, among them 88.2% are legal 
person shares and 11.8% of them are employee shares. 95.6% of its 
employees are shareholders. All the legal person shares are owned by the 
state. 
In July 1996, approved by Dalian City Government, WBGC initiated to 
establish WBC, Ltd. as a joint stock company by public offering. WBGC put 
50% of its assets into WBC, and converted them into shares, of which WBGC 
held 87.22% and employees held 12.78%. A few months later the employees' 
shares in WBC were converted into WBGC's debt to employees. In February 
1997, approved by the State council, WBC was floated in China's Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange and issued domestic listed foreign investment shares (B 
Shares). WBC had a total of 330 million shares, among them 200 million were 
held by WBGC, and the other 130 million were held by foreign shareholders, 
among them Sweden's SKF held 65 million, and British Airways Pensions 
Trust was the second largest foreign shareholder with 2 million shares. 
However, the mobility of these shares was limited. According to China's law, 
state shares, legal person shares and employee shares were not allowed to 
circulate in the stock market. The transfer of state shares must be approved 
by the National State Asset Management Bureau and Provincial State Asset 
management Bureau. In the case of WBGC, only the 130 million shares 
owned by foreign investors can be transferred in the stock market, however 
they can only be circulated among foreign investors. By the end of 2001, while 
SKF still held 65 million, the British Airways Pensions Trust sold out at least 
90% of its shares in WBC. The limited mobility of shares tends to weaken the 
shareholder's discipline upon management. 
In accordance with China's Company Law, WBC set up its shareholders 
meetings, Board of Directors and Boards of Supervisors. However, on the 
Board of Directors, all the 13 directors were internal directors, and 10 of them 
are top managers of WBGC, the other three are from SKF. WBGC's president 
was the president of WBC, and WBGC's CEO was the CEO of WBC. The ten 
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directors from WBGC included the Secretary General, the Vice Secretary 
General of Communist Party and the president of the Worker Union in WBGC. 
There are 9 supervisors on the board of supervisors, three of them were from 
WBGC, five were from government departments, and one was from the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank. The insiders controlled both the Board of 
Directors and the Board of Supervisors. 
Theoretically, the President of Share Holding Company should be selected 
through shareholder meeting, and CEO should be nominated by the 
President. As WBGC controls more than 60% shares of WBC, it has a 
decisive influence upon the selection of the president. Meanwhile, the State 
controls more than 80% of WBGC's asset, and WBGC's top management are 
still appointed by the Government, therefore the government still has a 
significant influence upon the selection of the CEO. Furthermore, in WBGC 
the President, the CEO and the General Secretary of Communist Party are all 
appointed or approved by the Government, and they all have the same status 
in the bureaucratic hierarchy, therefore there are potential conflicts of 
objectives between them. 
Merger, Liquidation and Debt Share Swap 
Since its corporatization in 1995, WBGC's assets began to have some degree 
of mobility. From 1995 onwards, WBGC has made attempts to merge with 
other SOEs, to liquidate its own subsidiaries and to write off its debts, 
however the local government has actually initiated some of these attempts. 
In 1996, WBGC merged with Liaoyang Bearing Company under the initiative 
of the provincial government. Liaoyang Bearing Company is located in 
another city in Liao Ning province and was a medium SOE. It was an affiliated 
member of the Enterprise Group evolved around WBF before 1995. During 
1990s, it performed poorly, although it did not make a loss, it just broke even. 
In September 1996, under the initiation and approval of LiaoNing Council of 
Economy and Trade, Liao Yang Bearing Company merged with WBGC. In 
November 1997 WBGC's share in LiaoYang Bearing was transferred to WBC. 
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Huamei Company was a joint venture WBF set up jointly with an American 
company in 1990. WBF held 69.7% of Huamei's equity; and Huamei was an 
associated company of WBC after its floatation in the stock market. In 
September 1999, Huamei started liquidation procedure, which lasted for 18 
months. Eventually the foreign party received an amount of RMB 248,000 of 
the book value of net assets according to a ratio other than investment ratio. 
And the WBC received all the rest of the assets and liabilities and was 
responsible for the settlement of Huamei's employees. 
In 2001, in order to reduce WBGC's debt level, the interests for which 
accounted for 4.8% of sale revenue in 1996, under the Debt Share Swap 
Scheme, WBGC's Power Supply Company was set up jointly by WBGC, 
China Huarong and Greatwall Asset management Corporations, which are 
two of the four Asset management Corporations (AMC) created by China's 4 
big banks to relieve SOEs' enormous debts. Under Debt Share Swap, 
Huarong and Great Wall AMC converted WBGC's bad debt, which they 
acquired from WBGC's creditors Agricultural Bank of China and Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China, into the shares they hold in the power supply 
company. Among the 250 million Yuan RMB of Registered Capital, Huarong 
and Great Wall accounted for 90.3%. As the result of the Debt Share Swap, 
WBGC's debt asset ratio reduced by 15%. 
Joint Ventures 
WBG has successfully established joint ventures with some of the world 
famous bearing manufacturers such as Koyo Seiko (Japan), THK (Japan) and 
American General Bearing Corporation Limited and has established strategic 
partnership with SKF (Sweden). 
In 1990, WBF and an American company jointly set up Huamei Company, 
which WBF held 69.7% of its equity. In March 1996, WBGC and American 
General Bearing Corporation Limited jointly set up Wafangdian General 
Bearing Co., Ltd, WGBC. Later on in 1997, WBGC transferred its share in this 
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joint venture to WBC. In August 1996, WBGC, and Koyo Seiko Toyota Tsusho 
Corporation set up a joint venture Dalian Koyo Wazhou Automobile Bearing 
Co., Ltd. In March 1996, DaLian THK Co., Ltd. was set up as a joint venture 
between JANPAN THK Co., Ltd. and WBGC with investment of $2,990,000, in 
which the former hold 70 percent and the latter 30 percent. In May 1998, 
WBC and SKF Investment Co., Ltd jointly set up SKF Wuzhou Company with 
respective capital contribution of 49% and 51 % of equity. 
Industrial Dynamics in General Machinery Parts Manufacturing Industry 
The general machinery parts manufacturing industry, which WBGC belongs 
to, is a three-digit industry. In 1987, there were 660 firms in this industry, 
among them 87 were SOEs, 561 were COEs, 7 of the remaining 12 firms 
were joint ventures between SOEs and COEs, the ownership of the other 5 
was not identified. By 1996, the number of firms in this industry was 1055, and 
the number of SOEs and COEs were 112 and 888 respectively. The number 
of foreign invested firms increased from zero to 34. And the number of small 
firms increased by 371. 
Number of Firms in General Machinery Parts Manufacturing Industry in 
Liaoning Province 
1987 1 1996 
SOEs 87 112 
COEs 561 888 
Foreign Invested 0 34 
Total 660 1055 
SOE share in Sales (%) 59 52 
The inflow of non-SOEs had only slightly reduced the share of SOEs' sale in 
the industry from 58.8% to 51.8% between 1987 and 1996. The 4 firms' 
concentration ratio had stayed relatively stable around 34%. However the 
relatively stable SOE share and CR4 do not mean the market is static. 
Contrast to the stable aggregate picture, the industry has showed a significant 
turnover. For example, from 1988 to 1992, there were 486 new firms entered 
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the industry, while 346 old firms exit the industry, 769 of the new entries and 
exits are small COEs. Moreover, incumbent firms had also showed significant 
turnover, only 3 of the top ten firms with the highest sales in 1987 were still on 
the top 10 in 1996. In 1987, there were two non-state firms on the top ten, one 
of them was COE and was a subsidiary of WBF, and the other one was a 
state and collective joint venture. By 1996, there were two COEs and one 
Foreign Owned Firm on the top ten. The foreign owned firms actually ranked 
the second in terms of revenue. 
WBGC (WBF)'s Performance 
From 1987 to 1996, WBGC's gross output value had more than doubled, with 
an average growth rate of 11 % annually and its labour productivity had been 
growing 6.9% annually, and has always been the leader of the industry. Yet, 
the emerging and development of non-state enterprises has posed significant 
competitive pressures upon it. WBF's profit margin has been declining. Its 
pre-tax profit sale ratio declined from 33.6% in 1980 to 11.7% in the later 
1995. Its debt asset ratio has been rising from 15% in 1980 to 65% in 1994. 
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While WBGC's profitability has been declining, the share of WBGC's retained 
profit has tended to increase, which WBGC did not put into investment as it 
was proved in 1995 that the State was the only registered investor. As a 
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consequence of declining profitability and a rising share of retained profit, the 
share of profits and taxes submitted to the state declined. 
Distribution of Profit (%) 
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WBGC has also witnessed the rapid increase of inter-enterprises arrears 
since 1985. The ratio of payment due to receive to sales increased from 4.9 % 
in 1984 to 41.8% in 1995, and the ratio of payment due to pay to sales 
increased from 0.7% in 1984 to 23.6% in 1994. 
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Chapter 4: Efficiency Evaluation of Chinese 
Enterprises from 1987- 1996, a DEA Measure 
4.1 Introduction 
As was discussed in the previous chapter, there exist two contradictory views 
about the effect of China's economic reform on SOE performance. One view 
is that China's economic reform has improved SOE performance, 
characterised by increasing TFP since the 1980s (Chen et al., 1988, Jefferson 
et al., 1996; Jefferson and Singh, 1999). The other view, based on the 
evidence of declining SOE profitability, is that economic reform has not 
improved SOEs' performance, and that SOEs have actually become a 
destabilizing influence on the whole economy (Sachs and Woo, 2000). 
However, neither productivity nor profitability is necessarily a good indicator of 
enterprise performance in transition economies. On one hand, Bai et al. 
(1997) suggested that improved productivity could possibly be an index of 
even lower economic efficiency given the significant non-profit objectives of 
SOEs. They suggested that when the objectives of the manager differs from 
that of profit maximization, higher productivity can induce distorted behaviour 
that partially or totally offsets efficiency gains from improved technology'. On 
the other hand, falling profitability may result from the emergence of 
competition from non-state enterprises, which is a desirable effect of 
economic reform (Naughton, 1995; Jefferson and Rawski, 1994). Moreover, 
falling profitability could be the result of expanded managerial autonomy, as 
when managers' autonomy expands, they have both the incentive and 
discretion to manipulate the financial account (Sicular, 1995). 
'For example, when SOEs' performance is assessed by output level, manager's objectives 
will be biased toward increasing output, and deviate further from profit-maximizing output 
level. One such evidence in China is the high level of inventory. According to the China 
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In order to assess accurately the effect of China's enterprise reform, there is 
clearly a need to measure enterprise performance in a more robust fashion. 
As efficiency improvement is a major objective of economic reform, and is 
considered a survival condition for firms in a competitive environment and is 
central to firm's long term growth (Bain, 1969), in this chapter we will assess 
directly enterprises' efficiency, and investigate the effects of economic reforms 
and increased competition upon enterprise efficiency. 
This chapter is organised as follows: in section 2, the concept of efficiency 
and the efficiency measurement used in this chapter are introduced: Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and the Malmquist Productivity Index; in section 
3, the data used in this chapter are described. In section 4, the estimations of 
DEA and the Malmquist index are implemented and the results of these 
estimations are reported. In Section 5, we discuss a number of mechanisms 
by which enterprise efficiency can be improved, and a panel data analysis is 
used to estimate the effect of enterprise efficiency determinants upon firms' 
efficiency indexed by the efficiency score estimated in section 4. In section 6, 
a dynamic panel data analysis is applied to study the dynamic process by 
which firms strive to catch up with technology frontier. The final section 
concludes. 
4.2 Concept of Efficiency and Efficiency Measurement 
4.2.1 Concept of Efficiency 
The efficiency of a production unit is defined as the ratio of observed to 
optimal values of its output and input. The comparison can take the form of 
the ratio of observed to maximum potential output obtainable from the given 
Statistical Yearbook (2000), inventory build-up accounted for 6.1% of GDP on average 
between 1990 and 1997. 
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input, or the ratio of minimum potential to observed input required producing 
the given output (Lovell, 1993). In this comparison, the optimum is defined in 
terms of production possibility, and efficiency is technical. The optimum can 
also be defined in terms of the behavioural goal of the production unit, and 
efficiency is measured by comparing the observed and optimal cost, revenue, 
profit, or other organisational objectives subject to constraints on quantities 
and prices. Under such a comparison, efficiency is economic. Economic (or 
productive) efficiency of a firm consists of two components: technical 
efficiency, which reflects the ability of a firm to obtain maximal output from a 
given set of inputs, and allocative efficiency, which reflects the ability of a firm 
to combine the inputs and the outputs in optimal proportions, given their 
respective prices. 
Koopmans (1951) provided a formal definition of technical efficiency: a 
production unit is technically efficient if an increase in any output requires a 
reduction in at least one other output or an increase in at least one input, and 
if a reduction in any input requires an increase in at least one other input or a 
reduction in at least one output. Debreu (1951) and Farrell (1957), who drew 
upon the work of Koopmans (1951), introduced a measure of technical 
efficiency, which is defined as one minus the maximum equi-proportionate 
reduction in all inputs that still allows continued production of given outputs. 
Lovell (1993) provided a measure of economic efficiency by the ratio of 
minimum cost to observed cost, given the objective of the production unit is 
cost minimisation. A measure of allocative efficiency can then be calculated 
by the ratio of economic efficiency to technical efficiency. 
This idea can be illustrated in simple firms using two inputs X1 , X2 to produce 
a single output q. The unit isoquant of the efficient firms is represented by 
AA in Figure 4.1, and assumes constant returns to scale. It shows various 
combinations of inputs producing a unit level of output. 
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Fig 4.1 Illustration of the Measure of Efficiency 
X2/q 
B 
X1/q 
If Point P is a specific firm, then the output oriented technical efficiency of firm 
P will be defined as: 
Technical efficiency= 
OR 
OP 
(4.1) 
A producer is said to be technically efficient if production occurs on the 
boundary of the producer's production possibilities; it is technically inefficient if 
production occurs in the interior of the production possibilities set. The term 
technical inefficiency is used to embrace all reasons for actual performance 
falling short of that which could be attained given inputs. Liebenstein's (1966) 
X -inefficiency is one component. 
In Figure 4.1, the input price is represented by the line BB, so that the 
allocative efficiency (price efficiency) of the firm operating at p is defined as: 
Allocative Efficiency = OS (4.2) 
OR 
The economic efficiency is defined as a product of technical and allocative 
efficiency, which is the overall cost of producing at Q relative to p. 
Economic efficiency= OS = OR X 
OS (4.3) 
OP OP OR 
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4.2.2 Efficiency Measurement: Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
Over the past 40 years, economic efficiency has been estimated using two 
frontier models: stochastic and non-stochastic. Econometric approaches and 
mathematics programming approaches have been used to estimate these two 
frontiers. Both of these two methods try to identify the production frontier and 
then measure how far away actual output is from the production frontier. 
Generally, the econometric approaches are parametric, combining the 
technical progress with inefficiency, while the mathematical programming 
approaches are non-parametric. Econometric approaches are stochastic, and 
try to distinguish random noise from inefficiency. Mathematical programming 
approaches do not distinguish noise from inefficiency. However, the 
econometric approaches confound the effects of misspecification of functional 
form with inefficiency. The mathematical programming approach is less prone 
to this type of specification error (Lovell, 1993). The most commonly used 
econometric approach is Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA). Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is the most frequently used mathematical 
programming approach. 
Stochastic Frontier models assumes the following function form: 
y=f (X) exp(u + v) (4.4) 
where v is random disturbance that captures the effects of statistical noise 
and is distributed as N(0,6? ) , the disturbance 
term u is independent of v, 
u<_ O. The deterministic production frontier is f (X) , which shows 
the 
technical possibility, the stochastic production frontier is f (X) exp(v), which 
captures the random influence of environment. And technical efficiency can be 
estimated as below: 
Technical efficiency (TE)= 
1' 
f (X) exp(v) 
= exp(u) (4.5) 
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In order to calculate TE, first equation (4.4) has to be calculated, then the 
residual has to be deconstructed into noise and technical inefficiency. The 
estimation was first implemented by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977), etc. 
The deconstruction was first proposed by Jondrow, Lovell, Materov, and 
Schmidt (1982). 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), proposed originally by Charnes, Cooper 
and Rhodes (1978), involves the use of linear programming methods to 
construct a non-parametric piece-wise surface (or frontier) over the data, and 
against which the efficiency is measured. It is a generalisation of the Farrell 
(1957) single-input/single-output efficiency measures to the multiple-output 
case by constructing a relative efficiency score as the ratio of single "virtual" 
output to single "virtual" input. 
In DEA, there are typically n Decision-Making Units (DMU) to be evaluated, 
each DMU using different amounts of m inputs to produce s different outputs. 
DEA tries to identify a set of best practice DMUs to form an envelopment 
surface, called the empirical production function or the efficient frontier. This 
set of best practice DMUs are those for which no other DMUs or linear 
combination of DMUs has as much or more of every output (given a fixed 
amount of inputs - for an output-oriented model) or as little or less of every 
input (given a fixed amount of outputs - for an input-oriented model). The 
envelopment frontier is formed as a piecewise linear combination that 
connects the set of these best practice DMUs, yielding a convex production 
possibility set. By comparing each DMU to the envelopment surface, the DEA 
provides a computational analysis of relative efficiency for multiple 
input/output situations. Units which lie on the surface are efficient; those 
which do not lie on the surface are inefficient. Thus DEA provides a measure 
of relative efficiency. 
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The basic DEA model is described as follow: 
T 
u Y; max 
Uv 
vT xi 
(4.6) 
subject to 
T 
uyj<_1 
vT xl 
j =1,2,..., i,... n 
u, v>_0 
Where (x;, y1) is the input-output vector to be evaluated, (x1, y; ) is the input- 
output vector of the j th production unit in the sample. This model estimates a 
set of non-negative weights UT and vT which, when applied to every 
production unit's input and output, maximizes the ratio of weighted output-to- 
input ratio for the production unit being evaluated. 
One problem with the above ratio formulation is that it has an infinite number 
of solutions, since if (u*, v) is optimal, then (au*, av*) is also optimal for a>0. 
Charnes et al. (1978) solved this problem by imposing the constraint VT X1 =1, 
and transformed the above basic model as follows: 
maxu ,, uT y; 
(4.7) 
St VTx; =1 
uT yj _T xj 
< o, j=1,2,..., N, 
uT, vT >_0 
Using the duality2 in linear programming, an equivalent envelopment form of 
this problem can be derived as follows: 
min B,, 0 
(4.8) 
sr -yi +Ya, >-o 
O; - X/I >- o 
A>o 
2 While the envelopment form provides information on efficiency and peers, 
the multiplier form 
provides information on shadow prices. 
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where X is an MxN input matrix with columns xj, Y is an SxN output 
matrix with columns y, ,9 is a scalar, and A is aNx1 vector of constants. 
This dual constructs a piecewise linear "envelopment" approximating to the 
true frontier by minimizing the levels of the inputs required to produce the 
given level of outputs. This envelopment form involves fewer constraints than 
the multiplier form (K +M <_ N+1), and hence is generally the preferred form 
to solve. The value of 0 obtained will be the efficiency score for the ith firm. It 
satisfies: B _< 
1, with a value of 1 indicating a point on the frontier and hence a 
technically efficient firm. This linear programming problem is solved N times, 
once for each production unit being evaluated, to generate N optimal values 
of (0, A). 
The DEA model above imposes the restriction of constant returns to scale 
(CRS). Imperfect competition, constraints on finance, etc., may cause a 
production unit to be not operating at optimal scale. Banker et al. (1984) 
suggested an extension of the CRS DEA model to account for variable returns 
to scale (VRS) situations by adding to equation (4.8) the constraints eT A =1, 
where e is aN by 1 vector of ones. The use of the CRS specification when 
not all DMUs are operating at the optimal scale will result in measures of 
technical efficiency (TE) that are confounded by scale efficiencies (SE). 
The calculation of technical efficiency and scale efficiency is illustrated for a 
single input and a single output in Fig 4.2. 
The technical efficiency of a production unit represented by point K in the 
case of Constant Returns to Scale (CRS) is 
HI 
. 
In the case of Variable 
HK 
Returns to Scale (VRS), the technical efficiency is 
HJ 
, and scale efficiency 
is 
HK 
HI 
, so 
that 
Hi 
TEcrs= 
HI 
= 
HJ * HI =TErs*Scale Efficiency 
HK HK HJ 
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Fig 4.2 Illustration of DEA Calculation 
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H 
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CRS: Constant Returns to Scale; 
VRS: Variable Returns to Scale 
'S 
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DEA has already been applied widely to estimate various kind of efficiency in 
both public service and private sectors, one example is Leibenstein and 
Maital's (1992) estimation of X-efficiency, and DEA has several features that 
are attractive to this study. 
Firstly, unlike SFA, which assumes a common production function form for all 
the firms in the sample, DEA places no restrictions on the functional form of 
the production relationship. Each firm can have a production function of its 
own. It is more flexible in recognizing differences in production functions 
between firms. This is an advantage, which is particularly attractive for this 
study, as one of the assumptions for production function selection in SFA is 
perfect market competition, which is not applicable in transition economies. 
Secondly, it deals with individual units rather than population averages. DEA 
is oriented toward individual firms that are regarded as responsible for utilizing 
inputs to produce the outputs of interest. It therefore utilizes n optimizations, 
one for each firm, rather than the single optimization that is usually associated 
with the regressions used in traditional efficiency analyses. Hence, the DEA 
solution is unique for each firm under evaluation. This is also advantageous 
for this study, as firms in transition economies - especially in a developing 
fDQ 
161 
EN 
transition economy such as China's - are in a range of developmental stages 
and adopt a range of technologies 
Thirdly, DEA focuses on revealing the best practice production frontier rather 
than on the general tendency of the frontier. Firms are directly compared 
against a peer or combination of peers, and for each firm, a single efficiency 
index to measure the utilisation of input factors to produce desired outputs is 
produced (Charnes et al., 1994). 
However, the same characteristics that make DEA attractive can also create 
problems. It is deterministic and only gives point estimates that do not provide 
information about uncertainty in estimation, and the estimation depends 
heavily upon the correct identification of frontier units. Hence, measurement 
error can cause significant problems. 
4.2.3 Measurement of Productivity Change: The Malmquist Index 
The concept of efficiency is closely linked with the concept of productivity, 
which is generally defined as the ratio of the outputs that the firm produces to 
a measure of the inputs that it uses. Productivity varies due to differences in 
production technology, differences in the efficiency of production process, and 
differences in the environment in which production occurs. Productivity growth 
therefore comes from the improvement in efficiency of the production process, 
the advancement of production technology (the outward shift of a production 
frontier), and improvement in the environment (Lovell, 1993). 
As it is observed in the Chinese context that China's economic reform has 
improved labour productivity and TFP at both firm level and aggregate level, 
we would like to see to what extent the improvement in firms' efficiency 
contributes to this productivity growth. It has been discussed in Chapter 3 that 
there are some problems in applying TFP estimation to firms in transition 
economies, a non-parametric Malmquist approach, which has been developed 
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by Fare et al., (1989) and their associates as a way of deconstructing 
productivity growth, is applied to estimate a firm-specific productivity index. 
Fare and Grosskopf (1992) defined an output based Malmquist productivity 
change index between period s (the base period) and the period t as: 
mxx= 
do'(xt, Y, ) 
X 
dö(xt, Y() 
0(YS9 S3Ytg t) [d: (x5, y5) d0 (xs 
9 
YS 
) 
where dö (xy, ) represents the distance of firm O's performance in period t 
relative to the period s technology. This Malmquist index represents the 
productivity change of the production point (x,, yt) relative to the production 
point (xs, yS ). It is the geometric mean of a pair of ratios of output distance 
functions. The first ratio compares the performance of firm 0 from periods s 
and t(t > s) relative to production possibilities in period s, and the second 
ratio compares the performance of the same data relative to production 
possibilities in period t. 
The above formula can be rewritten as: 
M, (y ,x, y x) = 
dö(xt, y, ) [d: (x, y) 
X 
dö(xs, ys) z 
ossr dö(xs, ys) dö(xr, yr) dö(xs, ys) 
This deconstructs the Malmquist output-oriented productivity change index 
into the product of two terms. The first term is the ratio of two output distance 
functions' technical efficiency indices from periods t and s, which indicates 
whether technical efficiency has improved. The second term is a geometric 
mean of the shifts in the production frontier in two directions, which shows 
whether or not there is a technical change. 
Efficiency change = _do 
(x`' y` 
dos (xs , Ys 
) 
ds(. -, vt 
=x 
ds( 
S , ysTechnical change ° [c1ö(_ 
t, ,) 
do(xs, ys) 
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The implementation of this is similar to DEA and is achieved by solving four 
sets of linear programming problems, which will not be discussed here. This 
deconstruction is illustrated in Figure 4.3 involving a single input and a single 
output, where a constant return to scale technology is assumed. F' and FS 
are production frontiers in period t and s respectively. The firm produces 
y' (x') and ys(xs) respectively in periods t ands . In each period, the firm is 
operating below the technology for that period. 
Fig 4.3 Decomposition of The Malmquist Productivity Index 
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Using the above equations, we obtain: 
Efficiency change = Yr/Yd 
Ys /Ya 
Technical change =[ y' 
/y` 
x ys 
/y° 
1 "' 
Ys lyb 
and 
Malmquist Productivity Index =Y 
/Yd 
X[ X 1i '2 
Ys / Ya Yr 
/Yd Ys /Yb 
x 
In this section, the methods of efficiency and productivity measurements have 
been discussed, in particular the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and the 
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Malmquist Productivity Index. In the section 4.4, these two methods will be 
applied in the context of Chinese firms to estimate firms' efficiency and 
productivity improvement. 
4.3 Data 
The data set used in this study is an unbalanced panel of data for the period 
1987-1996 from a Northern Chinese province, Liaoning, covering all the large 
and medium manufacturing enterprises in this province. In fact, the reform of 
large and medium SOEs has always been the focus of the China's enterprise 
reform. Moreover, the period 1987-1996 is the period when economic reform 
evolved, as discussed in Chapter 3, from `crossing the river by groping for 
stones' to establishing a market economic system, while SOE reforms 
gradually changed from expanding managerial autonomy and allowing profit- 
sharing to establishing a modern enterprise system and privatising small 
SOEs on a large scale. 
In China, the size of enterprises is classified according to criteria put forward 
in 1988 and amended in 1992 by the National Economic and Trade 
Committee, National Planning Committee, National Statistics Bureau, National 
Financial Ministry and National Personnel Ministry. According to these criteria, 
enterprises can be classified into Extremely Large, Large I, Large II, Medium I, 
Medium II and Small Enterprises according to their productive capacity and/or 
productive fixed assets. For example, in the iron and steel industry, 
enterprises are classified according to their steel production capacity and/or 
their productive fixed assets. See the table below: 
Table 4.1 Enterprise Size Classification Criteria for Iron and Steel 
Industry 
Extreme 
Large 
Large I Large II Medium I Medium II Small 
Capacity >=1.5 >=1 0.6 -1 0.3-0.6 0.1 -0.3 <0.1 
million Million million million million million 
tons tons tons tons tons tons 
Productive >1 billion 
Fixed Asset Yuan RMB 
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Each year, enterprises may apply to upgrade their classification as long as 
they have reached the required criteria. Therefore, this data set is dynamic 
and unbalanced, as a small firm may enter the dataset when it has reached 
the required criteria for being a medium firm. 
These enterprises consist of various ownership forms and administration 
structures, and are distributed in various manufacturing sectors. Table 4.2 
presents the distribution of these enterprises across various ownership types 
over the period under study. Most of the large and medium enterprises are 
SOEs; however, the share of SOEs is decreasing. In 1987,87.5% of large 
and medium enterprises were SOEs; this share decreased to 66.4% in 1996. 
The share of COEs has been relatively stable at around 15%. The number of 
non-public large and medium enterprises increased rapidly from 1 in 1987 to 
286 in 1996. 
Table 4.2: The Distribution of Large and Medium Enterprises in Liao 
Ning Province. 
Number 
SOEs COEs 
Domestic Joint Foreign Share 
of Firms Private Venture Owners holding 
1987 784 686 97 1 0 0 0 
1988 812 688 121 2 1 0 0 
1989 938 782 149 4 3 0 0 
1990 970 806 153 5 6 0 0 
1991 1054 866 169 0 14 5 0 
1992 1258 1012 224 1 16 5 0 
1993 1315 1020 182 47 36 5 25 
1994 1318 952 188 42 69 20 47 
1995 1559 1052 241 31 128 45 62 
1996 1488 988 214 27 130 61 68 
Similar to the picture of manufacturing enterprises at the national level, the 
performance of these enterprises has also shown a trend of declining 
profitability and rapidly increasing labour productivity. Fig 4.4 shows the labour 
productivity and profitability of these enterprises for the period of 1987-1996. 
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Labour productivity more than doubled, but the profit-sales ratio declined from 
around 12% in 1987 to less than 3% in 1996 (see Fig 4.4). 
Fig 4.4 Rising Labour Productivity (1987=100) and 
Falling Profitability (%) of Large and Medium 
Enterprises in Liao Ning (1987-1996) 
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4.4 Efficiency and Productivity: DEA and The Malmquist 
Productivity Index 
In this section, the efficiency index and the Malmquist productivity index are 
estimated for each enterprise over the 10 year period, then the average 
efficiency index and Malmquist index are reported, and the features of the 
frontier firms will also be discussed. 
4.4.1 Input and Output Variables 
There are five main variables involved in the estimation: four input variables 
(employment, two types of assets (fixed assets and current assets), and 
intermediate material inputs), and one output variable (industrial output). The 
variables are defined as follows: 
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Industrial Output: Gross value of industrial output (GVIO) in current prices is 
used as the measure of industrial output. This is a more appropriate measure 
than value-added, as value added can take negative values, which is not 
allowed in DEA. However, this measure also has its problems. For instance, 
due to the government regulation of strategic important industries, the prices 
of important products, such as coal, iron and steel, and oil etc., have long 
been subject to state controls and been set at lower than market prices, hence 
using gross value as the output measure of these products may 
underestimate the efficiency of firms in these industries. Another problem 
associated with using gross value of industrial output is that emphasising 
output maximization deviates from the market-oriented objectives of economic 
reform. In order to solve this problem, we include both intermediate inputs and 
current capital as inputs, as the unsold products are recorded as inventory, a 
component of current asset, according to China's accounting practice. 
Employment: The annual average number of employees, which captures the 
employment situation throughout the whole year rather than just the year-end 
employment situation, is used in this study. However, the data do not 
distinguish between production workers, researchers and management 
(including production workers, technicians, and management). In general, 
large SOEs have the highest ratio of management to production workers, and 
TVEs and Private Enterprises have the lowest management- production ratio. 
Assets: two types of assets - fixed assets and current assets - are 
distinguished. The reasons for distinguishing current assets are that they 
typically account for a third of a firm's total assets, and they capture the firms' 
liquidity, in which the non-state firms are constrained and SOEs are 
comparatively advantaged. 
Fixed assets consist of two components: productive assets and non- 
productive assets, both measured at their historical prices. Productive assets 
include infrastructure, machinery and equipment for industrial production, 
whereas non-productive assets refer to apartment buildings for employees, 
hospitals, and sometimes even schools. 
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Current assets include product inventory, short-term investment, cash, 
accounts receivable, and notes receivable, etc. For all enterprises, both year- 
end value of current assets and the annual average value of current assets 
were recorded. As the current assets fluctuate over the accounting year, here 
I use the annual average current capital to capture the characteristics of 
current capital in a whole year. 
Intermediate inputs: Intermediate inputs are measured in current prices. 
Intermediate inputs in general include raw materials, energy, depreciation, 
and other material consumption. They also include bought in components and 
services. 
As DEA is carried out on a year-by-year basis for the 10 year period, and 
each firm is compared to its concurrent production frontier, measuring gross 
industrial output, fixed assets, current assets and intermediate inputs in 
current prices is not a problem. However, in order to calculate a Malmquist 
index, which estimates the change of efficiency and the shift of production 
frontiers over time, these variables have to be deflated. As the Malmquist 
productivity index in this study is estimated for a firm over two consecutive 
years, inputs and output are only deflated to the previous year's price level. 
For fixed assets, only the newly increased assets are deflated. The fixed asset 
deflator can be found from the Statistical Yearbook of China. The intermediate 
input deflator can also be found from the same source. For current assets, 
due to its mobility, the inflation rate is used as the deflator. For Gross Value of 
Industrial Outputs (GVIO), we have the growth rate of GVIO in constant prices 
as a given, the deflated GVIO is calculated therefore by multiplying the 
previous year's GVIO in current prices by the growth rate of GVIO in constant 
prices. 
4.4.2 Economic Efficiency Index: DEA analysis 
The actual calculation process of the DEA efficiency index was conducted by 
EMS (Efficiency Management System) Version 1.3 developed by Scheel 
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(2000). We did not distinguish scale efficiency and allowed for super 
efficiency. In order to check the robustness of the DEA results, Stochastic 
Frontier Analysis was also performed. 
The average efficiency index and the market share weighted average 
efficiency index are presented in Fig 4.5. We can see that between 1987 and 
1990, there was a 10% increase in the average efficiency index. However, 
from 1990 onwards, there was a widening gap between the best practice firms 
and the majority of firms, as DEA estimates the comparative efficiency. The 
average efficiency index had decreased from 58.36% in 1990 to 34.67% in 
1996. The fact that the market share weighted average efficiency index lies 
above the simple average efficiency index indicates that larger firms tend to 
be more efficient. 
Fig 4.5. Average Efficiency Index 
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The widening efficiency gap since 1990 has also been confirmed by the 
results from Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA)3 (See Fig 4.6), which has 
shown a similar tendency for the efficiency index as that estimated from DEA 
since 1988. Moreover, the SFA results also suggest that larger firms tend to 
be more efficient, as the market share weighted average efficiency index lies 
above the mathematical average efficiency index. 
Fig 4.6 Average Efficiency Index by SFA 
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When we compare the average efficiency index of different ownership forms 
(See Fig 4.7), SOEs are the least efficient, with their average below the 
population average. The average efficiency index of foreign-invested firms is 
more than 15% higher than that of SOEs, even though they entered this 
dataset only after 1991. COEs also show higher technical efficiency; however, 
they are dominated by foreign-invested firms. It should also be noted that 
since 1990 and 1991, the efficiency gaps have been increasing across all 
ownership types. 
3 In SFA, we assume a Translog production function, and take gross value of industrial 
outputs as output, total asset and the average number of employees as inputs. 
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Fig 4.7 Efficiency Index by Ownership 
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This widening efficiency gap might have been caused on the one hand by the 
entry of new firms, which brings in new technology and new management 
practices and shifts forward the technology frontier; on the other hand, it might 
have been caused by the inability of inefficient firms to exit. Taking into 
account the dynamic feature of the dataset, the average efficiency indices of 
incumbent firms, new entries4 and exits5 are calculated. Fig 4.8 shows that 
new entries are indeed more efficient than incumbent firms on average; exits 
are less efficient than incumbent firms. 
4 New entries are generally former small enterprises developing into medium enterprises. 
5 Large and Medium Firms exit normally in the form of merger. 
172 
Fig 4.8 Efficiency Index by Entry, Incumbent and Exit 
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4.4.3 Productivity Growth: Malmquist Index 
In this section, firms' Malmquist productivity Index has been estimated and 
deconstructed into technological progress and efficiency improvement. Due to 
the unbalanced nature of the data set, the Malmquist Index can only be 
calculated for firms surviving for two continuous years. The calculation is also 
done by EMS (Efficiency Management System) developed by Scheel (2000). 
Fig 4.9 shows the average Malmquist Productivity Index by types of 
ownership. Except in 1989 and 1990, the Malmquist Index has been 
increasing, although the average Malmquist index has been fluctuating. And 
for the 10-year period, the annual average growth of Malmquist productivity is 
2.1%. In terms of ownership, COEs again outperform SOEs. Moreover, the 
Malmquist Productivity Index seems to be correlated with the growth of Gross 
Industrial Output. 
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Fig 4.9 Malmquist Index and Gross Industrial Output 
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As the Malmquist productivity index is the product of efficiency change and 
technological change (see section 4.2.3), by deconstructing the Malmquist 
index into efficiency change and the technological change (See Fig 4.10), we 
can see that the contribution to productivity improvement orienting from 
technical change seems to dominate the contribution from efficiency 
improvement in most years especially after 1991, indicating that productivity 
growth comes mainly from technical progress rather than from efficiency 
improvement. 
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Fig 4.10 Decomposition of Malmquist Productivity Index 
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4.4.4 Who Lead Technology Advance? The Features of Frontier Firms 
With a panel data of firms, we can investigate the features of firms on the 
production frontier and the movement of firms on the frontiers, and examine 
what types of firms lead the technological advance in the context of China's 
economic reform. It is also of interest to study the stability of the efficient units, 
which strengthens the reliability of the approach if the same units appear on 
the frontier over time. We first examine the distribution of frontier units by 
ownership for the period between 1987 and 1996 (See table 4.3), 
Table 4.3 The Distribution of Frontier Units by Ownership 
Year SOE COE DPE FOR SHARE Total 
1987 10 10 
1988 12 12 
1989 14 2 16 
1990 18 2 1 21 
1991 11 4 2 17 
1992 12 3 4 19 
1993 7 6 2 5 20 
1994 8 7 1 7 2 25 
1995 2 5 5 12 
1996 3 3 2 8 1 17 
SOE: State Owned Enterprises; COE: Collective Owned Enterprises; DPE: Domestic Private 
Enterprises; FOR: Foreign Invested Firms; Share; Share Holding Companies 
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It is observed that at the beginning of the period, all the frontier units were 
SOEs. However, since 1989, non-state-owned enterprises began to occur on 
the production frontier. Most significantly thereafter is the retreat of SOEs from 
the production frontier and the occurrence of foreign-invested firms (joint 
ventures and foreign-owned) on the frontier. By 1996, of all the 17 firms on the 
production frontier, only 3 were SOEs, but 8 of them were foreign-owned and 
joint ventures. The number of COEs on the frontier was on the increase as 
well, especially during the early 1990s. As such, we may argue that newly- 
entered firms such as COEs in the1980s, and the foreign-owned firms and 
joint ventures in 1990s tend to bring into the product markets new 
technologies or new governance mechanisms, which make them more 
efficient than their counterparts in state sectors. This result is arguably 
contrary to Jefferson et al. 's (1999) idea that SOEs lead in innovations. 
The movement of firms on the technology frontier is examined in Table 4.4. 
Before 1993, the frontier units were relatively stable. For example, of the 10 
firms on the production frontier in 1987,4 firms were still on the production 
frontier in 1992; and of the 12 firms on the production frontier in 1988,6 firms 
were still on the frontier in 1992. However, after 1992, the movement of firms 
on the production frontier accelerated. For example, of the 19 firms on the 
production frontier in 1992, only 2 firms were still on the production frontier in 
1996. 
Table 4.4 The Movement of Firms On The Production Frontier 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
1987 10 76 6 3 4 1 0 0 1 
1988 12 10 8 4 6 2 1 1 2 
1989 16 9 5 6 2 1 1 2 
1990 21 9 7 4 2 1 2 
1991 17 10 4 3 2 1 
1992 19 5 4 1 2 
1993 23 5 3 1 
1994 25 4 3 
1995 12 4 
1996 17 
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Another significant feature that should be noted is the extent of the occurrence 
of new entries on the production frontier (see Table 4.5). In fact, more than 
half of the frontier units entered the sample in the previous three years. 
Table 4.5 The Occurrence of New Entries On The Production Frontier 
Total 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
1987 10 
1988 12 3 
1989 16 1 4 
1990 21 3 2 4 
1991 17 2 4 4 
1992 19 2 3 4 
1993 23 3 3 5 
1994 25 5 7 3 
1995 12 3 04 
1996 17 164 
For example, of the 21 frontier units in 1990,3 firms entered the sample in 
1988,2 of them entered the sample in 1989, and 4 of them entered in 1990; 
and of the 17 frontier units in 1996,11 did not present in the sample until 
1994. 
Firms on the production frontier tend to have far higher efficiency scores than 
the population average in the following years (see Table 4.6), even though 
they might not be on the frontier anymore. For example, the average 
efficiency index of year 1987 frontier units in 1996 was nearly twice as high as 
that of the population average, and the average efficiency index of year 1992 
frontier units in 1996 was 2.2 times as high as that of the population average. 
Table 4.6 The Average Efficiency Score of Frontier Firms (%) in the Following Years 
1 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
1987 Frontier 116.14 110.30 98.78 94.72 99.77 72.93 70.91 51.50 b2. bl 
1988 Frontier 117.15 102.36 93.92 92.39 69.32 72.25 53.29 69.82 
1989 Frontier 99.84 91.75 88.66 68.49 67.55 49.07 64.51 
1990 Frontier 108.50 100.18 74.18 77.94 53.83 59.60 
1991 Frontier 116.79 81.24 85.26 74.10 74.30 
1992 Frontier 82.69 78.37 67.06 74.48 
1993 Frontier 92.50 59.66 58.51 
1994 Frontier 74.66 75.02 
1995 Frontier 82.28 
Average 53.83 48.73 58.36 54.62 50.67 47.28 46.10 34.59 34.67 
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4.5 Economic Efficiency, Ownership, Competition and 
Internal Incentive 
Why does firm' efficiency differ?, why are SOEs less efficient in particular?, 
and what are the effects of economic reform and increasing market 
competition on firms' efficiency? Using a panel data analysis, this section 
tries to answer these questions by estimating what determines firms' 
efficiency in the Chinese context. 
4.5.1 Determinants of Enterprise Efficiency 
According to the theories of the firm, firms' inefficiency arises due to the 
separation of ownership and control. As firms' ownership and control are 
separated, there exists the agency problem - managers tending to pursue 
their own goals at the expense of those of shareholders (Edlin and Stiglitz, 
1995; Williamson, 1964). This agency problem cannot be dealt with through a 
complete contract that can be monitored without cost (Hart, 1995; Mayer, 
1996; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). To induce the firm's manager to maximize 
profitability and to make the firm more efficient, the principal can provide 
incentives to the manager, making his pay dependent on the observed cost 
(Laffont and Tirole, 1986), therefore firms' efficiency can be improved by 
giving managers stronger incentives, or by flattening the hierarchy. 
Competition in the capital market, product market and managerial market can 
reinforce internal discipline based on performance contingence incentive 
contracts. Competitive markets and the ease of entry and exit are assumed to 
be able to reinforce firms' internal discipline and enhance firms' performance 
(Vickers, 1995; Nickell, 1996). There are two ways that competition may affect 
the behaviour of firms. The first effect is described by Vickers (1995) and 
Nickell (1996) as "discovery and selection", in which a low cost entrant will 
generate "disturbance' to the market equilibrium and may drive high cost 
incumbent exit. The second effect of competition is to sharpen managers' 
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incentives. It is argued that both managers' explicit incentives and implicit 
incentives will be improved as the numbers of competitors increase 
(Holmstrom, 1982; Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983; Hart, 1983; Nickell, 1995). 
Besides, in a competitive managerial market, competition helps to reveal the 
true ability of managers, and the concern for a future career induces efficient 
managerial behaviours (Fama, 1980; Holmstrom, 1999). The existence of the 
threat of 'takeover' in the capital market also acts as an incentive mechanism 
that deters management from the pursuit of policies that are substantially at 
variance with the interests of shareholders ( Vickers and Yarrow, 1988; Fama 
and Jensen, 1983; Grossman and Hart, 1980). 
As such the differences in firms' efficiency can be attributed to the difference 
in the efforts of workers and managers, the organisational structure of 
production and the use of innovations, what Nickell termed as `technology', 
and the differences in market conditions, including product market 
competition, market for corporate control and financial discipline (Nickell, 
1995). In addition, firms' size is also related to their efficiency (Hopenhayn, 
1992) 
Based on the above theoretical background and bearing in mind the debates 
around Chinese enterprise performance mentioned in Chapter 3, we will 
discuss the effects of ownership, market competition, and financial discipline 
upon enterprise efficiency in the Chinese context, together with the effects of 
the socialist legacy. 
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4.5.2 Determinants of Efficiency in Chinese Enterprises 
Ownership 
Chinese enterprises typically have five different ownership forms: State- 
Owned Enterprises (SOEs), Collectively-Owned Enterprises (COEs), Share 
ownership, Domestic Private-Owned Enterprises, China-Foreign Joint 
Ventures and Foreign Private-Owned Enterprises. Differences in the 
incentives of owners may result in difference in objectives of the enterprises 
they control, which leads to the difference in enterprise performance. 
Under government intervention, SOEs may pursue objectives such as social 
stability rather than profit maximization, which consequently leads to soft 
budget constraints, and eventually inefficiency (Kornai, 1980; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1994; Vickers and Yarrow, 1988). 
COEs, in particular TVEs, are often believed to be more efficient than their 
state counterparts. COEs, in particular TVEs, are allegedly representing 
hybrid ownership forms emerging as transitional devices in the course of 
transition (Nee, 1992; Tian and Li, 1995; Tian, 2000; McMillan, 1997). 
Community members own these firms collectively, in fact they are controlled 
by community governments, and the profits are shared by community 
members. Although COE is a form of public ownership, they are not subject to 
central planning and have greater autonomy and face harder budget 
constraints. Furthermore, the government's stake in COEs helps firms to 
access state finance and rationed materials, overcoming the problem of 
under-financing faced by private enterprises (Roland, 2000; Li, D., 1996; Che 
and Qian, 1998). 
Private ownership is considered more independent from government 
intervention and more profit maximization-oriented, and consequently to be 
more efficient (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988). 
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In particular, foreign firms are argued to be more efficient as they possess 
some superior technology and expertise and operate in international 
competitive product markets which may induce higher efficiency and allow 
them to outperform domestic firms (Teece, 1977). However, the positive effect 
of private ownership is not yet conclusive even in western economies (Laffont 
and Tirole, 1993), and the relationship between ownership and enterprise 
performance is not clear in transition economies (compare, for example, 
conclusions in the recent reviews by Estrin and Wright (1999) and Djankov 
and Murrell (2002). 
For the above reasons, SOEs are supposed to be less efficient compared with 
other ownership forms. Private-owned enterprises, especially foreign-owned 
enterprises, are supposed to be the most efficient. The efficiency of COEs 
should come between SOEs and private-owned enterprises. 
Internal incentives. 
Without changing ownership, China's enterprise reform has significantly 
expanded SOEs' contractual profit-sharing rights and managerial autonomy. 
The retained profit can be used for research and development, employees' 
wage and bonuses, all of which could lead to efficiency improvement. We use 
the ratio of retained profit to sales revenue to capture this incentive effect for 
all firms, in particular their management. As employees' bonuses are 
generally contingent on their output, therefore we also use the ratio of bonus 
to gross output value to capture this incentive effect for employees. 
However, as SOEs' managerial autonomy expands, SOE managers have 
more managerial discretion and face less monitoring, which consequently 
leads to so- called "insider control" (Aoki, 1995) - SOE insiders pursuing 
objectives other than profit maximization, such as income-appropriation and 
asset-stripping, which is easier than improving SOEs' efficiency. Under such a 
condition, SOEs managers have little incentive to resist workers' wage 
demands. Therefore we use wages and bonus in excess of industrial average 
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as a measure of the degree of `insider control'. 
Market Competition 
Since the start of economic reform in 1978, enterprises in China began to face 
increasing competition pressure coming from both SOEs and non-SOEs. 
However, enterprises in different sectors are not exposed to the same degree 
of competition. Market mechanisms were first introduced into sectors that 
were of no strategic importance and sectors where state-owned enterprises 
only account for a comparatively smaller fraction of sector outputs. As a result, 
while consumer goods industries now have relatively lower concentration of 
SOEs and stronger market competition, investment goods industries are still 
under a high level of government control. Furthermore, while the entry of new 
non-state owned firms is encouraged, another perspective of competition 
pressure, the exit of non-performing SOEs, is still lagging behind due to 
various social and economic concerns, which consequently weaken the threat 
coming from takeover and exit. 
The usual practice of measuring the degree of market competition in the 
literature is to proxy the market competition using an index of concentration. 
The most popular measure is the concentration ratio. However, market 
competition is difficult to determine with any precision, and cannot be 
completely captured by just one variable. To avoid the problems thus created, 
we have used 5 measures of market competition: the four largest firm market 
concentration ratio (CR4), the number of competitors (the number of large and 
medium enterprises in three-digit industrial sector), the number of new entries 
in the three digit industrial sector, firm's market share, and firm's technology 
advantage, proxied by the deviation of firm's asset labour ratio from that of 
minimum efficient size. We expect to see competition pressure driving up 
enterprises' efficiency index in a more competitive market. 
Financial discipline 
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Soft budget constraints have been allegedly responsible for enterprise 
inefficiency under the socialist system and consequently for its collapse 
(Maskin and Xu, 2001; Kornai, 1980). Hardening budget constraint has been 
one of the objectives of China's enterprise reform. It is argued, however, that 
SOEs' budgets are still soft due to their easy access to bank loans, 
government subsidies, and the concern of political and social stability 
associated with bankruptcy (Lin and Tan, 1999). 
As the State direct finance has been reduced, bank loans have become 
SOEs' main source of finance. However, bank loans in China are considered 
soft, and become another form of soft budget constraint. Taxation arrears and 
intra-firm arrears have emerged as other forms of soft budget constraints. Soft 
bank loans and intra-firm arrears arguably increase the possibility of being 
bailed out. Compared with SOEs, non-state enterprises, especially privately 
owned enterprises, have to face tougher budget constraints. The 
consequence of the tougher budget constraint is that activities of non-state 
owned enterprises are more market-oriented, because they have to make 
profit in order to survive. 
Here, the ratio of net interest expenditure to revenue is used as an indicator of 
firms' financial discipline. For the period after 1992, debt asset ratio is also 
available to capture the gearing effect of capital structure. As for the effect of 
soft budget constraint, for the period before 1993, there are data on profit and 
tax that should have been submitted to the government and the data on profit 
and tax have been submitted, the difference of these two values can be a 
proxy of the indirect soft budget constraints. For the same period, my data 
also contain information on intra-firm arrears, which is another form of soft 
budget constraint. After 1993, we have data on direct government subsidy to 
SOEs. 
Socialist Legacy 
Our final concern is SOEs' historical legacies and the reform costs borne by 
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SOEs, and their effect upon SOEs' efficiency. It is argued that SOEs have 
inherited from the socialist system far more social responsibilities than have 
their non-state counterparts, such as social security, medical care and 
housing, etc. As the lifelong employment policy has been gradually broken 
down since reform, SOEs also face large pension and insurance burdens. As 
SOEs' social burden is to a large extent expressed in the form of unproductive 
assets, such as hospitals, schools, etc., we therefore use the unproductive 
fixed asset ratio as a proxy of SOEs' social obligations. 
In the study, we also control for firms' technology level and firms' scale 
economy. I use the per employee productive asset as a measure of 
technology level and use the average fixed asset of firms accounting for 50% 
of sales as the minimum efficient scale of firm. Firm size is also controlled, as 
Hopenhayn (1992) suggested that larger firms tend to be more efficient. 
4.5.3 Empirical Result 
In estimating the impact of ownership, market competition, financial discipline, 
and socialist legacy upon productive efficiency, an econometric model with 
unbalanced panel data is estimated. We base our model on a production 
function: 
Yit = aitf(Xit ) (4.9) 
and 
a; ý =wZ;, +ul+eir 
'_ - 
where yi, is firm i's output at time t, Xtt is a vector of firm i's inputs to 
produce v,, , f(X;, ) 
is linear combination of Xtt , and is 
firm i's production 
frontier at time t, a;,, represents firm i's efficiency at time t, Z,,, is a vector 
of explanatory variables, u; is a firm specific factor, and uu is a set of 
parameters to be estimated. We do not include time specific variables, as 
efficiency index is estimated against the concurrent envelopment frontier. 
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Following our discussion in the last section, the explanatory variables to be 
included in the regression are shown in table below: 
Table 4.7: Explanatory Variables 
Ownership 
COE Collectively-Owned Enterprises, dummy variable 
FORE Foreign-Funded Enterprises (joint ventures and private owned) 
OTHER Firms other than SOEs, COEs and Foreign 
Internal Incentives 
RETAIN he ratio of retained profit to revenue 
RETAIN92 Interaction of retain and P92 
LNPCWAGE Logarithms of wages per employee 
DPCWAGE Deviation of the average wage per employee from industrial median 
LNPCBONUS Logarithms of bonus per employee 
DPCBONUS Deviation of the average bonus per employee from industrial median 
Market Competition and Technology 
C R4 
Defined as the output ratio of the four largest enterprises in 2-digit industry 
in the region 
NUMFIRM Number of firms in 2-digit industry 
NUMNEW he number of new firms 
DPCASSET Deviation of firm's asset labour ratio from that of minimum efficient size 
MARKETS Firm's market share, defined as firm's share of sales in the market. 
Financial Discipline 
INTEREST The ratio of interest expenditure to revenue 
INTEREST92 The interaction of interest with P92 
RREAR The ratio of tax arrear to revenue 
SUBSIDY he ratio of government direct subsidy to revenue 
DEBTRATE he debt asset ratio 
Socialist Legacy 
UPASSET he ratio of unproductive to productive asset 
Dummy variable 
P92 P92=1 if year>=1993, otherwise p92=0 
In order to make full use of the available data (as data on taxation arrears are 
only available before 1993, and data on debt and government subsidy are 
only available since 1993), four equations have been estimated using panel 
data analysis approaches. The first equation is applied to data between 1987 
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and 1992; the second equation is applied to data between 1993 and 1996; the 
third equation is applied to the full sample period, while the fourth is also 
applied to the whole sample period but with interactive terms to capture the 
effect of acceleration of economic reform since 1993. Each equation is 
estimated using three different panel data analysis approaches: the fixed 
effects model, the random effects model, and the Generalised Estimating 
Equations (GEE). 
The fixed effects model assumes that u1 is a time unvarying firm-specific 
factor, and is estimated by OLS after the data are transformed by subtracting 
group means from each observation (see Hsiao, 1985 and 1986). However, 
the transformation involved in this estimation process wipes out all 
explanatory variables that do not vary with time within a firm. This means that 
any explanatory variable that is time-invariant disappears, and so we are 
unable to estimate a slope coefficient for that variable (Baltagi, 1995; Hsiao, 
1986). In this study, firm ownership, could be an example, as the ownership of 
most firms is constant over the 10-year period. Furthermore, by implicitly 
including more than 3000 dummy variables, we will reduce the degrees of 
freedom by a large number (Greene, 1997). Moreover, as the number of firms 
is large, the estimators of the individual effects may not be consistent (Baltagi, 
1995). 
The random effects model assumes that ui is a random variable with a mean 
zero and a constant variance: ui - IIN(0,6ü) and is independent of 
e;, - IIN(0,6, ') . The random model is estimated 
by the Generalized Least 
Squares method. As we have suggested that my sample may have 
represented a larger population of Chinese firms in general. The random 
effect model seems to be more appropriate. A major problem with the random 
effects model is that the error term might be correlated with the independent 
variables, which we test for using the Hausman specification test. Another 
problem with the random effect model is the assumption of constant variance, 
which will be tested using the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test. 
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The Generalised Estimating Equations (GEE) proposed by Liang and Zeger 
(1986) is an extension of General Linear Model (GLM) to longitudinal data and 
panel data, assuming the existence of a relation between the observations of 
a cluster, while the observations of separate clusters are independent. The 
key concept is that heteroskedasticity and correlated error are treated as a 
nuisance and only the marginal expectation is modelled as a function of 
covariates. While the estimates are efficient if the covariance assumptions are 
correct, the estimated coefficients are still approximately unbiased even with 
misspecification of correlation structure, and the standard errors are 
reasonable if the sample is large (Liang and Zeger, 1986; Zeger et al., 1988). 
See more details for GEE in Liang and Zeger (1986), Zeger et al. (1988), and 
Diggle et al. (2002). 
The results from the estimations are reported in Table 4.8. We noticed that the 
fixed effect estimation is a very conservative estimate of the effect of 
ownership, especially in the case of COEs. We also noticed that the random 
effect estimators are superior to the fixed effect estimators, as they have 
considerably smaller standard errors, and bigger overall R-squares. However, 
both Hausman test and Breusch and pagan Lagrangian multiplier test have 
rejected the assumption underlying random model, suggesting that there are 
correlations between the error term and the independent variables. Therefore, 
we turn to the Generalised Estimating Equations (GEE) approach described in 
Liang and Zeger (1986), taking the firm-specific effect as random. In fact, the 
results from the Random Effect model and GEE approach are similar. The 
results of the estimations by GEE approach, which is my preferred approach, 
is presented in Columns (3), (6), (9), and (12). Evident from these regressions 
are positively the effect of Collective ownership and higher average wage per 
worker, and negatively the effect of high concentration, the number of new 
entries, the higher than average bonus per worker, and the level of 
unproductive asset. Most interesting of them all is the negative effect of 
concentration ratio (CR4) and the number of new entries (NEWFIRM). 
Focusing on the estimation by GEE approach, I will discuss the results in 
more detail in the following section. 
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4.5.4 Interpretation of Empirical Results 
Ownership and Efficiency 
For the whole sample period between 1987 and 1996, the effect of non-state 
ownership upon efficiency is controversial. While both collective ownership 
and foreign ownership have always been positively related to efficiency index 
as we have expected, the effects of domestic private ownership are not 
conclusive. For example, the coefficient for ownership type classified as 
Others is positive and statistically significant only in Column (6). Interestingly, 
this is contrasted with the conclusion we drew from section 4.4 that firms 
classified as "others" are more efficient than SOEs, which indicates that the 
efficiency advantages enjoyed by these firms may not derive from ownership 
structure. 
Efficiency and Market Competition 
All measures of competition, the number of competitors (NUMFIRM), the 
number of new entry (NEWFIRM), and the concentration ratio (CR4) have 
significant negative effects upon firms' efficiency in Column (6), (9), and (12). 
In addition, the effect of newfirm was significantly negative as well for the 
period between 1987 and 1992 (Column 3), while the effect of CR4 was 
negative but not significant. All these suggest that competition increases the 
firms' efficiency gap to technology frontier, and firms in more concentrated 
sectors lagged further behind. However, in an effective competition 
environment, firms' profit maximising behaviour and the pressure to survive 
will drive up firm's efficiency. 
One possible reason for increasing efficiency gap to technology frontier is 
that there are strong exit barriers within China's markets, as new firms find it 
relatively easier to enter, but inefficient ones are reluctant to or not concerned 
about exit. As such, with the entry of more efficient firms, the disparity 
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efficiency between frontier firms and majority firms becomes larger. This 
aspect of the market competition will be discussed in the next chapter. 
In addition, the results have also suggested that firms' market share is 
positively related to firms' efficiency, however it is not clear whether the 
efficiency of a firm relative to others determines its market share or firms' 
market share determines firms' efficiency. The effect of technology level, 
proxied by DPCASSET defined as the deviation of firms' asset labour ratio 
from that of minimum efficient size, is not statistically significant. 
Efficiency and Internal Incentives 
The effect of incentive measures has also been significant for the whole 
sample period. The regression results suggest that at the initial stage of 
reform, profit retention does have a significant positive effect upon efficiency. 
However, its positive effect seems to fade away. For example, the coefficient 
of RETAIN in Column (3) is 0.424, and is only 0.007 in model (6). By 
incorporating an interaction variable of retain and P92, we find that the effect 
of retain92 is significantly negative (See Column (12)). Average wage per 
worker, another indicator of incentive mechanism, is positively correlated with 
the efficiency index over the two periods. Interestingly, the incentive effect of 
excess bonus has been significantly negative for the two periods, which 
indicates the existence of insider control, under which SOE managers 
distribute excessive bonus rather than wages to workers, probably because 
wage levels were more closely regulated by the government. 
Efficiency and Financial Discipline 
Regression results do show that firms respond positively to gradually 
hardened budget constraints. However, even 20 years into the reform, soft 
budget constraints still persist. As a proxy of implicit government subsidy, 
enterprises' tax arrears are negatively associated with the efficiency index for 
1987-1992. The government's direct subsidy is negatively associated with the 
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efficiency index as well for 1993 to 1996. However, another form of soft 
budget constraint, intra-firm arrears, has a positive effect upon firms' 
efficiency. This can be explained as the effect of firms trying to get round the 
hard budget constraint imposed by the government as the result of economic 
reform. 
4.6Are Firms' Efficiency Gaps Persistent? A Dynamic Panel 
Data Analysis 
The above regressions have emphasized the static relationship between 
firms' efficiency and its determinants. However, it inadequately addresses 
how firms respond to dynamic competition, such as the intense competition 
between large firms, the entry of new firms, etc., and some other dynamic firm 
characteristics, such as change in ownership, etc. Such dynamic 
characteristics may be better captured by examining the persistence of the 
efficiency gaps between firms. 
If competition is intense and the market selection process is effective, there is 
likely to be a convergence in the efficiency of competing firms to the 
technology frontier. As firms strive to catch up with the technology frontier to 
improve efficiency in order to be profitable and to survive, and those lagging 
behind will exit. If market selection process is not effective, then there is likely 
to be a weaker convergence in firms' efficiency. As new firms enter driving 
forward the technology frontier, but inefficient firms do not exit, which provides 
weaker incentives for firms to improve efficiency. In the context of China, we 
expect to see that non-state firms respond faster than SOEs to the technology 
advance brought about by new entrants, and SOEs are slower in catching up 
with technology frontier, this might lead to the convergence of SOEs' 
efficiency to the lower end of the efficiency spectrum. 
Essentially, this is a Schumpetarian perspective on the competition process, 
which can be described as follow: 
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Aai,, =Yi +ßi (af -ai, t-1)+eft (4.10) 
where Aa;, = a, ,- al, t_, , and a; , 
is the efficiency of firm i at time t, aj is the 
efficiency of frontier units, and e, t is an error term. af- al r is defined as the 
efficiency gap of firm i at time t to technology frontier, where af =1 as was 
defined by the characteristics of the technology frontier. This equation 
describes the process of firms trying to catch up with technology advance. 
The coefficient /3, is interpreted as the speed of firm catching up with 
technology advance (technology frontier). 
Rewriting equation 4.10, we have the following equations: 
Dal, = Yj -ßu1,1-r + ei, (4.11) 
Where y; = yl +, 8j. This equation is related to the convergence literature 
(Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1992; Sala-I-Martin, 1996). In the context of cross 
section and time series methods of testing convergence, if /3, > 0, then there 
exists ß' convergence', indicating that less efficient firms tend to increase 
their efficiency faster than more efficient firms. There are three types of ", 8 
convergence", if both ß; and y, are the same across firms then ß 
convergence is called absolute convergence; if, ß; is the same but y; is not 
constant for all the firms, then 8 convergence is called conditional 8 
convergence; a third type of ,8 convergence 
is club convergence if ß; is not 
constant for all the firms. A second test of convergence is 'u Convergence', 
which holds if the cross-sectional standard deviations of the efficiency index 
decrease over time. The existence of ß convergence is a necessary condition 
for the existence of 6 convergence, as it is impossible to have two firms to be 
closer in efficiency without the less efficient firm improving its efficiency faster. 
However the 'a Convergence' concept process maybe not especially 
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relevant here since this is an out-of steady state behavior. The more relevant 
test of the competitive process is the ß convergence. 
In this chapter we first test if the dispersion of firm efficiency tends to 
decrease, the existence of `a convergence', by calculating the standard 
deviation of firms' efficiency over the period of 1987-1996. The results are 
presented in Fig 4.11. In general, there was a increase in the cross sectional 
standard deviation for efficiency from 0.15 in 1987 to 0.25 in 1993, this was 
followed by a decline to 0.19 in 1996, which was nevertheless still higher than 
that in 1986. For COEs, there was a substantial increase from 0.08 in 1986 to 
0.30 in 1991, which was followed by a gradual decline to 0.18 in 1996. The 
increased dispersion of firm efficiency suggests that more efficient firms are 
entering, but less efficient ones are still staying, which may have changed 
since the acceleration of economic reform in 1992, as is indicated by the 
gradual decline in the dispersion of firms' efficiency since 1992 and 1993 . 
0.35 
0.30 
0.25 
0.20 
0.15 
0.10 
0.05 
0.00 
Fig 4.11 Sigma Convergence: Standard 
Deviations of Efficiency 
. 
cýY 
All - SOE COE 
--- -- 
cgb' b<b' , oi oi e c§" e(: ý, c §' c §' ce c§" (:? ' 
In testing whether there is 8 convergence, we based our estimation on the 
equation (4.11). However, in a dynamic context, the presence of an 
endogenous variable in the right hand side of the equation implies a more 
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complicated estimation of the model due to collinearity with the error term. 
This renders the conventional ordinary least square (OLS) estimator biased 
and inconsistent. To solve the problem, Anderson and Hsiao (1981) proposed 
using further lags of the level or the differences of the dependent variable to 
instrument the lagged dependent variables included in a dynamic panel data 
model. This leads to consistent but not necessarily efficient estimates of the 
parameters in the model. 
In light of this, we rewrite equation (4.11) as follows: 
a. + 11. a. _+e. 
(4.12) 
where 2; =1- ß1. This equation can be regarded as a reduced form of a more 
elaborate structural model involving entry, threatened entry and exit of firms, 
in which an efficient new entrant will generate a substantial disturbance to the 
market equilibrium, and may drive out some the least efficient incumbents 
(Vickers, 1995). In equilibrium, the level of efficiency will be: 
a; LR 
However, equation (4.12) doesn't differentiate between different sources of 
convergence in efficiency. In order to account for the different sources of 
convergence and different speeds of convergence due to firm ownership 
types and firm internal incentives, the following equation is estimated in this 
chapter: 
air - yi + 
(A1 + A2Y, ) " a1r-1 + CJ Xir + Eir (4.14) 
where vi" is a firm-specific effect, 2, = A; + A; Y,., , X;, is a vector of exogenous 
covariates, Y,., is a set of ownership and internal incentive variables, s is an 
error term, and A.; , A,, and w are 
the parameters to be estimated. 
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Arellano and Bond (1991), based on Anderson and Hsiao (1981), proposed a 
generalized method of moments (GMM) procedure treating the model as a 
system of equations, one for each time period. The predetermined and 
endogenous variables in first differences are instrumented with suitable lags 
of their own levels and strictly exogenous variables. GMM can be estimated 
by either the one-step method or the two-step method. The GMM estimator is 
robust in that it does not require information about the exact distribution of the 
disturbances and is instrumental in combating the problems associated with 
potential endogenity. This procedure is considered to be more efficient than 
the Anderson and Hsiao (1981) estimator, and the consistency of the 
estimation depends on whether lagged values of the endogenous and 
exogenous variables are valid instruments in our regression. Also, this 
methodology assumes that there is no second-order autocorrelation in the 
errors. Arellano and Bond (1991) have derived a test for autocorrelation. 
In this study, the above dynamic equation is estimated using one-step robust 
Arellano-Bond estimators, assuming a heteroskedastic error term. The 
covariates included in the estimation are presented in Table 4.9. 
Table 4.9 Explanatory Variables for Persistence of Efficiency gap 
SCORE(-1) Firm's efficiency gap to technology frontier in year-1 
SOE92 Interactive term of SOE and P92 
COE Collective Owned Enterprises, dummy variable 
FORE Foreign-Funded Enterprises (joint ventures and privately-owned) 
OTHER Firms other than SOEs, COEs and Foreign 
OWNCH 
Ownership change, towards private ownership =1, towards state 
ownership =-1 
RETAIN The ratio of retained profit to revenue 
MKTS Firm's market share, defined as firm's share of sales in the market. 
COE*SCORE(-1) Interactive term between COE and SCORE(-1) 
FORE*Score(-1) Interactive term between FORE and SCORE(-1) 
OTHE*SCORE(-1) Interactive term between OTHE and SCORE(-1) 
OWNCH*SCORE(-1) Interactive term between OWNCH and SCORE(-1) 
RETAIN*SCORE(-1) Interactive term between RETAIN and SCORE(-1) 
MKTS*SCORE(-1) Interactive term between MKTS and SCORE(-1) 
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We report in Table 4.10 the estimation results from 6 different specifications: 
Specification 1 is the most restrictive in which both y; and 2t are set to equal 
a constant which is the same for all the firms. In specification 2 ),; is still set to 
equal a constant and is the same for all the firms, but yl is set to depend on 
X. Specification 3, is similar to specification 2, includes an interactive term to 
capture the effect of acceleration of economic reform since 1993. 
Specification 4 sets A, to depend on Y, and y, is set to depend on X. 
Specification 5 is applied to SOEs only, while Specification 6 is applied to 
COEs. The Arellano-Bond tests of first order correlation (Ml) and second 
order serial correlation (M2) are reported in the bottom lines of the table. 
Estimates would be inconsistent if the null hypothesis of no second order 
correlation is rejected. 
Both specification 1,2, and 3 seems to suggest that there is convergence of 
firms' efficiency, as 2l is in the range of [0.32 0.34], indicating that ß, is in the 
range of [0.66 0.68]. However, a finer estimation in specification 4 suggests 
firms of different ownership types display different convergence patterns. For 
example, the values of A for SOEs, COEs, and firms being categorised as 
others are 0.428,0.10, and 0.002 respectively, indicating that the speed of 
convergence for SOEs is slower than that for COEs and firms categorised as 
others, while the value of A for foreign firms is -0.7, suggesting that there is 
no convergence in efficiency for foreign firms. The difference in speeds of 
convergence between SOEs and COEs are further confirmed in specification 
5 and specification 6, with the value of A for for SOEs is 0.314, while this 
value for COEs is 0.226. 
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The results indicate that there is really a tendency for firms to catch up with 
the technology advance (frontier shift upward), and less efficient firms are 
quicker in catching up than more efficient firms. Non-state firms' speed to 
`catch up' with the technology frontier seems to be faster than that of SOEs. 
However, the dispersion of the efficiency seems to have increased, especially 
for the period prior 1993. Considering that fact that the average efficiency 
index has been declining, this seems to suggest that firms' efficiency has 
been converging to the lower end of the efficiency spectrum, especially those 
of SOEs'. The results have also suggested that profit retention reform does 
not have significant effect upon firm's speed in responding technology 
advance, while the partial privatisation and privatisation may have an 
immediate negative effect upon a `firm's speed in responding to technology 
advance. 
Considering the effects of ownership on the level of firms' efficiency, the 
ownership types do not seem to have statistically significant effect on the level 
of firm efficiency, as none of the coefficients for COE, FORE, and OTHE is 
statistically significant in Specification 4, although coefficients for FORE are 
significant in Specification 2 and 3, and coefficients for OTHE are only 
significant in Specification 3. As for the effect of profit retention program, it is 
only statistically significant for COEs. These results seem to suggest that the 
efficiency difference between firms of different ownership types might have 
resulted from their different response to technology advance. 
4.7 Conclusion: 
In this chapter, we applied the DEA technique to estimate enterprise efficiency 
and productivity change in the context of Chinese large and medium 
enterprises between the reform period 1987 and 1996. Contrasted with the 
results of improving enterprise performance measured by TFP from other 
studies, there is a general tendency of an increasing efficiency gap between 
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average enterprise and the technology frontier rather than a decreasing 
efficiency gap as is expected from a competitive market. 
By estimating the impacts of enterprise reform and increasing competition on 
firms' static efficiency and firms' dynamic progress to catch up with the 
technology frontier, it suggests that the effect of ownership upon firms' static 
efficiency is not conclusive. While COEs are generally more efficient and more 
productive that SOEs, the ownership effect of foreign ownership and domestic 
private ownership is not clear. However, firms of different ownership types do 
seem to respond differently to catch up with the technology frontier, with 
SOEs being the slowest. These findings suggest that efficiency differences 
between firms of different ownership types might result from their different 
speed in catching up with technology advance. 
The analysis also suggests that a profit retention programme does have a 
positive effect upon improving a firm's efficiency at the initial stage of reform; 
this positive effect phases out in the later stages of reform. As for performance 
wages and bonuses, their effects are complicated and need to be designed 
properly to achieve a positive effect upon efficiency improvement. 
Market competition in China seems to be working, but ineffectively. As new 
firms enter, thus driving up the technology frontier, but incumbent SOEs are 
slow to respond. Hence, we suspect that the market competitive process is 
not working effectively, and a lower exit probability of SOEs might account for 
the weaker convergence of SOE efficiency. This needs further investigation, 
which will be dealt with in the next two chapters. 
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Chapter 5: Entry, Exit and the Dynamics of Productivity 
Growth 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we found that technical efficiency at the enterprise level 
showed a tendency to diverge in the period between 1987 and 1996. It is 
observed that this contradicted the result that might have been expected of the 
transition from the former centrally planned economy to a market economy. It is 
hypothesised that there are two reasons underlying the divergence of technical 
efficiency: the entry of more efficient firms, paralleled with the survival of 
inefficient and value-destroying firms, especially inefficient state-owned firms. 
However, this can only have been sustained as long as growth remained strong. 
As both the TFP and DEA approaches represent something of a black box from a 
micro-dynamic perspective, this chapter, looking beyond the "within firm" effects 
of economic reform and market competition, attempts to investigate the micro 
dynamics of entry, exit, and aggregate productivity growth using firm-level data 
on Chinese manufacturing, and gauges the extent to which the competitive 
process has improved as a result of the latest bout of reform since 1992, dubbed 
the transition to the "socialist market economy", while the reform before 1992 had 
been dubbed as "crossing the river by groping for stones". Specifically, the 
chapter has three main objectives: to document the actual patterns of firm entry 
and exit, to analyse the post-entry and pre-exit behaviour of Chinese enterprises, 
and to estimate the contribution of new entries, exits and survival firms to 
aggregate productivity growth. This chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 
briefly surveys the literatures on firms' entry and exit; Section 5.3 describes the 
pattern of entry and exit in the Chinese electrical engineering industry; section 
5.4 analyses the longitudinal performance of surviving and exiting firms; section 
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5.5 deconstructs aggregate productivity growth; and section 5.6 concludes the 
chapter. 
5.2 Entry and Exit in Advanced and Transition Economies 
There has been a long-standing interest in understanding firms' entry and exit 
behaviour and their determinants. Following Bain's (1956) research on the 
process of entry and Edwin Mansfield's (1962) plea for a greater emphasis on 
the research into the dynamic aspects of industrial organization, there comes an 
increase of such research. Several theories have been developed to study the 
process that generates each firm's entry, exit, productivity growth, and market 
share change. They generally related to the process of "creative destruction" 
(Schumpeter, 1943). In most models, each of the above dimensions of 
performance is depicted as the optimal behaviour of forward-looking 
entrepreneurs with rational expectations but limited information. 
Hopenhayn (1992) provides a relatively tractable formulation. In his model, firms 
differ only in terms of their productivity levels, each of which evolves as a random 
process over time according to an exogenous Markov process. He relates the 
exogenous characteristics of the industry, such as entry cost, total demand and 
the stochastic process for the productivity parameters, to the steady-state 
distribution of firms and to the process of entry and exit. Under such a set-up, 
new firms enter when the distribution from which they draw their initial 
productivity level is sufficiently favourable that their expected future profit stream, 
net of annual fixed costs, will cover the sunk costs of entry. Firms exit when they 
experience a series of adverse productivity shocks, driving their expected future 
operating profits sufficiently low that exit is their least costly option. 
Hopenhayn's (1992) model shares a number of implications with other 
representations of industrial evolution developed by Jovanovic (1982) and 
Ericson and Pakes (1995). By modelling firms' evolution as a passive learning 
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process, Jovanovic (1982) showed that firm productivity varies initially but 
eventually settles down to a constant level. As firms only learn about their true 
efficiency by effectively operating and producing, a process of natural selection 
arises whereby less efficient firms leave the industry while more efficient firms 
grow to their optimal size. This selection mechanism results in younger firms 
being on average smaller, more heterogeneous but less productive than older 
firms. In contrast to this `passive learning' by firms, Ericson and Pakes (1995) 
stressed the importance of `active learning' by firms through investments in 
productivity enhancement. In their model, a firm explores its economic 
environment actively and invests to enhance its profitability under competitive 
pressure from both within and outside the industry. Its potential and actual 
profitability changes over time in response to the stochastic outcomes of the 
firm's own investment, and those of other actors in the same market. The firm 
grows if successful, shrinks or exits if unsuccessful. 
As we can see from the above models, both entry and exit are modelled as the 
optimal responses made by innovative entrepreneurs contingent on the balance 
between future expected return and costs. At any point in time, an entire 
distribution of firms with different sizes, ages and productivity levels exists, and 
simultaneous entry and exit is the norm. Young firms have not yet survived a 
shakedown process, so they tend to be smaller and to exit more frequently. 
Large firms are the most efficient, on average, so their mark-ups are the largest. 
Nonetheless, despite all the heterogeneity, equilibrium in both Jovanovic's and 
Hopenhayn's model maximizes the net discounted value of social surplus. Thus 
market interventions, such as artificial entry barriers, severance laws, or policies 
that prop up dying firms generally make matters worse. The exogenous fixed 
costs, such as economies of large scale, product differentiation and absolute cost 
advantages of incumbent firms compared with entrants, pose barriers to both 
entry and exit. 
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A number of recent studies have examined the dynamic aspects of firm 
behaviours in the context of advanced economies. Examples include Acs and 
Audretsch's (1989) and Audretsch's (1995) work on U. S manufacturing, Baldwin 
and Gorecki's (1991) work on Canadian industry, Geroski's (1991a, b) work on 
the British manufacturing industry, Dunne et al. (1988,1989)'s work on the US 
manufacturing industry, Mata's (1993) work on Portugal's manufacturing industry, 
and Schwalbach (1991) on German manufacturing industries. They found that 
both entry and exits are common; they are large in number but small in size. 
They also found that substantial variations in entry and exit rates exist across 
industries, and that entry and exit rates are positively correlated within an 
industry. Entry is less likely to be successful; if it does survive, it grows larger. In 
fact, the research on industrial dynamics has generated the following stylised 
facts: 
  Both entry and exits are common, but while they are large in number, they are 
small in size (Dunne et al., 1988; Schwalbach, 1991; Geroski, 1995). 
  Exit and entry rates are highly positively correlated (Shapiro and Khemani, 
1987), which indicates that entry and exit are part of a process of change in 
which large numbers of new firms displace large numbers of older firms. 
  High rates of entry are often associated with high rates of innovation and 
increases in efficiency (Geroski, 1995). 
  The exit rates of new entrants tend to be high (Dunne et al., 1988; Geroski, 
1991), and it takes a long time for successful entrants to achieve a size 
comparable to the average incumbent. 
  Firms' exit rates are closely related to both firm size and age (Audretsch, 
1995). 
  Entry and survival rates vary considerably across industries; however, most of 
the total variation in entry across industries and over time is within industry 
variation rather than inter-industry variation (Geroski, 1995; Audretsch, 1995; 
Dunne et al., 1988). 
203 
This dynamic process of entry and exit is described as a revolving door at the 
bottom of the industry size distribution (for a general discussion, see Caves 
(1998)). 
Firms in former centrally planned economies were not concerned with this 
competitive selection process. This competitive selection process had been 
replaced with a bureaucratic one, in particular an easy exit and easy entry 
mechanism was substituted with one that precludes the timely termination and 
formation of enterprises. Central planners decided which enterprises should be 
created, enlarged, and contracted. Enterprise failures were treated through 
various subsidies and mergers. This has been argued accountable for the lack of 
dynamic efficiency in former socialist countries (Poznanski, 1993). As the 
formerly centrally planned economies are transforming into market economies, 
the creation, survival and growth of newly established firms and the downsizing 
and exit of traditionally large, dominant state-owned firms are vital to the success 
of this transition process. It is also central to the long-term health of those 
economies. 
The above-named stylized facts in advanced economies may also be expected in 
a transition market economy. If restructuring and reallocation of resources in an 
economy moving from plan to market occurs efficiently, we would expect that the 
firms established before transition, large and potentially the least efficient, 
producing low quality and low demand commodities, will shrink and be replaced 
by new small and more efficient firms with more "fashionable" goods. These new 
firms, if they succeed, are expected to grow with time. However, one feature to 
be noted is that the break with the old regime necessitated a central change in 
the paradigm. Transition countries have to channel resources from the industrial 
sector to services, de-concentrate their industrial structure, and untangle 
irrationally bundled assets. An unusually large amount of resources must be 
liberated from their entrenched uses and moved to places where they can be of 
the highest value. 
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All the above studies are conducted in advanced economies, such as US, UK, 
Germany, Japan, etc. They all assume that firms are profit-maximizing and 
respond the same way to the same market signals apart from the difference 
caused by their scale advantage or disadvantage. They also assume the 
environment in which firms operate is homogeneous. While these assumptions 
might be quite appropriate in advanced economies, they are not appropriate for 
economies in transition, where the new market economic institutions are still in 
the making, and the old central planning legacies remain. For example, in 
Russia, -the most productive companies not only can't make a buck, but are 
being driven out of business by government-subsidized productivity laggards" 
(Lewis, 1999). 
5.3 Entry and Exit in the Electrical Engineering Sector 
There are a number of ways in which the effectiveness of the reform process can 
be judged, and the most popular approach has been to compare total factor 
productivity over time and across different firms. For a recent review see 
Jefferson et al. (1996). A possible problem with this technique is the difficulty of 
comparing like with like. Given the tendency of small firms and firms in the non- 
state sector to enter market niches, it seems likely that the comparison may not 
be robust to the output deflators employed. Further, the approach represents 
something of a black box from a micro-dynamic perspective. Is TFP growth 
indicative of what is happening to incumbent firms or regarding the impact of 
entry and exit? As we shall see, this question is particularly important given the 
high rates of "movement" of enterprises and small enterprises in particular. An 
alternative approach to the assessment of the reforms is therefore to consider 
these processes explicitly and to gauge the extent to which the competitive 
selection process has improved as a result of the latest bout of reform. Below we 
get some handle on the effectiveness of the competitive process by examining 
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measurable characteristics of the processes of entry, exit and growth and how 
they have changed with reform. 
5.3.1 Rationale for Considering the Electrical Engineering Industry 
The dataset we use in this chapter covers an almost complete sample of Chinese 
firms in the electrical engineering industry in a Northern Chinese Province -Liao 
Ning over a ten-year period starting from 1987 to 1996. Liao Ning province used 
to be the centre of China's manufacturing Industry, and is the area where the 
central planning system was most deeply rooted. The electrical engineering 
industry is the sector where traditionally SOEs dominated, and currently the new 
entry of non-SOEs is relatively easy, therefore the selection of this sector is to 
some extent representative of the current reform situation, with a clear probability 
that competition has worked over the reform period. The electrical engineering 
industry accounts for about 5% of the province's gross industrial output, and it 
accounts for about 5-6% of the gross output of the Chinese electrical engineering 
industry. This dataset contains 3992 firms, of which 1996 firms exited in the 10- 
year period. Some simple statistics of the dataset are shown in Table 5.1 below: 
Table 5.1 Numbers of Enterprises (1987-1996) 
Total By Size By Ownership 
Large Medium Small SOEs COEs Foreign Others 
a 
1987 1092 17 23 1052 134 944 0 14 
1988 1170 19 26 1125 138 1021 1 10 
1989 1246 22 28 1196 149 1087 2 8 
1990 1309 22 29 1258 168 1130 3 8 
1991 1292 26 33 1233 164 1116 6 6 
1992 1418 24 41 1353 183 121 16 9 
1993 1514 26 49 1439 169 1285 36 24 
1994 1335 28 43 1264 130 1117 42 46 
1995 1334 31 43 1260 129 1132 60 13 
1996 1632 32 51 1549 168 1343 74 47 
Note: Othersa includes domestic private firms (including share holding companies) and state 
and/or collective and private cooperative firms. 
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Over the ten-year period, the number of firms increased by 540 units, 500 of 
them being small firms, with 400 of them being COEs. The number of firms with 
foreign participation, including joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned firms, 
increased from 0 in 1987 to 74 in 1996. The growth of both gross industrial 
output and labour productivity have been positive except in 1988 and 1990, the 
employment in this sector has declined from its peak of 268,000 in 1989 to 
245,000 in 1995, but in 1996 it increased again to the level of 1989 (See Figure 
5.1). 
Figure 5.1 Growth Rate of Output, Employment and 
Productivity (%), 1988-1996 
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In order to estimate whether firms' efficiency determines firms' propensity to exit, 
we quantify firms' efficiency by applying the same technique we used in chapter 
4, DEA. The average and output weighted average efficiency indices are shown 
in Figure 5.2. This result has also confirmed what we found in chapter 4, that 
there is a tendency of divergence in firms' efficiency. The average efficiency 
score decreased from around 60% in 1987 to 30% in 1996. 
207 
Figure 5.2 Average Efficiency Index in Electrical 
Engineering Industry in Liao Ning Province 
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5.3.2 The Contribution of Different Types of Firms to Output Growth 
This section first considers some simple decompositions of output change by firm 
size, and by firms' ownership, and it then looks into the contribution of young 
firms, defined as less than 5 years of age. 
Figure 5.3 depicts some snapshots of how the various size classes contributed to 
output growth over the period 1987-1996. Two sub-periods, 1987-1992 and 
1992-1996 are considered, corresponding to periods before and after the most 
recent set of reforms. 
Fig 5.3 Contributions to Output Growth by 
Firm Size (%) 
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Note that the contribution of small enterprises, while considerable, actually falls 
somewhat between the two sub-periods. This might indicate the survival and 
growth of small firms into medium firms, the more successful small firms 
developing into medium firms; actually we do observe the relatively bigger 
contribution of medium firms in the second period. 
Figure 5.4 examines the contribution of output growth by ownership type. The 
main point to note is that that there was a big fall in the contribution of SOEs in 
the later sub-period. In fact SOEs' contribution to output growth has been 
negative for the period between 1992 and 1996. This is mainly accounted for by 
Fig 5.4. Contributions to Output Growth by 
Ownership Type (%) 
80 
60 
Q 1987-96 
40 
  1987-92 
20 Q 1992-96 
0 
-20 
EE Foreign Other 
the sharp rise in the contribution of foreign-related ownership including 
investment from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan in the most recent period. 
As it is observed in Figure 5.3 that small firms accounting for a significant bulk of 
output growth, Figure 5.5 focuses on the small firms themselves. It is suggested 
that output growth by small enterprises is generally coming from COEs, and that 
the contribution from foreign firm participation and other types has become more 
noticeable only since 1992. 
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Fig 5.5. The Contribution of Small Enterprise 
to Output Growth by Ownership Type (%) 
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We also summarize the importance of new firms (see Table 5.2). For the period 
between 1987 and 1996, firms under 5 years old accounted for around a third of 
the number of the firms, yet they accounted for less than 13% of employment. 
The larger contribution of younger firms in terms of numbers of firms and the 
relative smaller contribution to employment indicate that those firms are usually 
small ones. Their contribution to output was less than 10% before 1992, but 
since then their contributions seem to be increasing. Compared with the average, 
they are more productive but less efficient; this could be due to higher capital 
intensity within young firms. 
Table 5.2 Performance of Young Firms (Age <5 years) 
% 
Share of 
Firm 
Number 
Share of 
Employment 
Share of 
Output 
Labour 
Productivity 
Relative to 
Average 
Efficiency 
Relative to 
Average 
1987 39.8 10.5 8.1 77.0 96.4 
1988 33.7 7.4 7.6 101.7 100.8 
1989 30.2 6.3 6.2 98.9 99.8 
1990 29.3 5.6 7.1 127.8 88.0 
1991 26.3 6.3 9.8 157.5 88.6 
1992 26.4 5.0 6.6 132.3 89.1 
1993 33.3 8.9 11.2 125.6 98.6 
1994 35.0 11.1 15.6 140.4 103.0 
1995 23.3 8.2 15.7 191.7 95.2 
1996 33.9 12.9 17.9 138.5 98.8 
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The importance of young firms can be compared with the evidence from other 
countries. Aw et al. (1997) reports, after examining nine manufacturing industries 
in Taiwan, that one to five year-old firms account for approximately two-thirds of 
the number of firms in operation and between one-third and one-half of each 
industry's production in 1991. Using data for Colombian manufacturing plants, 
Roberts (1996) finds that the combined market share of one to five year-old 
plants varied between 18.3 and 20.8 per cent depending on the year. With similar 
data for Chile, Tybout (1996) finds one to five year-old plants account for 15.0 to 
15.7 percent of manufacturing output. Using data for US manufacturing firms, 
Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1988) find the market share of one to five-year 
old firms varies from 13.6 to 18.5 depending on the year. Hahn (2000) finds in 
the context of the Korean manufacturing industry, that one to five year old plants 
accounted for around 40% of the plant number, and 15% of output during the 
period between 1995 and 1998. Thus, the importance of new firms in China 
seems to be less pronounced than that in both advanced economies and newly 
developed economies, such as Taiwan and Korea. 
5.3.3 The Pattern of Entry and Exit of Firms 
Utilizing the longitudinal aspect of our dataset, we can define surviving firms, 
entrants, and exiting firms. Here we adopted the definition of surviving firm, 
entrant, and exiting firm developed by Dunne et al. (1988). For the period 
between year t-k and year t, an entrant is defined as the firm that appears in 
the last year (t ), but not in the first year (t -k). An exit is defined as the firm that 
appears in the first year (t -k), but not in the last year (t). A surviving firm is 
defined as the one that appears both in the first year (t - k) and the last year (t) 
of the period. Under such definitions, all firms that entered before the last year of 
the given period are regarded as entrants and all firms that exited after the first 
year are regarded as ones that exited. We define the following variables: 
NE, = number of firms that enter the industry between years t-k and t; 
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NT, = total number of firms in the industry in the year t. 
NX, 
_k = 
number of firms that exit the industry between the years t-k and t 
QE, = total output of firms that enter the industry between the years t-k and t 
QT, = total output of all firms in the industry in year t 
QX, 
_k =total year t-k output of 
firms that exit the industry between years 
t-kand t 
Using the above variables, the entry and exit rate for the industry between years 
t-k and t are defined as: 
ER, = NE(/ NT _k 
XRt_k = NX(_k l NT_k 
where ER, is the entry rate and XRI_k is the exit rate between years t-k and t. 
In order to look at the contributions of new entrants and exits to industry output, 
we define the market shares of firms that enter or exit between the years t-k 
and t as: 
ESHt = QE, / QT 
XSHt-k = QX t-k 
/ QT 
-k 
where ESH, is the market share of new entries and XSHt_k is the market share 
of exiting firms. They measure the contribution of new firms in the first year in 
which they were observed and of the exiting firms in the last year in which they 
were observed. 
As we have presented in chapter 3, the entry of new firms in China takes various 
forms, such as the entry of both domestic private and foreign-owned firms, the 
entry of new COEs including TVEs, and the entry of new SOEs. In addition to 
these, some established firms might enter the electrical engineering sector by 
switching from other manufacturing sectors; however as we focus on this single 
electrical engineering industry, we do not distinguish between the switches and 
212 
the new entries. The number of new entries and entry rates in each year are 
presented in Table 5.4 and Table 5.5 respectively: 
Table 5.4 The Number of Entries and The Entry Share in the Electrical 
Engineering Industry Between 1988 and 1996 
Total 
Number of 
Share of New Entries (%) Entry Share 
New Entries 
Small Firms SOEs COEs Others of Industrial Output (%) 
1988 195 99.5 3.1 95.9 0 4.1 
1989 205 99.5 6.3 93.2 0.5 4.3 
1990 213 99.5 10.8 88.7 0.5 1.8 
1991 170 99.4 8.8 90.0 1.2 2.6 
1992 333 99.7 8.7 89.2 2.1 7.2 
1993 536 98.3 5.2 89.0 5.8 13.2 
1994 320 98.4 3.4 83.1 13.4 11.4 
1995 472 97.7 5.9 87.3 6.8 17.6 
1996 634 97.8 9.8 81.5 8.7 14.7 
As shown in the above table, there is a significant increase in both the number of 
new entries and the entry share of industrial output. Between 1988 and 1996, the 
number of new entries in each year increased from 195 in 1988 to 634 in 1996. 
For the same period, the entry share increased from 4.1% in 1988 to 14.7% in 
1996. Most of the new entries were small firms and COEs, accounting for more 
than 97%, and 80% of new entries respectively. 
Table 5.5 below has shown an increasing entry rate after 1992. For example, 
between 1988 and 1991, the entry rates ranged between 13.2% and 16.7%; 
between 1992 and 1996, the entry rates ranged between 23.5% and 38.8%. 
Most notably, the entry of non-public ownership (Others) has become much more 
significant after 1992, with its entry rates ranging between 28% and 51.7%. 
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Table 5.5 The Entry Rate (%) in the Electrical Engineering Industry Between 
1988 and 1996 
Total Small Firms SOEs COEs Others 
1988 16.7 17.2 4.5 19.8 0.0 
1989 16.5 17.1 9.4 18.7 10.0 
1990 16.3 16.9 15.4 17.4 9.1 
1991 13.2 13.7 8.9 13.5 16.7 
1992 23.5 24.5 17.7 26.6 28.0 
1993 35.4 36.6 15.3 39.4 51.7 
1994 24.0 24.9 6.5 20.7 48.9 
1995 35.4 36.6 21.5 36.9 45.7 
1996 38.8 40.0 36.9 38.5 45.5 
As far as the exits are concerned, there are many reasons for firms to exit from 
this particular electrical engineering sector as well. Firstly, the owner(s), either 
government department in terms of SOEs, the community in terms of COEs or 
private persons in term of both foreign and domestic privately-owned enterprises, 
may decide to close down an under-performing enterprise. Firms exiting in this 
form ceased to operate completely. Secondly, firms exit due to merger and 
acquisition, by which the government aims to restructure and regroup SOEs. The 
bureaucratic overseer of the enterprises may decide to merge a poor-performing 
enterprise with a successful one aiming to save the poorly performing enterprise 
from bankruptcy. The mergers may also happen voluntarily without the 
interference of the government. A third reason is privatisation. Privatisation takes 
various forms: firms being sold out to the public, firms being sold out to 
individuals, firms being sold out to employees and management. Although 
privatization often involves substantial changes to the operations of firms, due to 
specific characteristics of a transition economy, it is not considered a form of exit 
in this study; privatized firms are matched with their predecessors. The fourth 
reason is that firms switch to another manufacturing industry. The number of 
exits and the exit rate in each year for the period between 1988 and 1996 are 
presented in Table 5.6 and Table 5.7: 
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Table 5.6 The Number of Exits and Exit Shares in the Electronic 
Engineering Industry Between 1988 and 1996 
Total Share of Exits (%) Exit Share 
Number of 
Exits Small Firms SOEs COEs Others 
of Industrial 
Output (%) 
1988 117 99.1 5.1 94.0 0.0 2.5 
1989 134 100.0 2.2 97.8 0.0 1.1 
1990 150 100.0 6.7 93.3 0.0 2.1 
1991 187 99.5 11.8 88.2 0.0 1.7 
1992 207 100.0 5.3 94.7 0.0 3.0 
1993 450 99.1 9.3 89.6 1.1 8.5 
1994 502 98.2 9.0 88.0 3.0 12.9 
1995 329 98.8 5.8 84.5 8.5 14.7 
1996 343 97.4 7.6 87.5 5.0 9.5 
There are significant increases in both the numbers of exits and exit shares 
during 1988 and 1996 as well. The numbers of exits increased from 117 in 1988 
to 502 in 1994, and the exit share of industrial output increased from 2.5% in 
1988 to 14.7% in 1995. Again, most of the exits are small firms and COEs, 
accounting for more than 97% and 84% of exits respectively. 
Table 5.7 The Exit Rate (%) in the Electronic Engineering Industry 
Between 1988 and 1996 
Total Small Firms SOEs 
COEs Others 
New 
Entries 
1988 10.7 11.0 4.5 11.7 0.0 
1989 11.5 11.9 2.2 12.8 0.0 25.1 
1990 12.0 12.5 6.7 12.9 0.0 22.4 
1991 14.3 14.8 13.1 14.6 0.0 25.8 
1992 16.0 16.8 6.7 17.6 0.0 20.6 
1993 31.7 33.0 23.0 33.3 20.0 39.0 
1994 33.2 34.3 26.6 34.4 25.0 43.3 
1995 24.6 25.7 14.6 24.9 31.8 53.1 
1996 25.7 26.5 20.2 26.5 24.3 28.2 
Similarly, we also observe an increasing exit rate after 1992. In 1988, only 10.7% 
of firms exited, but in 1994 around a third of the firms in the sector exited. The 
firm exit rate among new entries is even higher, which will be discussed in the 
following section. However, the pace of exit among SOEs is 6%-11 %, below that 
of the population average (except in 1991). 
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As in developed economies, the entry rate and exit rate, and the entry share and 
exit share seem to be highly correlated in this specific Chinese manufacturing 
sector (See Fig 5.6). However, both entry rates and entry share are higher than 
exit rates and exit shares in general. This is consistent with the growing feature 
of the electrical engineering sector and the whole Chinese economy. The fact 
that the pace of both entry and exit has accelerated since 1992 corresponds to 
the positive effects of the accelerating pace of economic reform since 1992. 
In order to quantify the contribution of entrants and exits to output growth, we 
conduct some simple decompositions of output change by firm types and in 
terms of survival. The results are shown in Figure 5.7 and Figure 5.8, which show 
the contribution of entry, exit, and surviving firms to the growth of output for the 
whole period and the two sub-periods. 
Figure 5.7 suggests that there was a big increase in the importance of 
"movement" of enterprises between the two sub-periods, with both the positive 
contribution of entry and the negative contribution of "exit" increasing 
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substantially. Indeed, in the period since the reforms, the net impact of entry and 
exit is clearly more important than the growth of surviving firms. 
Fig 5.7 The Contributions of Entry, Exit and 
Survival to Output Growth (%) 
150 
100 
50 
0 
Q 1987-96 
  1987-92 
Q 1992-96 
-50 
1_ 
Figure 5.8 concentrates on the small firm sector. It shows that a similar 
phenomenon was also occurring here, with big increases in the role of both entry 
and exit. 
Fig 5.8 The Contribution of Entry, Exit, and 
Survival Among Small Firms 
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The data analysis in this section therefore suggests that entry and exit are 
gradually playing an increasing role in the sectoral studies and in the course of 
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China's economic reform, and it also suggests the existence of the increasing 
movement of primarily small firms. 
5.3.4 Productivity and Efficiency Differential Among Entering, Exiting and 
Continuing Firms 
In order to identify the relationship between firm productivity, firm efficiency and 
firm turnover patterns, we compare efficiency and productivity levels of 
continuing firms, entrants, and exiting plants at the time of entry and exit. 
Table 5.7 shows the relative productivity and efficiency levels of entrants, 
surviving and exiting firms (relative to the average productivity and efficiency 
levels of the sector) in electrical engineering industry at a given year. 
Table 5.7 Average Productivity and Efficiency Index of Entrants, Exits and 
Surviving Firms Relative to Population Average (%) 
Entry Exit Survival 
Labour 
Productivity 
Efficiency Labour 
Productivity 
Efficiency Labour 
Productivity 
Efficiency 
1987 65.8 98.4 100.7 100.0 
1988 50.3 105.8 51.1 103.7 101.1 99.7 
1989 112.8 105.6 55.5 96.6 101.7 100.4 
1990 56.0 101.6 45.2 98.1 102.2 100.4 
1991 90.8 100.9 46.0 93.1 104.5 101.1 
1992 59.8 101.2 74.7 99.6 103.2 87.3 
1993 87.5 105.9 61.4 97.2 110.4 101.3 
1994 110.8 105.6 83.5 99.8 103.3 100.6 
1995 102.2 99.6 79.0 94.0 102.5 101.7 
1996 81.2 101.7 
The main features of Table 5.7 could be summarized as follows. First, exiting 
firms in a given year are, on average, less productive and less efficient than both 
continuing firms and new entrants in that year. Exiting firms are generally more 
than 20% less productive than continuing firms. This result is consistent with the 
prediction by models of firms' heterogeneity that market selection forces sort out 
low-productivity plants from high-productivity firms. Second, new entrants are on 
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average less productive than continuing firms in the first year they are observed, 
although there were exceptions in 1989,1994 and 1995. However, of all the new 
entrants in these three years (1989,1984, and 1995), only around 10% of them 
have above-average labour productivity. But, new entrants are generally the 
most efficient. Initial low productivity of new firms relative to continuing firms is 
not consistent with the presence of the simple vintage effect that new firms are 
more productive than older firms. However, as they are the most efficient, it is not 
contradictory to the prediction of several recent models of firm dynamics, such as 
Jovanovic (1982) and Hopenhayn (1992). Potential entrants who are uncertain 
about their productivity but hold a positive outlook on their post-entry productivity 
performance - i. e., who expect they could catch up with the incumbents in terms 
of productivity sooner or later - might enter despite their initially low productivity. 
Of course, new firms themselves are also heterogeneous in terms of productivity, 
as will be discussed later. Initial low productivity of new firms relative to 
incumbents is also documented by other studies, such as Aw et al., (1997)1 for 
the Taiwanese manufacturing industry, and Foster et al., (1998)2 for the US 
manufacturing industry. 
Furthermore, from the above table we can see that the productivity gap between 
new entrants and continuing firms has narrowed. On the one hand, this fact 
conforms well to the assumption of recent R&D-based endogenous growth 
models, such as that of Grossman and Helpman (1991), that potential entrants 
receive externality from previous innovation; on the other hand it reflects the fact 
that many new entrants are actually privatised continuing firms. 
1 Aw et al., (1997) reported that entrants in Taiwanese manufacturing sector in 1986 are, 
depending on industry, between 0.6 per cent and 6.9 per cent less productive than incumbent 
firms in the same year 
2. Foster et al., (1998) report that in terms of labour productivity, entering plants have lower 
productivity than continuing plants even at ten year intervals. 
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The above discussion suggests that observed patterns of the turnover of firms in 
the electrical engineering sector reflect the underlying productivity and efficiency 
differential between new entrants, continuing firms, and exiting firms in the short 
term. Lower productivity and efficiency of exiting firms relative to continuing firms 
and new firms is consistent with the prediction of theoretical models. Yet, the 
relative lower productivity of new entrants relative to continuing firms casts doubt 
on the aggregate productivity gain from new entrants. 
5.4 Market Selection Process: Longitudinal Performance of 
Surviving and Exiting Firms 
In the above section, firm dynamics is studied from a short-term perspective. In 
this section, we examine whether the firms' performance gaps persist, and 
whether the market selection forces in this sector have in fact sorted out low 
productivity and inefficient firms among the new entrants, and promotes the 
growth of successful new entrants from longitudinal perspective. By focusing on 
the behaviour of both entry cohorts and exit cohorts, we first examine the post- 
entry performance of new firms, secondly we examine the pre-exit performance 
of exiting firms, and finally we examine the performance of surviving firms. 
5.4.1 Post Entry Performance of New Firms 
In our sample, there are nine cohorts of new firms according to birth years, 1988 
to 1996. Focusing on a particular birth-year cohort has the advantage that 
possible age effects and reform effects on survival are accounted for. Table 5.8 
presents the market shares, average sizes of surviving firms, relative labour 
productivity and efficiency, and failure rate for each entry cohort in each year. 
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Table 5.8 Market Shares, Average Firm Sizes, Productivity and Exit Rates 
of Entry Cohorts 
Market Shares' (%) 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
<_1987 95.9 92.4 89.4 86.5 80.2 69.4 59.2 46.5 36.4 
1988 Entry 4.1 3.4 3.5 2.9 2.9 1.6 1.4 1.0 1.1 
1989 Entry 4.3 5.2 6.5 6.8 7.4 8.9 9.5 7.2 
1990 Entry 1.8 1.7 2.2 1.6 1.5 0.8 0.7 
1991 Entry 2.6 3.4 2.3 2.1 1.8 2.2 
1992 Entry 7.2 6.5 5.2 4.3 1.7 
1993 Entry 13.2 12.0 11.5 15.5 
1994 Entry 11.4 8.2 11.0 
1995 Entry 17.6 20.6 
1996 Entry 14.7 
Average Size4 of Surviving Firms Relative to All Firms i n the Indust 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
<_1987 107.8 125.4 139.7 146.2 150.1 185.9 205.5 232.6 290.4 
1988 Entry 49.4 46.7 55.2 52.5 74.1 95.2 69.0 76.5 110.6 
1989 Entry 23.0 28.3 39.2 46.8 34.5 109.3 145.8 194.3 
1990 Entry 20.0 21.3 28.0 30.1 30.2 32.7 32.5 
1991 Entry 21.7 30.2 46.8 51.7 46.0 50.3 
1992 Entry 51.1 65.5 74.4 84.5 87.9 
1993 Entry 42.7 39.1 44.6 66.3 
1994 Entry 42.8 40.3 59.0 
1995 Entry 48.8 62.0 
1996 Entry 70.3 
Averaae Labour Productivity Relative to All Firms in the Industry 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
<1987 104.5 101.7 101.1 99.9 101.8 99.2 89.4 76.9 69.4 
1988 Entry 50.3 61.7 69.3 64.1 54.7 41.5 64.1 56.0 54.8 
1989 Entry 112.8 152.7 175.3 171.2 227.6 222.0 222.9 186.4 
1990 Entry 56.0 65.2 84.7 102.0 129.1 97.8 110.1 
1991 Entry 90.8 118.3 89.6 88.2 124.8 181.7 
1992 Entry 59.8 73.6 62.2 64.3 64.5 
1993 Entry 87.5 134.6 199.5 222.2 
1994 Entry 110.8 180.2 245.0 
1995 Entry 102.2 132.6 
1996 Entry 81.2 
3 Market share is defined as the share of firms' sale to aggregate sale. 
4 Average Size is calculated as the average employment. 
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Table 5.8 (Continued) 
Hvera e crncienc i naex i eiatuve to all Firms in the Indust 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
<_1987 99.0 97.4 98.3 96.8 96.6 95.2 91.3 89.3 85.9 
1988 Entry 105.8 109.8 107.2 107.1 106.1 103.6 94.8 100.1 90.9 
1989 Entry 105.6 102.6 99.9 99.4 92.7 98.2 89.4 99.4 
1990 Entry 101.6 113.1 110.6 99.5 135.3 95.8 109.0 
1991 Entry 100.9 104.9 102.7 103.4 80.8 94.8 
1992 Entry 101.2 100.9 92.1 95.0 83.6 
1993 Entry 105.9 107.3 133.8 105.4 
1994 Entry 105.6 94.2 110.6 
1995 Entry 99.6 108.0 
1996 Entry 101.7 
Entry Cohort Exit Rates (%1 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
<_1987 10.7 7.5 8.2 7.6 2.7 24.5 24.6 19.1 15.5 
1988 Entry 25.1 17.1 6.6 11.5 40.0 31.7 24.4 6.5 
1989 Entry 22.4 23.3 0.8 37.2 35.5 20.4 30.8 
1990 Entry 25.8 17.7 40.0 34.6 35.3 24.2 
1991 Entry 20.6 37.8 28.6 31.7 19.5 
1992 Entry 39.0 26.6 29.5 29.5 
1993 Entry 43.3 43.1 17.3 
1994 Entry 53.1 31.3 
1995 Entry 28.2 
From the above table we should note the significant role played by firms set up 
before 1987: in 1988 they accounted for 95.9% of the sale industry output in this 
sector, by 1994 they still accounted for 59% of the sales in this sector. In fact, it is 
only since 1995 that the contribution of these firms reduced to less than 50%. 
This suggests that firms set up before 1987 had been an important stabilizing 
factor in the Chinese economy before 1993, the time when China started its 
second stage of economic reform, at least in Chinese manufacturing industries. 
Another feature is that the market share of each entry cohort following entry 
tends to decline as the cohort ages, on average. For example, the market share 
of the 1988 entry cohort was 4.1% in 1988; this figure was only 1.1% in 1996. 
This decline in market share is the result of two processes: the change in the size 
of surviving firms in the cohort, and the exit of firms from this cohort. In order to 
examine the former, we summarize the average size of the surviving firms. 
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Typically, the average firm size within each cohort increases relative to the 
industry average as the cohort ages. For example, the average size of the 1988 
entry cohort was only 49.4% of industry average in 1988; by 1996 it was 10.6% 
bigger than the industry average. So survivors have grown and gained in size 
relative to incumbent firms in the competitive selection, process. 
The third feature that needs to be noted is that each entry cohort shows very 
rapid productivity improvement following entry, and catches up with continuing 
firms in productivity level after several years. For example, the productivity 
disadvantage of the 1988 entry cohort relative to the 1987 survival cohort is 
about 50%; by 1996 this figure narrowed to 20%, and for some other entry 
cohorts, their productivity even surpassed that of 1987 survival cohort in 1996. 
Thus, the results are supportive of the presence of rapid learning by surviving 
members of births, especially during the first few years after entry. 
In terms of efficiency, on average the entry cohort tends to be more efficient than 
the 1987 survival cohort. However, the efficiency of entry cohorts tends to 
decrease as entry cohorts age, which is probably due to the entry of newer firms, 
and newer technologies. The entry cohort tends to have a higher failure rate in 
the first few years after entry; the failure rates for all entry cohorts increased after 
1993. 
5.4.2 Pre-Exit Performance of Exit Firms 
In the last section, firms' post-entry performance is examined. In this section, we 
examine the pre-exit performance of exiting firms in order to understand another 
dynamic aspect of the market selection process: exit. Table 5.9 presents the 
average performance (productivity, efficiency and firm size) for each exit cohort 
in each year before their exits. 
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Table 5.9 shows clearly that, for each exit cohort reported here, exiting firms are 
both less productive and less efficient than surviving firms at the time of exit, and 
they are much smaller in firm size. In fact, the performance differences between 
exiting firms and surviving firms are highly significant in terms of labour 
productivity and firms size. For example, the surviving firms are 50% to 100% 
more productive than exiting firms depending on exit year, and the average firm 
size of surviving firms is between 1.5-5 times bigger than that of exiting firms, 
depending on exit year. However, the efficiency gap between surviving firms and 
exiting firms is not as significant as the labour productivity gap between surviving 
firms and exiting firms 
Moreover, the productivity differences occur not just at the time of exit, in fact 
these differences exist for years before exits. This suggests that firm exits reflect 
underlying productivity differences that have existed for quite a period of time. 
For example, for the 1996 exit cohort, the productivity disadvantage relative to 
the surviving group was about 25 per cent in 1995. However, the productivity 
differential goes back as far as 1990, when the productivity disadvantage was 
already 10 per cent. Similar results hold for other death cohorts. 
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Table 5.9 Productivity, Efficiency and Firm Size of Exit Cohorts By Year 
Average Labour vroauctu v: ry rre-txit R elative to All F irms 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
1988 Exit 65.8 
1989 Exit 39.9 51.1 
1990 Exit 43.6 65.1 45.0 
1991 Exit 57.3 67.3 49.5 45.2 
1992 Exit 43.4 52.4 37.7 36.4 46.0 
1993 Exit 42.3 57.8 42.3 63.9 70.5 74.7 
1994 Exit 59.8 61.8 38.0 62.5 58.1 65.8 61.4 
1995 Exit 96.4 154.1 122.9 78.4 71.1 80.2 80.2 83.5 
1996 Exit 149.1 114.5 82.0 112.7 97.4 83.8 95.4 97.3 79.0 
Survivor 5 126.4 116.8 82.0 124.1 121.6 115.7 116.0 104.6 102.5 
Average Efficiency Index Pre-Exit Relative to all Firms 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
1988 Exit 98.4 
1989 Exit 105.7 103.7 
1990 Exit 99.0 99.7 94.0 
1991 Exit 101.3 96.9 99.6 98.1 
1992 Exit 96.9 94.0 95.6 96.7 93.1 
1993 Exit 101.7 102.4 100.8 105.0 101.6 99.6 
1994 Exit 92.9 91.5 93.2 97.4 96.2 96.5 97.2 
1995 Exit 99.3 101.4 96.8 98.5 103.7 99.4 101.3 99.8 
1996 Exit 97.9 97.6 98.0 98.2 101.6 98.9 104.7 106.3 94.0 
Survivor 103.4 105.4 98.0 101.8 103.0 103.1 100.9 99.2 101.7 
Average Firm Size of Pre-Exit Relative to All Firms 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
1988 Exit 35.6 
1989 Exit 23.9 18.6 
1990 Exit 44.5 34.2 30.9 
1991 Exit 35.2 34.3 30.9 26.5 
1992 Exit 87.3 67.5 64.4 63.5 40.0 
1993 Exit 46.4 51.1 47.2 39.2 38.9 35.9 
1994 Exit 76.4 77.8 85.2 73.3 64.8 68.8 63.4 
1995 Exit 74.7 75.2 75.6 70.7 69.2 64.8 50.3 71.5 
1996 Exit 81.0 95.3 86.3 82.8 82.9 83.7 66.9 51.8 47.0 
Survivor 215.3 211.6 211.5 222.7 217.1 200.5 160.2 146.7 117.0 
5 Survivors: Firms surviving up until 1996 
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Another feature demonstrated by Table 5.9 is that the relative size of pre-exit 
firms tends to decrease compared with the average size of the whole sample as 
they come to the point of exit. For example, the average firm size of the 1996 exit 
cohort was 81% of that of the industrial average in 1987, and by 1995, a year 
before their exits, their average size was only 47% of the population average. 
Similar patterns are found for other death-year cohorts as well. 
In terms of pre-exit efficiency, it is observed that exiting firms are generally less 
efficient than surviving firms. For example, the efficiency index of the 1992 exit 
cohort was nearlylO% less efficient than surviving firms in 1991, a year before 
their exit, and this efficiency gap can be tracked right back to 1987. Furthermore, 
exiting firms are less efficient than the industry average immediately before exit. 
Thus, firms' exit seems to reflect not only point-in-time performance 
disadvantage around exit but also persistent bad performance. These results 
strengthen the conclusion we drew earlier that markets sort out firms on the basis 
of firm performance. Both labour productivity and the efficiency index seem to be 
good indicators of firm exiting, but it is not known which indicator better predicts 
the probability of firms' exit . 
5.4.3 Performance of Surviving Firms: A Transition Matrix Analysis 
Until now, we have been examining firms' post-entry and pre-exit performance by 
focusing on the average productivity and efficiency differentials among various 
entry and exit cohorts. In this section, we focus on the long-term performance of 
surviving firms by analysing the movement of firms across productivity and 
efficiency distribution over time. One way of summarizing the above features of 
our data and complementing our previous analysis is to rely on transition matrix 
analysis. Following Baily et al., (1992), we set up transition matrices for two time 
intervals: 1987-1992 and 1992-1996. In order to do this, the efficiency score and 
labour productivity of surviving firms within the industry were compared to the 
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industrial average in the beginning and end years of each period, and firms were 
divided accordingly into 5 quintiles. For example, in terms of productivity, firms 
were divided according to the following: 
Quintile 1: (Pt -P)/P >- 60% 
Quintile 2: 60% > (Pr - P) /P >- 20% 
Quintile 3: 20% > (P,., - P)/P >- -20% 
Quintile 4: -20%> (Pt -P)/P >--60% 
Quintile 5: -60%>(P1 -P)/P 
Then, for each quintile in 1987 and 1992, we calculate what fractions of those 
firms were in each quintile in 1992 and 1995 respectively, and what fractions 
have exited. The transition matrix for productivity and efficiency for each period is 
shown in the following tables: 
Table 5.10 Transition Matrix of Surviving Firms 
Relative Labour Productivity Rankings (1987-1992) 
1992 
Number of Firms Share 
1987 1 2 3 4 5 Exit Total Up Stable Down Exit 
1 46 14 24 14 13 10 121 0.0 38.0 53.7 8.3 
2 11 14 16 14 10 11 76 14.5 18.4 52.6 14.5 
3 16 17 33 61 25 40 192 17.2 17.2 44.8 20.8 
4 14 9 39 95 66 83 306 20.3 31.0 21.6 27.1 
5 6 5 9 30 49 166 265 18.9 18.5 0.0 62.6 
Total 93 59 121 214 163 310 960 16.3 24.7 26.8 32.3 
Relative Labour Productivity Rankings (1992-1996) 
1996 
Number of Firms Share 
1992 1 2 3 4 5 Exit Total Up Stable Down Exit 
1 22 4 17 26 16 66 151 0.0 14.6 41.7 43.7 
2 5 1 10 13 19 51 99 5.1 1.0 42.4 51.5 
3 6 1 6 24 54 90 181 3.9 3.3 43.1 49.7 
4 2 3 3 16 95 262 381 2.1 4.2 24.9 68.8 
5 2 2 3 5 68 333 413 2.9 16.5 0.0 80.6 
Total 37 11 39 84 252 802 1225 2.6 9.2 22.7 65.5 
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Table 5.10 Transition Matrix of Surviving Firms (Continued) 
Relative Efficiency Rankings (1987-1992) 
1992 
Number of Firms Share 
1987 1 2 3 4 5 Exit Total Up Stable Down Exit 
1 2 6 3 3 0 9 23 0.0 8.7 52.2 39.1 
2 3 18 47 13 0 38 119 2.5 15.1 50.4 31.9 
3 5 61, 247 110 6 195 624 10.6 39.6 18.6 31.3 
4 2 8 49 43 2 50 154 38.3 27.9 1.3 32.5 
5 0 0 0 1 0 4 5 20.0 0.0 0.0 80.0 
Total 12 93 346 170 8 296 925, 13.9 33.5 20.5 32.0 
Relative Efficiency Rankings (1992-1996) 
1996 
Number of Firms Share(%) 
1992 1 2 3 4 5 Exit Total up Stable Down Exit 
1 1 3 7 1 0 28 40 0.0 2.5 27.5 70.0 
2 3 12 56 19 2 113 205 1.5 5.9 37.6 55.1 
3 10 23 97 86 14 429 659 5.0 14.7 15.2 65.1 
4 1 3 21 36 19 195 275 9.1 13.1 6.9 70.9 
5 0 0 3 3 0 11 17 35.3 0.0 0.0 64.7 
Total 61 58 101 88 120 776 1204 5.6 12.1 17.9 64.5 
Starting from the first row of the table, of the firms that were in the top quintile in 
1987, about 38 percent of them were again in the top quintile in 1992, and 53.7% 
of firms experienced downward movement in relative productivity ranking, of 
which only 19% of firms moved down to the bottom two quintiles in 1992. Among 
the firms that were in the second quintile in 1987,18.4 per cent of them stayed in 
the second quintile and 14.5% of them moved up to the first quintile in 1992, and 
again more than 50% of firms moved downwards in relative productivity rankings. 
In total 16.3% of firms moved upwards in relative ranking, 24.7% stayed in the 
same quintile, and 26.8% of firms moved downwards. The high percentage of 
upward and stable movements of firms (about 41 % of firms moved upwards and 
stayed in the same quintile) indicates the persistence of productivity. As 
expected, the percentage of exits conditional on the 1987 productivity quintile 
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gets higher as we go down the productivity quintiles. In the top quintile about 
8.3 per cent of the firms exited within five years, while as much as 62.6 per cent 
exited in the bottom quintile during the same period. One interesting observation 
here is that there are many high productivity exits. For the period 1992 to 1996, 
less than 12% of firms moved upward or stayed in the same quintile, 22.7% of 
firms moved downward, and 65.5% of firms exited. The percentage of exits 
conditional on the 1992 productivity quintile becomes higher as well when we go 
down the productivity quintiles, but it is higher than that for the period between 
1987 and 1992. 
In term of efficiency ranking, for the period between 1987 and 1992,13.9% of 
firms moved upwards in relative efficiency ranking, 33.5% of firms stayed in the 
same quintile, and 20.5 % moved downwards. For the period between 1992 and 
1996, only 5.6% of firms moved upwards, and 12.1 % stayed in the same quintile. 
In terms of the percentage of firm exits conditional on the1987 efficiency quintile, 
there is no significant difference among different quintiles. However, for the 
period between 1992 and 1996, the percentage of exits for firms in quintiles 2,3 
and 4, accounting for 95% of the firm population in 1992, tends to get higher as 
we go, down the efficiency quintiles. Although firms in quintiles 1 and 5 are 
exceptions, they only accounted for less than 5% of the firm population in 1992. 
These findings may suggest that labour productivity is a better indicator of firms' 
exit probability than the efficiency index over a relatively longer time period, while 
the efficiency index is a better indicator of firms' exit probability in a relatively 
short time period. Also, it suggests that as China's economic reform proceeds, 
the efficiency index has gradually become a better indicator in predicting firms' 
exit. 
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5.5 Entry, Exit and Aggregate Productivity Growth 
Superficially, the evidence from the above sections suggests a sharpening of the 
competitive process over the period under investigation. More correctly, however, 
establishing the result depends upon both the risk represented by exit, which we 
will discuss in the next chapter, and the competitiveness of new entrants. In this 
section, we evaluate the competitiveness of new entrants by examining the 
contributions of the entry and exit firms, and that of continuing firms among all 
firms. Ideally we would want to examine either total factor productivity, or the 
efficiency index and Malmquist Productivity index. However, calculating TFP 
requires the specification of production function assuming profit- maximizing 
enterprise behaviours and competitive product and factor markets, which are not 
compatible with the transition nature of the Chinese economy. As for the 
efficiency index and the Malmquist productivity index, the aggregation of the firm- 
level efficiency index to the aggregate efficiency index needs theoretical 
underpinning, and the calculation of the Malquist productivity index is confined to 
continuing firms only. Furthermore, there are currently no such studies using the 
efficiency index, making it difficult to make international comparisons. We 
suspect that within a specific sector, movements in labour productivity may 
represent a reasonable proxy for movements of total factor productivity and the 
efficiency index. We have already noticed in Chapter 4 that labour productivity is 
closely related with the efficiency index. This section first examines the methods 
for productivity decomposition, and then deconstructs the growth of labour 
productivity in the electrical engineering industry in Liao Ning province. 
5.5.1 Productivity decomposition Methods 
There exist several alternative decomposition methods, and the decomposition 
results are sensitive to decomposition methods (see Foster et al., (1998), 
Bartelsman and Doms (2000), Ahn (2001) for a general review). Aggregate 
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productivity in a given sector is generally represented by a weighted average of 
each individual firm's productivity in the sector in the following form: 
P, =ý61p1 
where Pt is an aggregate productivity measure (either labour productivity or total 
factor productivity) for the sector at time t; B;, is the share of firm i in the given 
sector at time t; and pi, is a productivity measure of an individual firm i at time 
t. Usually, employment (or the staff-hour) share is used in weighting labour 
productivity, and the output share is used for weighting TFP. Aggregate 
productivity changes are generally deconstructed into factors including: 
i) Within-firm effect: within-firm productivity changes in continuing firms; 
ii) Productivity changes resulting from changes in market shares of 
high-productivity firms and low-productivity firms; 
iii) Productivity changes resulting from the process of entry and exit. 
Baily et al., (1992) used the following decomposition: 
AP 
eit-k APIs + I] P« AOK, 
iEC iEC 
+ e« Pit e, l -k Per-k ! EE iEX 
where B;, is the output share of firm i in the given sector at time t; productivity 
growth (Ape) is measured between the base year t-k and the end year t; and 
C, E and X are sets of continuing, entering, and exiting firms, respectively. 
Using the Longitudinal Research Database of the United States, Baily et al., 
(1992) found that the within- firm effect was ve ry important in aggregate 
productivity growth in manufacturing for the three periods considered (1972- 
1977, 1977-1982, and 1982-1987), determining the trend of TFP growth. The 
effect of increasing the output shares of high-productivity plants and the 
decreasing output shares of low-productivity plants, are also important, having a 
positive effect on aggregate productivity growth in all the 23 examined 
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manufacturing industries in all three periods (1972-1977,1977-1982, and 1982- 
1987). However, the net contribution of entry and exit turned out to be very small 
and sometimes even negative. 
Haltiwanger (1997) pointed out that the problem with the above decomposition 
method is that if the market share of entrants is very low and if the market share 
of exiting firms is very high, the net entry effect will be negative even when 
entrants are more productive than exiting firms. Furthermore, it does not account 
for the cathartic effect of exiting which sorts out the low-productivity firms. To 
overcome these problems, Haltiwanger (1997) modified the above decomposition 
as follows: 
DP 
eir-k A pit +IA eit (Pit-k - rt-k) +Z\ 
eif A Pit 
1EC iEC iEC 
+8,, (p 
it - -k) 
eit-k (Pit-k 
-'-k 
) 
iEE IEX 
where A refers to changes over the k -year interval between the first year (t - k) 
and the last year (t); Bl, is the share of firm i in the given sector at time t; C, E, 
and X are sets of continuing, entering, and exiting firms, respectively; and P, _k 
is 
the aggregate (i. e. weighted average) productivity level of the sector as of the 
first year t-k. Under this decomposition method, an entrant or exiting firm will 
contribute positively to productivity growth when it has higher or lower 
productivity than the initial industry average. This method further deconstructs 
Baily et al., (1992)'s three factors into five components: 
i) Within-firm effect, firm-level productivity change weighted by initial shares 
in the industry. 
ii) Between-firm effect: change of market share weighted by the difference 
between initial firm-level productivity and initial industry average. 
iii) Cross effect: product of market share change and productivity change at 
firm level 
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iv) Entry effect: productivity gains (loss) coming from a new entrant having 
higher (lower) than initial industry average weighted by the market share 
of the new entrant. 
v) Exit effects: the productivity gains (loss) coming from an exiting firm 
having lower (higher) than initial average productivity weighted by the 
initial market share of an exiting firm. 
Using the same dataset as Baily et al., (1992), and employing the improved 
decomposition methodology of Haltiwanger (1997), Foster et al., (1998) showed 
that the contribution of net entry to aggregate productivity growth is also 
substantial, especially over a longer period. While the "exit effect" is usually 
positive reflecting the fact that exiting firms are less productive than the industry 
average, the "entry effect" is often negative especially when measured over a 
shorter time horizon. In other words, new entrants tend to be less productive than 
incumbents, but surviving entrants' average productivity grows fast, reflecting 
selection and learning effects. In the UK, using a panel of manufacturing 
establishments drawn from the Census of Production, Disney et al., (2003) found 
that the sum of "between", "cross", "entry", and "exit" effects accounted for 50% 
of labour productivity growth and 90% of total factor productivity growth in the 
total manufacturing sector over 1980-1992. 
OECD (2003) adopted another decomposition method suggested by Griliches 
and Regev (1995) to make an international comparison of firm dynamics and 
their contribution to aggregate productivity for ten OECD countries (United 
States, Germany, France, Italy, United Kingdom, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
Netherlands and Portugal). This decomposition method is as follow: 
e, APir +I AO, (pi -r) AP 
fEC fEC 
+I eil (Pit - P) -I eil-k (Pit-k - P) 
lEN iE, X 
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where a bar over a variable indicates the average of the variable over the base 
and end year. While the previous method uses the first year's values for a 
continuing firm's share (et(_k ), its productivity level (p1t_k) and the sector-wide 
average productivity level (P_k ), this method uses the time averages of the first 
and last years for them (9, , p; , and P). This method deconstructs aggregate 
productivity growth into four components: within effect, between effect, entry 
effect, and exit effect. As a result of this time averaging, cross effect disappears. 
OECD (2003) suggested that within-firm productivity growth accounts for a 
substantial share of overall labour productivity growth, and the net contribution of 
new entrants and exits is positive, accounting for between 20% and 40% of total 
productivity growth. 
5.5.2 Decomposition of Labour Productivity in the Electrical Engineering 
Industry 
We have discussed, the methods of productivity decomposition and the result of 
productivity decomposition in some advanced economies in the above section. 
Here we turn to the decomposition of aggregate productivity growth in the 
Chinese economy, in particular in the electrical engineering industry in Liao Ning 
Province. We focus on decomposing the labour productivity growth. 
As we are more concerned with the contribution of new entrants, exits, and 
surviving firms to productivity growth than with the output reallocation among 
surviving firms, we simply deconstruct the aggregate productivity growth into the 
productivity growth from new entrant, exiting and surviving firms rather than 
deconstruct the contribution of surviving firms into within-firm effect, between-firm 
effect, and cross effect. We modify Haltiwanger (1997)'s method as follows by 
combining the first three components of Haltiwanger (1997)'s decomposition 
method and making it easy to calculate: 
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P) represents the change of aggregate 
iEC 1EC 
labour productivity attributed to surviving firms (including both within-effect and 
between-effect), including two components, surviving firms' current productivity 
growth over base year average productivity, and surviving firms' productivity in 
base year higher than the sample average productivity in base year. 
O,, (p;, - P) represents the change of aggregate labour productivity attributed to 
iE1. 
new entry, and IOi, 
_k 
(Pit 
-k - 
P) represents the change of aggregate labour 
iEX 
productivity due to firms' exit. 
In practice, we divided the 10-year period between 1987 and 1996 into two sub- 
periods, 1987-1992, and 1992-1996. We first deconstruct labour productivity 
growth for the two sub-periods, and then deconstruct labour productivity growth 
for the whole period between 1987 and 1996. The decomposition results are 
shown in Fig 5.9 and Fig 5.10. 
Fig 5.9 The Contribution Of Entry, Exit, and 
Survival to Productivity Growth (%) 
(all enterprises) 
100 
80 
Q 1987-96 
60 _  
1987-92 
40 Q 1992-96 
20 
0 
Entry Exit Survival 
235 
Fig 5.9 shows the contribution of entry, exit, and surviving firms to the sector's 
productivity growth. It suggests that all three (on average) made positive 
contributions to productivity growth over both periods. However, the major impact 
came from entrants, accounting for around 51% and 72% of labour productivity 
growth in the two sub-periods respectively, while both exiting and surviving firms 
played only a limited part. For the two sub-periods, surviving firms accounted for 
only 35% and 7% of labour productivity growth respectively, and their 
contribution seemed to be declining. This contrasts with the fact that surviving 
firms played a dominant role in advanced economies. Exiting firms do appear to 
have increased their role a little over the sub-periods; their contribution to labour 
productivity growth increased from 13% to 21 %. 
Looking solely at the contribution of small enterprises to overall productivity 
growth, Figure 5.10 suggests that survival is even less important among small 
firms, while exit is considerably more important. 
Fig 5.10 The Contribution of Small Firms to 
Productivity Growth (%) 
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5.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter we have attempted to examine aspects of the competitive 
selection process in an important sector of Chinese manufacturing, looking in 
particular for changes resulting from the latest stage of reform, dubbed the 
transition to the "socialist market economy". These dynamic processes may be 
becoming increasingly important for the continuing growth of manufacturing as 
the agricultural sector as a source of surplus labour begins to decline. 
Our analysis suggests that the competitive selection process is taking shape in 
China, with new firm entries contributing substantially to both output growth and 
productivity growth; however, old firms are still an important stabilizing element in 
determining the trend of the economy. Our analysis also suggests that it is 
insufficient to analyse the competitive process from the point of view of new firm 
entry and incumbent firm growth alone. Indeed the substantial rate of movement 
of enterprises that we observe in this sector means that a study of exit is just as 
important as that of entry. Moreover, this rate of movement appears to have 
increased substantially in the latest phase of reform. In fact, our productivity 
decomposition suggests that exits do contribute to productivity improvement 
especially within the small firm. Our analysis suggests that for small firms and 
COEs, the competitive selection process operates much as we would expect it to 
in a private market economy. However, for SOEs the rate of exit is much slower, 
and compared with new entry the contribution of exit to productivity growth is 
trivial; this will be the subject of analysis in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6: A Hazard Model Analysis of the Impacts of 
Enterprise Reforms upon Firms' Exit Behavior 
In the previous chapter, we found that new entrants contributed the most to 
the growth of both industrial output and labour productivity, with only a limited 
part played by surviving and exiting firms. This contrasts distinctly with the 
conclusions drawn from studies of advanced market economies, in which the 
entry and exit flows are found to be positively correlated, and are described as 
a revolving door at the bottom of the industry size distribution (Geroski, 1991 a, 
b; Shapiro and Khemani, 1987). Why is the exit behaviour of Chinese firms 
different? In this chapter we examine directly firms' exit behaviours and 
quantify the significance of a range of factors influencing firms' closure 
behaviours in the context of Chinese firms, using the same panel of Chinese 
electrical engineering firms from 1987 to 1996 that we used in Chapter 5. 
The continuous and simultaneous entry, growth and survival, decline and 
eventual exit, or what Schumpeter referred to as "creative destruction", 
characterises capitalism and may be thought of as a hallmark of a market 
economy. Such a competitive selection process is based on an exit 
mechanism for individual enterprises, allowing unprofitable firms to decline 
and fail. Through such a selection process, Alchian (1950) argued that profit- 
maximising behaviour in a market economy is ensured, since a lack of profits 
threatens a firm's survival. Poznanski (1993) argued that the substandard 
dynamic efficiency of Eastern European economies could be attributed to the 
substitution of an easy exit and easy entry mechanism with one that precludes 
the timely termination and formation of enterprises. In fact, Kornai (1995) 
points out that the soft budget constraint is basically a problem of exit. In the 
context of transition economies, while the role of the entry of newly- 
established firms and the restructuring of large state-owned enterprises has 
been a focus of attention for academics and policy-makers (for example Qian 
(1999), and EBRD (1995)), the role played by the exit of old inefficient firms 
has been largely ignored. We are unaware of the studies examining firm's exit 
behaviour and their determinants in the context of transition economies, 
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although there are a number of similar works in the context of advanced 
economies, e. g., Lieberman's [1990] work on American firms. Arguably both 
the entry and exit of firms should be emphasized equally, as they are two 
sides of " creative destruction" (Stiglitz, 1999). 
Investigating the process governing the process of enterprises' closure in the 
Chinese economy is important for a number of reasons. Firstly, China's idea 
of gradual reform aims to encourage the entry of new firms and phase out the 
old inefficient SOEs through bankruptcy and restructuring. Therefore, a study 
of firms' exit and survival behaviour can shed light on how gradual reform 
works. Secondly, exits have played and are playing an important economic 
role in the transition to a market economy. On one hand, the exit of inefficient 
firms releases scarce resources, reduces social wastage and mobilises social 
resources, facilitates the prospects for new firms entering the industry and 
structural adjustment, and promotes entrepreneurship (Aghion and Howitt, 
1997). On the other hand it provides credible threats to incumbent firms 
(Jensen, 1988; Hart, 1995), which may then hasten governance restructuring. 
However, exits involve costs (Ericsson, 1994), and in special circumstance 
exits may lead to the disorganisation of the entire economy. Thirdly, by 
studying the firms' exit behaviour and its determinants and comparing it with 
its counterparts in advanced economies, we can estimate to what extent the 
market mechanism is functioning and to what extent the old legacy is still 
working, and shed light on China's `gradualism'. 
As the objectives of the transition are to restructure state-owned enterprises 
and to reallocate its resources to their best use, the idea that the old state- 
owned enterprises (SOEs) - which are designed for the old central planning 
system and where inefficiency is allegedly pervasive - are less likely to survive 
in the face of competition from new innovative non-state firms seems to be a 
logical assumption. However, in the Chinese case we suspect that the high 
economic and social costs associated with the closure of state-owned 
enterprises, such as the possible increase in unemployment and the social 
unrest associated with it, the possible waste and loss of the capital invested in 
the past due to the underdeveloped capital market, the potential financial 
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crisis that might be triggered by the closure of SOEs, the possible output 
decline and disruption of production, and possible political opposition to 
transition, etc., create strong barriers to exit, which prevent old inefficient 
state-owned enterprises from closing down. Furthermore, in order to support 
those inefficient firms, subsidies and preferential loans have to be provided, 
which means efficient firms find it more difficult to get external funding to 
finance their investments, and heavy taxes have to be imposed upon efficient 
firms, which in turn could crowd out efficient firms. Also, the subsidies to 
inefficient firms distort market signals, which make efficient firms more likely to 
exit. In this chapter, we are particularly concerned with the questions of what 
determines the exit of Chinese firms in the process of China's transition to a 
market economy, what constitute the barriers to firms' exit, and whether these 
barriers have changed to any great extent as a result of the reforms taking 
place under the Socialist Market Economy. 
This chapter analyses the determination of Chinese firms' exit behaviour since 
the endorsement of China's Bankruptcy Law in 1986, and makes three 
contributions to this literature. Firstly, it examines firms' exit behaviour in the 
context of transition economies. Although there are some studies examining 
the entry of de nova firms and the bankruptcy and privatisation of old state- 
owned firms, previous studies have not examined the lifecycle aspects of 
firms' behaviour in transition economies. Secondly, it uses survival analysis, 
especially a hazard model, to examine the survival function and hazard 
dependence. This allows for the examination of the influence of firm- specific, 
industry-specific and macro economic factors upon firms' survival 
probabilities. Most of the earlier similar studies focus on the effect of industry- 
level factors. Thirdly, most of the studies of firms' behaviour in transition 
economies are based on survey data rather than on a complete population. 
Because of the rapid changes experienced in transition economies, it is 
almost impossible to find a complete and consistent sample spanning 10 
years. My dataset is a complete census of one industry sector in a province 
of China. 
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The chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.1 provides an overview of the 
firm exit determinants in both developed and transition economies. Section 
6.2 looks in particular at firm exits and exit determinants in the Chinese 
context. Section 6.3 sets up an empirical analysis to clarify these results in 
relation to the specific hazard posed for an individual enterprise by industry 
exit, and discusses the empirical implementation results, while the final 
section concludes. 
6.1 Empirical Studies of Firms' Exit in Developed and 
Transition Economies 
A number of studies have examined the dynamic aspects of firms' behaviour 
in the context of advanced economies, in which firms' entry and survival are 
emphasized and exit behaviours are only studied as a by-product, such as 
Audretsch's (1990,1995) and Dunne et al. (1988,1989)'s work on U. S 
manufacturing, Baldwin and Gorecki's (1989)'s work on Canadian 
manufacturing, Goreski's (1991a, 1991b)'s work on British manufacturing, 
Mata's (1993a, 1993b) work on Portuguese manufacturing, and Schwalbach 
(1991) on German manufacturing. 
Empirical studies of the processes of entry and exit for developed economies 
tend to indicate that industry characteristics explain a large amount of the 
variation observed not only between industries but also within industries over 
time (See Caves (1998) for a review). Variables associated with observed 
differences across industries include entry barriers such as sunk costs, 
absolute capital requirements, minimum efficient scale, and market 
concentration (Bain, 1956; von Weizsacker, 1980). Caves and Porter (1976) 
and Eaton and Lipsey (1980,1981) first noticed the symmetrical relationship 
between entry and exit. Caves and Porter suggested that each source of entry 
barriers identified by Bain could also erect a barrier to exit. Empirically, 
Shapiro and Khemani (1987) showed in a study of 143 four-digit Canadian 
manufacturing industries, over 1972-76, that these variables tend to be 
associated with both barriers to entry and barriers to exit. A number of other 
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studies have confirmed the correlation between entries and exits (e. g., Dunne 
et al., (1988) for US manufacturing industries, Schwalbach (1991) on German 
manufacturing industries, and Geroski's (1991 a, 1991 b) study of British firms). 
The positive correlation between entry and exit flows, especially among small 
firms, has been described as a revolving door at the bottom of the industry 
size distribution. Other studies indicate that entry rates tend to be positively 
influenced by both expected rates of return in the industry and by its growth 
rate (Geroski, 1990; Schwallbach, 1991), which asymmetrically have a 
positive effect on exit rates as well. Macroeconomic conditions are also found 
to be important for exit rates (van Ewijk, 1997). Over the business cycle, exit 
rates increase during downturn (Caballero and Hammour, 1994,1996; 
Audretsch and Mahmood, 1995). 
Most of the above studies have been conducted at industry level, 
concentrating on industry characteristics that determine firms' survival and 
closure. Yet, firm-specific effects are also important. For example, small firm 
size is generally thought to be more likely to indicate higher rates of closure 
(e. g., Lieberman, 1990), and young firms tend to have higher exit rates (e. g., 
Audretsch and Mahmood, 1995; Dunne et al., 1989). However, in most of the 
previous studies some of the important features of firms pre-exit, which have a 
significant effect upon firms' closure decisions, have not been considered, 
such as firms' profitability, productivity, R&D activities, marketing strategies, 
financial leverage, governance structure, etc. 
In the process of transition from centrally planned economies to market 
economies, the closure and exit of value-destroying firms' or inefficient firms 
1A firm is defined as value-destroying when the value of inputs it purchases from 
other firms exceeds the value of the output that is produced. Thus, a value- 
destroying enterprise is in worse financial straits than a loss-making one. The 
former's output is worth less than the inputs before labor and capital costs are added 
in, while the latter's revenues are less than its costs (including labor and capital 
costs). 
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are important aspects of market dynamics, which both limits the wastage of 
social resources and enables the inflow of new and more productive 
enterprises. However, the above studies cannot be readily applied to 
transition economies, as all of them are conducted in advanced economies, 
such as the US, UK, Germany, Portugal, Japan, etc., and they all assume that 
firms are profit-maximizing and markets are competitive, therefore firms 
respond in the same way to the same market signals apart from the difference 
caused by their scale advantage or disadvantage. These assumptions might 
be quite appropriate in advanced economies, but may not be appropriate for 
economies in transition and China in particular, where the new market 
economic institutions are in the making, and the old central planning legacies 
still remain. 
In transition economies, the "destruction" of old inefficient firms, involves a 
substantial and complicated change in the structure of production, 
employment and factor use, as much of the physical and organisational 
capital is not viable in a market economy. Furthermore, the undeveloped 
capital and financial markets in most transition economies make much of the 
resources currently employed by the incumbent enterprises, especially those 
employed by state-owned enterprises, virtually immobile. This immobility of 
resources may be compounded by the weakness or by the absence of well- 
defined and protected property rights that facilitate the reallocation and 
transfer of real assets. Therefore, the closure of unviable enterprises may be 
associated with substantial social as well as economic costs, such as the loss 
of net product and the disruption of economic ties, which are increasing with 
the scale of firms exiting. The costs are shown to an extreme degree in the 
early stage of transition in Eastern and Central Europe and Former Soviet 
Union Countries, such as the sharp decline in output, increasing 
unemployment, falling investment, the disruption of production organisation, 
the opposition of transition, even the reversal of transition path, etc. These 
may consequently hinder non-viable firms from exiting. 
As transition goes on, the commitment not to bail out failing firms may still not 
be credible. In 1998, of CEE and FSU transition countries, bankruptcy 
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proceedings seemed to be efficient only in Poland, Hungary, and Estonia, with 
the Czech Republic lagging behind Poland and Hungary (Roland, 2000). The 
loss-making firms seemed readily to get subsidies and to be rescued 
(Schaffer, 1998; Li and Liang, 1998). In Russia, bankruptcy law does not put 
pressure on managers to restructure; on the contrary, managers of large 
regional enterprises may cooperate with regional government to use 
bankruptcy to expropriate the federal government and outside investors. 
Instead of encouraging restructuring, it may even prevent restructuring 
(Lambert-Mogiliansky et al., 2000). 
Hence, when we look into firms' closure behaviour in the context of transition 
economies, apart from the factors that are common to all economies, such as 
sunk cost, economies of scale and the cost advantages of incumbent firms, 
the peculiar institutional settings in transition economies, such as the lack of a 
social security system, undeveloped factor markets, and ambiguous property 
rights, the potential social and economic costs should also be taken into 
account, 
6.2 Firms' Exit and Determinants in China 
China's enterprise reform has been the focus of China's economic reform, 
which is characterised by its gradualism. However, in my study of the 
technical efficiency of Chinese firms under restructuring in chapter 4, I found a 
significant divergence in technical efficiency rather than convergence in 
technical efficiency, as I expected, as the result of improved market 
environment. Through a detailed study of the dynamics of firms' entry, exit 
and productivity growth, we found that the roles played by firms' exiting are 
still trivial. We suspect that the competitive selection process has not yet been 
set up effectively even 20 years into reform. In fact, it is still the case that 
inefficient and even value-destroying state-owned enterprises are still being 
supported in various forms out of concern for the potential high economic and 
social costs associated with firm closure. Those failing state- owned 
enterprises are supported in the form of subsidies, credits, tax holidays, and 
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growing payments, tax and wage arrears. For example, although the state's 
subsidies to loss-making SOEs have been declining since 1989, they still 
amounted to more than 10% of state revenue between 1989 and 1992. 
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6.2.1 Firms' Exit In China 
While failing firms are still supported, the exit of firms has gradually become a 
real threat in China. Firms exit generally in the form of closing down, 
bankruptcy, mergers and acquisition, and partial or complete privatisation. 
Closing Down 
This is the most common type of firm exit in China; it occurs when the owners 
(either a government department in the case of SOEs, the "community" in the 
case of COEs, or private individuals in the case of both foreign and domestic 
privately-owned enterprises) have been unable to secure a sufficient return, 
and may decide to close down an under-performing enterprise. As I am 
concentrating on the electrical engineering industry, I am sensible to the fact 
that firms may exit through switching to some other industries. 
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Fig 6.1 State Subsidies to Loss Making SOEs and the 
Share of Subsideis in State Revenue 
Bankruptcy 
China's first bankruptcy law was enacted in 1986. For years, it was rarely 
applied. From 1988 to 1991, there were less than 300 cases of bankruptcy, 
and all of them were small firms. The first bankruptcy case of large and 
medium SOEs occurred in 1992, six years after the enactment of the 
bankruptcy law, and it encountered enormous opposition from workers2. 
In1996, a new bankruptcy law, largely resembling those in market economies, 
was enacted. Currently, bankruptcy has become a realistic threat. The 
number of bankruptcies rose sharply from 98 in 1989 to 5048 in 1997 (World 
Bank, 2000). From 1998 to 2000 the figure became stable at around 5,000 per 
year, partly due to the control by central government of the scale of 
bankruptcies in order to maintain social stability and avoid financial crisis. In 
fact, 1.5% of total SOEs went into bankruptcy proceedings in 1999-2000 
(Wang, 2001). 
Fig 6.2 Bankruptcy Cases Heard by Chinese Court 
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Source: World Bank (2000) 
However, barriers hindering the bankruptcy of SOEs and the laying-off of 
SOEs employees remain. The exit barriers for SOEs generally include the 
2 
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ambiguity of ownership of state assets, as the ownership of a SOE's state 
assets is complicated, for example, part of the state assets may be controlled 
by central government, and some other parts may be controlled by local 
government or SOEs themselves, which makes it difficult to distinguish who 
owns what; underdeveloped secondary markets for assets, complicated inter- 
enterprises arrears and debts, and the substantial entitlements of labour 
affected by SOE bankruptcy (Zhou and Zhang, 1997; Jefferson and Rawski, 
2002). Currently, the bankruptcy of SOEs, especially the bankruptcy of large 
and medium SOEs, is normally the result of government intervention rather 
than the market mechanism, and must be endorsed and administered by the 
government. Creditors have little influence on the process, and creditor banks, 
which were considered the biggest losers in the bankruptcy proceedings, 
commonly recovered only 3-10% of their claims (Wang, 2001; Zhou and 
Zhang, 1997; ICBC, 1997). 
Merger and Takeover 
In order to avoid these problems facing bankruptcy, the merger of a financially 
sound firm with a financially distressed firm is favoured and in fact encouraged 
by the government, being regarded as an alternative to bankruptcy. Under 
such a merger, the workers of financially distressed firms are submerged into 
the better firms, which avoids the cost of unemployment. The merger can also 
take place voluntarily without the interference of the government. Merger and 
acquisition mainly occurs in large and medium enterprises. While in Western 
economies, merger and takeover also include `successful' exits - firms being 
sold out or merged for high profits, in China, before 1996 when secondary 
markets for assets were still underdeveloped, firms being sold or merged did 
so mainly because of poor market performance and financial difficulties. 
Privatisation 
A third reason for a firm to exit is privatisation. Privatisation takes various 
forms such as joint ventures where foreign capital dominates, firms being sold 
to the public, firms being sold to individuals, and firms being sold to 
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employees and management. However, privatisation, either partial or 
complete, is a sensitive issue in China. Before 1995, privatisation mainly took 
the form of joint venture. Since 1995, as private ownership has acquired a 
more legitimate status, privatisation is more likely to be in the form of selling 
out to private owners, to employees and management, or to the public. In 
general, there are three concerns around ownership changes: the fear of loss 
of government control over enterprises, the loss of state- owned assets, and 
the realignment of redundant employees. 
It is important to note that we cannot distinguish the forms of exit in our 
dataset. However, for Chinese firms, before 1996, informal bankruptcy 
(closing down) was the most usual form of exit. Regarding firms being 
merged or acquired, they were generally operating as financially independent 
firms, submitting financial reports independently, and therefore they are not 
counted as exits. As for privatisation, large-scale privatisation had not been 
implemented before 1996, at least in Liao Ning Province. Therefore, exiting 
firms in my dataset largely refers to firms closing down. 
6.2.2 Determinants of Firms' Exit in China 
However, exactly what factors determine firms' exit in the context of the 
Chinese manufacturing sector during the process of transition? It is clear that, 
in addition to the factors generally found to be important in advanced 
economies, a number of additional factors need to be considered in the 
context of transitional economies in general and the Chinese economy in 
particular. With the ensuing econometric analysis in mind, we need to 
consider here the following factors at firm level, industry level, and 
macroeconomic level. 
Firm-level factors: 
Ownership. Our data allows us to classify enterprises into 4 groups, State- 
Owned Enterprises (SOEs), Collectively-Owned Enterprises (COEs), Foreign- 
Invested Firms, and firms categorised as Others including Domestic Privately- 
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Owned Enterprises, and Shareholding Companies, etc. The ownership form 
is likely to be an important determinant of exit in the Chinese context, though 
the relationship may be complex. While, for example, SOEs may be 
inefficient, the probability of their exit may be influenced by a consideration of 
the social costs and resistance associated with their closure. Moreover, the 
differential fiscal and legal treatment of enterprises according to ownership 
form (and for which we cannot adequately account) may also be important. 
Enterprise age. Those enterprises that have survived the longest have 
established themselves in the market, and may be better able to survive an 
adverse shock of given size (e. g., through trademarks, "goodwill" and 
established links to suppliers or to the capital market). In the context of 
transition economies, the effect may be strengthened since established firms 
are frequently the place where traditional planning mechanisms and vested 
interests are most deeply rooted. However, old firms burdened with 
established organisation-specific knowledge (Hayek, 1935; Murrell, 1992, 
1993) acquired during the socialist era might be slower in acquiring 
organisation-specific knowledge adaptable in a market economy, and 
therefore be slower in learning to survive in a market economy. 
Enterprise size. The bigger a firm is, the more likely it is to enjoy economy of 
scale, and the more likely it is to invest in R&D, marketing strategies and 
information gathering. They have also survived and grown throughout various 
internal and external shocks, and have accumulated competitive assets and 
skills as well, therefore, they are more likely to survive. In China, for 
administrative purposes, China's State Planning Committee classifies a firm 
as large, medium, or small according to its productive capital and its 
production capacity, and makes policies according to this classification. 
Therefore firm size captures not just the advantages of large firms over small 
firms in economies of scale but also control for differential effects of 
government policies with regard to enterprises of different size. We expect to 
see a negative effect of firm size upon firms' closure probability. We measure 
firms' size by employment, and firms' scale advantage by the derivation of the 
size of capital stock from the minimum efficient scale (MES). MES is defined 
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as the average size of the largest plants accounting for 50% of industry 
employment. It should be noted that size variables may also capture the 
characteristics of the sunk cost of firms in an imperfect market environment, 
which is especially important in transition economies where capital markets 
and labour markets are underdeveloped. An additional control for sunk costs 
is a measure of capital intensity. This may also be important for another 
reason. In the 1980s, the government targeted the electrical engineering 
industry in ways that may well have encouraged entry by enterprises with less 
than optimal capital intensity. 
Enterprise performance. In a market economy, this is the key to the 
competitive selection process, with poor performance punished by exit. In the 
context of transition economies, however, the relationship may not be so 
straightforward, as efficient firms may be punished by higher taxation, and 
inefficient firms may be encouraged by state subsidies. We include three 
types of performance measures: profitability measured by the ratio, labour 
productivity, efficiency index we estimated by using Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA). As suggested by the literature that the closure of inefficient 
firms is a market selection process, we expect to see that more productive 
and more efficient firms survive and grow, and less productive and less 
efficient firms decline and close down (Jovanovic, 1982; Hopenhayn, 1992), 
and a firm's closure decision is based on the comparison of expected profit 
staying in the market and the expected cost of staying in (Dixit, 1989). 
Therefore, firms' current profitability should have negative effects upon firms' 
closure. In China, as well as in other transition economies, firms' profitability 
may be only a poor signal of the potential viability of a firm. As not all firms are 
profit- maximising oriented, both SOEs and COEs have to take on social 
responsibilities apart from their economic objectives. Firms' efficiency index is 
included for two reasons: firstly, firms' survival ability is a test of firms' 
efficiency in a competitive market (Bain, 1969), and the exit of less efficient 
firms is normal in a market economy; secondly, productivity might not be a 
good indicator of enterprises' performance in the context of transition 
economies, and higher productivity might actually lead to greater allocative 
distortion, lower profits, and lower efficiency as suggested by Bai et al. (1997). 
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We have shown in chapter 5 that there is a tendency of divergence in firms' 
efficiency, which is supposed to be associated with increased firm turnover 
(Caves, 1998). 
The hardening of financial constraints. The hardening of financial constraints 
will eliminate support to under-performing firms, therefore it will increase the 
probability of firms' closure. In this study, we use individual firms' ratio of 
interest payment to fixed capital as an indicator of the degree of financial 
constraint faced by individual firms. 
Firms' social burden. In China, where the social security system is just 
beginning to be set up, SOEs, which had been designed to satisfy both 
economic and social duties, have heavy social security and social welfare 
responsibilities. Those social responsibilities take the forms of in-house 
schools, hospitals, employees' housing, health care and pension schemes for 
employees, etc., and are represented by unproductive capital. In this chapter, 
the share of productive fixed capital is used to capture the effect of social 
burdens upon firms' closure. The potential social burdens are also captured 
by the numbers of employees. On one hand, higher unproductive capital ratio 
decreases the level of return, which in turn increases the closure probability; 
on the other hand, in transition economies with a poor social security system, 
those social obligations imply strong opposition against firms' closure. 
Industrial and Macroeconomic Factors 
Industry-level and macroeconomic factors play an important role in 
determining firms' exit probability as well; here we consider the following 
factors: 
Market competition. In a more concentrated market, the existence of 
monopoly makes smaller firms more prone to failure. In order to allow for 
differences in the market environment, we also include indicators of the 
degree of market competition. We use the four largest firms' output ratio as an 
indicator of the degree of market competition. 
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The growth of the industry and the expected profit rate at industry level. In a 
fast-growing industry, as Bradburd and Caves (1982) found, price-cost 
margins tend to be high, and market penetration can be achieved without 
causing much harm to competitors, therefore firms tend to live longer. The 
higher expected profit rate of an industry will tend to attract more firms to enter 
the industry and increase the market competition. In this study, we use the 
percentage of industrial output in the electrical engineering industry as a proxy 
for the growth of the electrical engineering industry. As a measure of the 
expected return level within the electrical engineering industry, we use the one 
year lagged profit margin at industry level. 
Reform stages. The Fourteenth Party Congress held in September 1992 
marked a rough two-stage process of economic reform. While before 1992, 
the official ideology lingered between "planning supplemented by market" and 
"planned commodity economy", since 1992 setting up a "socialist market 
economy" has been endorsed as the primary objective of China's economic 
reform, and the reform of enterprises has begun to focus more on 
organisational and ownership change. We use a dummy variable to 
incorporate the impact of the post- 1992 reforms. 
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6.3 Modelling The Exit Hazard of Chinese Enterprises 
This section sets up the empirical methodology for analysing the 
determination of Chinese firms' exit behaviour, and reports the results of the 
estimates. To analyze firms' exit behaviour and to account for the right 
censoring nature of the dataset, we utilized methods from the literature on 
economic duration data (see, e. g., Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 1980; Kiefer, 
1988; Lancaster, 1979), to model firms' exit as a hazard rate, which is defined 
as the conditional probability that an enterprise exits in a small interval of time. 
Hazard rate (or event history) analysis has been used extensively in the study 
of organizational mortality (Hannan and Carroll, 1992) and new firm survival 
(Audretsch and Mahmood, 1995). Theoretically, the hazard analysis can be 
described as follows: 
Let T be a random variable measuring the duration of a particular firm during 
1987-1996 with a continuous probability distribution f(t), where t is a 
realization of T. The cumulative probability is: 
r 
F(t) = 
Jf(s)ds 
= Prob(T <_ t). 
0 
The survival function defining the probability that a firm survives at least t is 
given by: 
S(t) =1- F(t) = Pr(T > t) 
Hazard rate A(t) can then be derived as follows: 
fi(t)=1imP(t<_T<t+dtIT>_t) 
dt-*O dt 
A(t) =tim 
F(t + dt) - F(t) 
dt-30 dtS(t) 
2(t) =f (t) / s(t) 
hence, the hazard rate is the rate at which a firm exits, given that the firm has 
not failed up a certain point in time. 
The distributions of hazard rate can take various forms. The exponential 
distribution is a widely-used model for durations that do not exhibit much 
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variation, which defines the hazard rate as A(t) =y with parameter y>0. The 
exponential distribution is sometimes termed memory-less, as the hazard 
function is constant and reflects no duration-dependence. Another popular 
choice is the Weibull model, the hazard function of which is defined as 
A(t) = yat"-', where y>0 and a>0. In this specification, the hazard function 
is monotonically increasing in duration (positive duration dependence) if the 
scale parametera > 1, and monotonically decreasing if a<1, and constant if 
a =1, which is exactly the exponential model. The log-logistic model is 
Yat «-ý another choice, the hazard rate of which is defined as A(t) =l. While the 
+t «Y 
Weibull model exhibits a monotonic hazard, the log-logistic specification, has 
a non-monotonic hazard. For a> I the hazard first increases with duration 
then decreases. If 0< a<_ 1, the hazard function decreases with duration. 
The hazard function or hazard rate can be estimated through univariate 
descriptive methods such as Kaplan-Meier, and multivariate regression 
methods. While the univarate analysis displays a general trend of firms' 
survival or hazard rate, and provides information for model specification for 
multivariate analysis, the multivariate regression can then look at what 
determines firm' survival or hazard rate. Initially, we use a typical univariate 
technique - the Kaplan-Meier estimators - to estimate the hazard functions 
non-parametrically, then we use multivariate regression methods to estimate 
the hazard functions and to look at what determines firms' hazard rate. 
6.3.1 Nonparametric Estimation of the Hazard Function: Kaplan-Meier 
Estimator 
The Kaplan-Meier Estimator is a strictly empirical approach to survival and 
hazard function estimation. Assume t,, t2,..., t;,..., tn denote the exit times of the 
firms in my dataset, and t, < t2 <1... < t, < ..., < to . 
Let hj be the number of firms 
that exit after tý , and ný 
is the number of firms at time tj, then the estimator of 
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h. the hazard rate at is Z (tj) =', and the corresponding estimator for the 
nj 
survival function is: S(t; ) _ fl (n; - h; ) / n; _ 
fl (1- 2(t; )) 
We only present in this section the smoothed Kaplan-Meier estimation of 
firms' hazard function. First, a Kaplan-Meier estimation of hazard function 
including all firms is presented. Then, the estimated hazard functions for firms 
stratified by ownership, size, and age are presented. The results are 
presented in Fig 6.4 to Fig 6.6. Meanwhile, the Mantel-Cox log-rank test, and 
the Wilcoxon-Breslow-Gehan test are conducted to check whether the 
difference in survival patterns among stratified firms are significant. 
Fig 6.3 shows the cumulative survival function for all the firms in the sector 
during the period between 1987 and 1996,95% confidence band are shown in 
fainted lines. 
Fig 6.3 Smoothed Hazard Estimate 
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The hazard rate increases between 1987 and 1993, peaks in 1993, and 
decreases rapidly thereafter. 
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Fig 6.4 shows the cumulative survival of the firms stratified by ownership. It 
indicates that significant differences of survival probability exist between state- 
owned enterprises firms and collectively-owned firms. The probability of a 
state-owned firm surviving in the near future is higher than that of a 
collectively-owned firm. 
Fig 6.4 Smoothed Hazard Estimates, by Ownership 
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Fig6.5 shows the smoothed hazard estimates stratified by firm size. Firms are 
divided into three categories: large, medium and small firms. 
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Fig 6.5 Smoothed Hazard Estimates, by Firm Size 
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Fig 6.5 suggests that the survival probability of small firms is significantly 
higher than that of medium firms and large firms over the 10-year period, and 
as we approach the end of the sample period, the exit behaviours of medium 
firms and large firms begin to show differences. The pace of exit of medium 
firms is accelerated. Large and medium firms are more likely to survive; the 
small firms are the most likely to exit. This result is consistent with the 
literatures that firm size matters in determining firms' exit decisions. 
Firms that have been founded in different time periods also display different 
survival and exit behaviours. Fig 6.6 shows the smoothed hazard estimates 
stratified by founding periods. We divide firms into three groups according to 
when they were established: firms established between 1987-1996, firms 
established between 1977-1986, and firms established before 1977. The first 
two groups are firms founded after the start of economic reform, and the third 
group were founded before reform. Those three groups display different 
survival and exit behaviours. Firms that were established before reform have 
the lowest hazard rates, while the newly-entered firms have the highest 
hazard rates. 
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Fig 6.6 Smoothed Hazard Estimates, by Founding Time 
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For the above estimations, both the Mantel-Cox log-rank test and the 
Wilcoxon-Breslow-Gehan test have been conducted. They all suggested that 
the differences in survival and exit patterns among different types of firms are 
statistically significant. 
6.3.2 Semiparametric Estimation of the Hazard Function: Cox 
Proportional Hazard Model 
Through the non-parametric estimations, we have already found that firms 
displayed different survival and exit patterns; in this section we will analyse 
the underlying causes for the different survival and exit patterns through 
multivariate regressions. As was discussed in section 6.1 and 6.2, both firm- 
specific characteristics, such as firm size, age, and performance, and 
industry-specific characteristics, such as competition, entry and exit barriers, 
have effects upon firms' exit behaviour. Furthermore, during the process of 
China's transition, various economic reform policies also have effects upon 
firms' exit behaviour. To account for such effects, we allow the firm hazard 
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rate at a particular point in time to depend on the realization of a set of 
industry and firm-specific time-varying covariates. 
There are two popular methods of analysing the effect of explanatory 
variables on the hazard rate. One is the proportional hazard model: in this 
model the hazard function depends on a vector of explanatory variables x 
with unknown coefficients p and A0, and the hazard function of which takes 
the form of A. (t, x, ß,,. o) = O(x, ß)Ao(t) , where /, o is a "baseline hazard", which is 
unknown and needs to be estimated. The effect of explanatory covariates is to 
multiply the baseline hazard 20(t), which is an individual specific constant, by 
a factor 0, which does not depend on duration t and is generally defined as 
q(x, ß) = exp(x'ß). The other method is the accelerated failure time model, in 
which the effect of covariates is incorporated by specifying the hazard function 
as '%(t, x, ß) =1, o[to(x, ß)]q(x, ß) . This specification allows the regressors to 
rescale the duration time directly. The proportional hazard model has seen the 
most wide usage in industrial organization literature, for example Audretsch 
and Mahmood (1995) on new firm survival, Bandopadhyaya (1994) on US firm 
bankruptcy, Karshenas and Stoneman (1993) on new technology diffusion, 
and Disney et al. (2003) on firm survival in the UK manufacturing sector, etc. 
In this chapter, we adopt the proportional hazard model as well. Following 
Kiefer (1988), and Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980), we allow the firm hazard 
rate at a particular time to depend on the realization of a set of common and 
firm-specific time-varying covariates, with X; (t) denoting the ith firm's 
covariates at time t, therefore we construct our model as follows: 
ýl (t) _ eQT X; (t) ý, o 
(t) 
In estimating the proportional hazard model, Cox (1972) suggested a semi- 
parametric estimation in which the proportional hazard model could be 
estimated in a two-step procedure, where ,8 is first estimated through a partial 
likelihood approach without specifying the form of the baseline hazard function 
20 , and then 
A0(t)is estimated non-parametrically. The relevant likelihood in 
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estimating P, due to the proportionality of A, (t) and A0(t), as was shown in 
Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980), can be given by: 
Lýß) _ JJ_exp(ß'X1(t1)) iED, eXp(f' Xk (ti )) 
kER, 
where tj are the ordered failure times, Dj is the set of observations fail at tj , 
Rj is the set of observations that are at hazard at time tj . 
and the parameter 6 is estimated by maximising the partial log-likelihood 
function: 
LnL(ß) {ß'x; (tj) - log I exp(ß'xk (ti ))} . iEDj kERi 
The most important assumption of the Cox proportional hazard model is that 
the hazard ratio is proportional over time. The test of the proportional hazard 
assumption is based on the assumption restricts ß(t) =ß. Grambsch and 
Therneau (1994) showed that many of the tests for proportional hazards are in 
fact a test of non-zero slop in a generalised linear regression of the scaled 
Schoenfeld residuals on functions of time. This test also assumes 
homogeneity of variance across hazard sets. 
In our study of the influence of a set of industry-specific-and firm specific time 
variant covariates upon firms' exit behaviour, we do not have any strong a 
priori reasons for imposing a particular functional form for the dependence of 
a firm's hazard rate on its survival time, and we are more concerned about the 
effect of various industry-specific and firm-specific factors upon firms' hazard 
rate than the actual hazard rate. Therefore, we choose to use semi-parametric 
estimation rather than parametric estimation. However we experimented with 
a variety of functional forms of hazard function, such as Weibull, Lognormal, 
and Exponential distribution (see appendix), and differences were not found to 
be significant. This finding is in keeping with other econometric studies of 
hazard rates (e. g., Karshenas and Stoneman, 1993). 
260 
Following our discussion of firms' exit determinations in the previous section, 
in our analysis we include the following covariates, which are shown in Table 
6.1. 
Table 6.1 Hazard Model Covariates 
Variables Definition 
Firm Level Factors 
DEA DEA efficiency Index 
COE Collective Owned Enterprises 
Foreign Foreign Funded Enterprises (joint ventures and private owned) 
Other Firms other than SOEs, COEs and Foreign 
Prof The ratio of profit to sale revenue 
Prof92 The interaction of Prof and P92 
Prod Productivity, defined as the ratio of output to employment 
Lncapi Logarithm of firm's fixed capital 
Lnemp Logarithm of the number of employee 
Inrate The ratio of interest payment to fixed capital 
Inrate92 The interaction of INRATE and P92 
Capinte Capital intensity, defined as the ratio of capital to employment 
Capint92 The interaction of capital intensity and P92 
Salerate The ratio of sale revenue to gross output value 
Industry Level Factors 
Exprofit One year lagged industry profit rate 
Ratio Share of the electrical engineering industry to Manufacturing 
Industry 
Conc Regional Concentration ratio, defined as the output ratio of the 
four largest enterprises in the region in electrical engineering 
Conc2 The square of concentration ratio 
Macroeconomic Environment 
Growth The growth rate of GDP 
P92 Dummy variable, P92=1 if year>1 992, P92=0 if year<=1992 
In this chapter, we try to analyse the specific impact of the latest batch of 
reforms on the competitive process; our approach is to consider the reform as 
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a specific covariate, included as a straight dummy variable (P92 =1 if 
t>1992). It represents the impact on the hazard rate facing all enterprises in 
the sample. However, our experiments also allowed for the reforms to impact 
differentially according to ownership type, firm size, measures of profitability, 
and capital intensity. We estimated this possibility by interacting these 
variables with our reform dummy. We also try to test whether firms' 
performance measures, especially firms' efficiency, are good indicators of 
firms' exit or survival propensity. Finally, we allow for entirely different hazard 
functions, by estimating different equations by ownership type, for small firms, 
and for new firms established between 1986 and 1996. A separate estimation 
for larger firm sizes was precluded by the limited numbers of observations. 
Table 6.2 presents the results from semi-parametric estimation. 
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Column (1), column (2), and column (3) of Table 6.2 take DEA efficiency 
index, profitability, and labour productivity as measures of firms' performance 
respectively. Column (4) includes all three performance measures as 
covariates. It can be seen that a number of co-variants have significant and 
correctly signed influences on the hazard rate. Note that the SOE form of 
ownership is the benchmark ownership type. Significant positive impacts on 
the hazard rate result from collective ownership (COE), while the effect of 
domestic private ownership is only marginal significant. By way of example, 
the hazard rate facing a COE was nearly 21 % above that for a SOE. Industrial 
concentration ratios and national GDP growth exert positive influences as 
well. 
Negative impacts are coming conversely from foreign ownership, although not 
statistically significant, the age of the enterprise, capital as a measure of firm 
size and scale advantage, employment and unproductive capital ratio as 
measures of the enterprise's social burden and socialist legacy, and from the 
relative weakness of the electrical engineering industry in the Chinese 
economy as a whole. Note all three performance measures, efficiency, labour 
productivity, and profitability have exerted significant negative effects upon an 
enterprise's hazard rate, yet efficiency index and profitability are better 
indicators to predict firms' exit. 
Column (5) examines SOEs only. Note first that while we observe a positive 
and potentially large impact coming from the reforms (P92), this is determined 
very imprecisely. Secondly, it may be observed that neither efficiency index 
nor profitability appear to be significant, either pre- or post- reform. However, 
firms' productivity is a significant factor in determining firms' hazard rate. 
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Column (6) offers a contrast by considering only COEs. Here we obtain 
results that are more consistent with a competitive selection process. Unlike 
SOEs, the efficiency index and profitability are important influences on exit 
rates, as is the new regime itself for all COEs. However, the effect of 
productivity is not significant. This pattern is largely replicated in column (7) 
for small firms; this is not surprising since the samples are largely 
coextensive. 
Column (8) examines new enterprises established between 1986 and 1996. 
While the regression results are largely similar to those in column (4), column 
(6) and column (7), we should note that the coefficients for COE and for Other 
are higher, and that the effects of Other become significant at 1% level. This 
might indicate that newly-established non-state enterprises are exposed to a 
higher exit hazard than newly-established SOEs. 
Through all regressions presented in Table 6.2, the impact of the reforms, 
which we proxied using variable P92, while correctly signed, is not particularly 
large (effectively increasing the baseline hazard by about 5%), and is 
statistically insignificant. We suspect that the other industry-level and 
macroeconomic factors might have captured the impact of the reforms. 
Hence, in order to estimate directly whether the acceleration of economic 
reform since 1992 has any impact upon firms' exit behaviours, we interact all 
our firm-level variables with P92, and the regression results are presented in 
Table 6.3. Column (1) of Table 6.3 applies to all samples, and column (2) and 
column (3) apply to SOE and COEs respectively, while column (4) and 
column (5) apply to small enterprises and newly-established enterprises 
during the period between 1986 and 1996. 
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Table 6.3 Estimated Hazard Functions for Enterprises in Liao Ning 
Province 1987-96: Semi-Parametric Estimation with Interactive Terms 
(1) All Sample (2) SOE (3) COE (4) Small (5) New Enterprise s Enterprises 
Coef. P>z Coef. P>z Coef. P>z Coef. P>z Coef. P>z 
COE 0.221 ** 0.02 0.212** 0.03 0.302* 0.07 
foreign -0.239 0.25 -0.198 0.36 -0.099 0.69 
other 0.262 0.19 0.309 0.13 0.652*** 0.01 
AGE -0.157*** 0.00 0.097 0.38 -0.183*** 0.00 -0.151*** 0.00 
Efficiency Index -0.619*** 0.00 -0.509 0.68 -0.647*** 0.00 -0.619*** 0.00 -1.370*** 0.00 
Efficiency Index 0.103 0.63 0 356 78 0 152 0 48 0 109 0 61 0 0.849*** 0.01 *P92 . . . . . . 
Profit Margin -0.048*** 0.00 -0.365 0.57 -0.047*** 0.00 -0.048*** 0.00 -0.038** 0.02 
Profit Margin * P92 0.035** 0.02 0.320 0.62 0.035** 0.03 0.036** 0.02 0.032* 0.08 
Ln(Labour 
-0.005 17 0 -0.059 11 0 -0 003 0.29 -0.004 0.25 0.002 0.46 Productivity) . . . 
Ln(Labour 0.004 21 0 0 049 0.19 0.003 0.35 0.003 0.31 -0.002 0.44 Prod uctivi *P92 . . 
Ln(Capital/MES) -0.106*** 0.01 -0.160 0.47 -0.098** 0.02 -0.100*** 0.01 -0.069 0.25 
Ln(Capital/MES) 0.036 0.40 0.011 0.96 0.037 0.41 0.030 0.49 0.002 0.97 *P92 
Ln(Employment) -0.159*** 0.00 -0.147 0.61 -0.145*** 0.01 -0.151*** 0.00 -0.212*** 0.01 
Ln(Employment) 0.058 0.31 0.038 0.90 0.041 0.49 0.055 0.34 0.120 0.14 *P92 
Unproductive 
-0.601 *** 0.00 -0.511 0.52 -0.487*** 0.00 -0.545*** 0.00 -0.745*** 0.00 Capital Ratio 
Unproductive 0.588*** 0.00 0.496 0.53 0.474*** 0.01 0.539*** 0.00 0.622*** 0.02 Capital Ratio *P92 
Interest Ratio 0.013 0.85 0.015 0.95 0.019 0.78 0.014 0.84 -0.003 0.97 
Interest Ratio*P92 0.044 0.55 -0.216 0.68 0.043 0.55 0.043 0.55 0.058 0.54 
Capital Intensity 1.271*** 0.00 1.600** 0.04 1.758*** 0.00 1.237*** 0.00 0.466 0.49 
Capital Intensity 
_, . 253*** 
0.00 -1.031 0.27 -1.669*** 0.00 -1.214*** 0.00 -0.465 
0.50 
*P92 
Expected Profit -0.177*** 0.00 -0.263*** 0.00 -0.170*** 0.00 -0.177*** 
0.00 -0.159*** 0.00 
Industry Growth -3.163*** 0.00 -4.059** 0.03 -3.175*** 0.00 -3.207*** 
0.00 -3.858*** 0.00 
Concentration 0.431 *** 0.00 0.555*** 0.00 0.413*** 0.00 0.431*** 0.00 0.412*** 0.00 
GDP Growth 0.099*** 0.00 0.170*** 0.00 0.096*** 0.00 0.099*** 0.00 0.103*** 0.00 
No. of Obs 13259 1527 113 07 12645 5059 
Log-Likelihood -14470.18 -608.75 -12841.07 -14274.97 -7685 . 
05 
LR Chi(2) 1275.51 169 . 55 
1007.14 1185.71 583.28 
Note: *** Sianifican t at the 1 per cen t level. ** Significant at the 5 per cent level. * Significant at the 10 per 
cent level. 
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The additions of interactions between profit margin, unproductive capital ratio, 
capital intensity and P92 not only are significant but also appear to sharpen 
the estimates. While profitability now exerts a larger negative impact on the 
probability of exit, the interactive term is both significant and positive. We 
believe that this may reflect a higher propensity under the new regime for the 
more profitable firms to exit through restructuring, such as acquisition. We 
also now observe that the effects of capital intensity and unproductive capital 
ratio exist only prior 1992. All theses seem to suggest that reform since 1992 
has changed firms' exit behaviour. However, the additions of interactions 
between the efficiency index, labour productivity, capital, employment, interest 
and P92 are not statistically significant. It should be noted here that for newly- 
established enterprises, the efficiency index is a less quantitatively significant 
indicator of exit probability after 1992; and for SOEs, the negative effect of 
interest upon exit probability is larger in the post 1992 period, indicating a 
lock-in effect between SOES and state banks. 
These results suggest that the probability of enterprises to exit during 1986- 
1996 tends to be higher in COEs and firms categorized as Others compared 
with SOEs, suggesting that SOEs do enjoy some advantages in regard to exit 
hazard exposure arising from their unique features in the transition. On the 
contrast, foreign-funded enterprises tend to have the highest survival 
probability even after controlling for other variables. The firms categorised as 
Others, which can be regarded as China's de novo firms, are the least likely to 
survive during the sample period. This may be due to the fact that most of the 
firms categorized as Others are private or partially private firms, and it was not 
until 1996 that they acquired their legitimate status, hence before 1996 they 
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were discriminated against in accessing bank loans and applying for 
investment quotas, etc. 
Looking at the effect of firms' performance measures on firms' exit probability, 
we find that the efficiency index is negative for all regression and is 
statistically significant at 1% except for SOEs. Similarly, the effect of firms' 
profitability upon exit probability is also negative through all regressions, and 
is statistically significant at 1% except for SOEs. The effect of labour 
productivity is only significant when labour productivity is taken as the sole 
performance measure or for SOEs. In general, we find that firms' efficiency 
index is a far better indicator of firms' exit probability; this is true even when all 
three performance measures are included. Our results suggest that a 
doubling of firms' efficiency tends to reduce firms' hazard rate by around 40%, 
while a doubling of productivity or profitability can only reduce firms' hazard 
rate by less than 2%. 
In estimating the effect of firms' size on their exit hazard, our analysis 
suggests a significantly negative effect of firms' employment size and capital 
stock upon their hazard rate. On one hand, this indicates that firms' scale 
advantage and sunk costs play an important role in determining firms' exit 
hazard, on the other hand it also captures the effect of resource reallocation 
costs associated with firms' exit in China where the capital market and labour 
market are underdeveloped, and the social security system has just begun to 
emerge. Capital intensity shows a positive effect upon firms' hazard rate in 
our regression, indicating that the higher the capital intensity the higher the 
closure probability; however, this effect largely exists prior to 1992. This may 
be due to the fact that in the 1980s, the electrical engineering industry was 
targeted by the government as an engine for economic growth, which has 
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encouraged entry by enterprises with more advanced technology but less 
than optimal scale. By way of example, in 1990 60% of the enterprises in 
electrical engineering industry were founded in the 1980s, and around 60% of 
them had fixed capital less than 100,000 Chinese Yuan. We also observed 
that firms' unproductive capital, a proxy for firms' social burden, exerts a 
negative effect on firms' exit hazard only prior to 1992. 
In estimating the impacts of firms' financial constraints upon their exit 
probability, our proxies for liquidity and gearing, and interest ratio, appear to 
have different effects upon SOEs and non-SOEs. While for COEs, small 
enterprises and newly-established enterprises, this effect is positive and 
significant at 10% level for COEs, for SOEs it is negative though not 
statistically significant, and this negative effect seems to have increased since 
1992. This suggests that SOEs are still facing soft budget constraints . 
As for whether the acceleration of reform pace since 1992 has had any 
impacts upon firms' exit hazard, by interacting firm-level factors with P92, our 
analysis suggests that reform since 1992 has changed firms' exit behaviour, 
as the signs of coefficients for firm-level variables and the signs of coefficients 
for the corresponding interactive terms are opposite in general except for 
firms' profit margin. However, this seems to be significant only for non-SOEs. 
Other industrial factors and macroeconomic factors have also played an 
important role in determining firms' exit hazard in China. Our analysis 
suggests that expected profit margin at industrial level (EXPROFIT) and 
industry growth have a significant negative effect on firms' exit hazard, while 
concentration ratio and GDP growth have a significant positive effect upon 
firms' exit hazard. 
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Our results therefore largely confirm the discussion and the evidence 
presented in chapter 4. The reforms have considerably increased rates of 
movement in this key sector of manufacturing, a process which affects small 
firms and COEs in particular. On the other hand, we find little evidence that 
the reforms have impacted upon the SOE sector, and that in neither sub- 
period do conventional indicators of enterprise performance nor the efficiency 
index appear to have much influence on the probability of exit. 
6.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we specifically investigated an important aspect of the market 
selection process, firms' exit and its determinants in China's manufacturing 
industry. Our estimation of a hazard model for firms' exit probabilities 
suggests that the exit behaviour of COEs and small firms are increasingly 
subjected to the discipline of market forces, especially after 1992. 
However, our analysis suggests an entirely different role for SOEs. 
Conventional enterprise performance indicators are not good predictors of 
their demise and we can find no evidence that things have changed since 
1992. While their role in the economy is declining as other sectors have 
established faster growth rates, their continuing privileged status does not yet 
appear to have come under serious threat and we do not as yet find 
convincing evidence that competitive selection is actually providing a 
sufficiently important substitute for corporate governance mechanisms based 
on ownership. This may represent a considerable challenge for the future. 
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Appendix 6.1: Semi-Parametric Vs. Parametric Estimation of Proportional 
Hazard Model 
Cox Weibull Exponential Gompertz 
Coef. P>Izl Coef. P>jzI Coef. P>Izl Coef. P>Izl 
COE 0.216** 0.02 0.255*** 0.01 0.224** 0.02 0.244*** 0.01 
foreign -0.209 0.32 -0.049 0.81 -0.192 0.36 -0.114 0.58 
other 0.279 0.16 0.565*** 0.00 0.328* 0.10 0.418** 0.03 
age -0.163*** 0.00 -0.451 *** 0.00 -0.185*** 0.00 -0.322*** 0.00 
Efficiency Index -0.475*** 0.00 -0.549*** 0.00 -0.482*** 0.00 -0.470*** 0.00 
Profit Margin -0.016*** 0.01 -0.021*** 0.00 -0.017*** 0.01 -0.019*** 0.00 
Ln(Labour Productivity) -0.001 0.19 0.000 0.57 0.000 0.24 0.000 0.41 
Ln(CAPITAL/MES) -0.076*** 0.00 -0.092*** 0.00 -0.079*** 0.00 -0.089*** 0.00 
LN(EMPLOYMENT) -0.111*** 0.00 -0.100*** 0.00 -0.108*** 0.00 -0.109*** 0.00 
Unproductive 
-0.123 0.11 -0.119 0.13 -0.124 0.11 -0.124 0.11 Capital Ratio 
Interest 0.049* 0.06 0.061 ** 0.02 0.051 ** 0.04 0.056** 0.03 
Capital Intensity 0.027 0.43 0.023 0.45 0.026 0.43 0.026 0.42 
Expected Profit -0.181 *** 0.00 -0.146*** 0.00 -0.180*** 0.00 -0.165*** 0.00 
Industry Growth -3.159*** 0.00 -3.558*** 0.00 -3.630*** 0.00 -3.660*** 0.00 
Concentration 0.431 *** 0.00 0.374*** 0.00 0.418*** 0.00 0.392*** 0.00 
GDP Growth 0.102*** 0.00 0.105*** 0.00 0.107*** 0.00 0.107*** 0.00 
P92 0.045 0.73 0.146 0.23 0.072 0.54 0.032 0.79 
Cons -2.083* 0.06 -2.007* 0.08 -1.690 0.13 
Log Likelihood -14423.37 -3235.02 -3364.17 -3333.04 
LR Chi2 1369.14 1626 . 01 1507.37 1552. 66 
No. of Obs. 13259 
Note: *** Significant at the 1 per cent level. ** Significant at the 5 per cent level. *Significant at the 10 per 
cent level. 
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Appendix 6.2: Semi-Parametric Vs. Parametric Estimation of 
Proportional Hazard Model with Interactive Terms 
Cox Weibull Exponential Gompertz 
Coef. P>z Coef. P>z Coef. P>z Coef. P>z 
COE 0.221 ** 0.02 0.258*** 0.01 0.229*** 0.01 0.250*** 0.01 
foreign -0.239 0.25 -0.079 0.71 -0.221 0.29 -0.141 0.50 
other 0.262 0.19 0.546*** 0.01 0.311 0.12 0.396** 0.05 
AGE -0.157*** 0.00 -0.447*** 0.00 -0.179*** 0.00 -0.317*** 0.00 Efficiency Index 
-0.619*** 0.00 -0.708*** 0.00 -0.618*** 0.00 -0.541*** 0.01 Efficiency Index * P92 0.103 0.63 0.108 0.59 0.098 0.63 0.014 0.95 
Profit Margin -0.048*** 0.00 -0.043*** 0.00 -0.048*** 0.00 -0.047*** 0.00 
Profit Margin * P92 0.035** 0.02 0.024 0.12 0.035** 0.02 0.031 ** 0.05 
Ln(Labour 
Productivity) -0.005 0.17 -0.007** 0.05 -0.005 0.15 -0.006* 0.10 
Ln(Labour 
Productivity)*P92 0.004 0.21 0.007** 0.05 0.004 0.19 0.006 0.11 
Ln(Capital/MES) -0.106*** 0.01 -0.107*** 0.01 -0.108*** 0.01 -0.095** 0.02 
Ln(Capital/MES) 
*P92 0.036 0.40 0.018 0.66 0.035 0.41 0.006 0.89 
Ln(Employment) -0.159*** 0.00 -0.128*** 0.01 -0.156*** 0.00 -0.153** 0.00 
Ln(Employment) 
*P92 0.058 0.31 0.024 0.67 0.056 0.33 0.046 0.42 
Unproductive 
*** Capital Ratio -0.601 0.00 -0.559*** 0.00 -0.600*** 0.00 -0.525*** 0.00 
Productive 
Capital Ratio *P92 0.588*** 0.00 0.547*** 0.00 0.585*** 0.00 0.493*** 0.00 
inrate 0.013 0.85 0.014 0.86 0.012 0.86 0.016 0.82 
inrate92 0.044 0.55 0.058 0.48 0.048 0.52 0.052 0.48 
Capital Intensity 1.271 *** 0.00 1.389*** 0.00 1.280*** 0.00 1.310*** 0.00 
Capital Intensity *** *** *** *P92 -1.253 0.00 -1.372 0.00 -1.262 0.00 -1.289*** 0.00 
Expected Profit -0.177*** 0.00 -0.144*** 0.00 -0.178*** 0.00 -0.160*** 0.00 
Industry Growth -3.163*** 0.00 -3.569*** 0.00 -3.641 *** 0.00 -3.633*** 0.00 
Concentration 0.431 *** 0.00 0.377*** 0.00 0.420*** 0.00 0.394*** 0.00 
GDP Growth 0.099*** 0.00 0.104*** 0.00 0.105*** 0.00 0.102*** 0.00 
Cons -2.031 * 0.06 -1.966* 0.08 -1.791 * 0.10 
Log Likelihood -14470.18 -3203.31 -340 0.72 -3350.33 
LR Chi2 1275.51 1689.41 1434.26 1518.07 
No. of Obs. 13259 
Note: *** Significant at the 1 per cent level. ** Significant at the 5 per cent level. *Significant at the 10 per 
cent level. 
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has studied the experience of China's transition at enterprise level, 
examining whether China's gradual and experimental economic reform has 
set up an effective competitive market selection process. It thereby aims to 
enrich our understanding of the transition from a centrally planned socialist 
economy to a market economy. This chapter summarizes the main findings 
of this study and draws out its implications for further enterprise reform in the 
wake of China's WTO entry. 
7.1 Economic Transition and Transition Performance 
China's significant economic growth since it began the transformation from a 
centrally planned socialist economy to a market economy in the year 1978 
has posed a puzzle for economic theories. For the period between 1978 and 
1996, it achieved phenomenal growth rates, with an average growth rate of 
around 9% in GDP annually. Although the GDP growth rate has slowed down 
since 1997, it has still achieved an impressive 7.5% annually for the period 
between 1997 and 2002. However, this impressive economic growth has 
been achieved with the absence of a number of factors commonly deemed to 
be essential to a successful transition. These include reasonably complete 
market liberalization, large-scale privatisation, secure private property rights, 
and democracy (Chow, 1997). This contrasts distinctively with the transition 
performance in CEE and FSU countries, who have all undergone a sharp 
decline in GDP in the initial stage of transition since 1990, ranging from 20% 
to 60% (World Bank, 2001), and even now many of them have not reached 
their 1989 GDP levels, despite adopting "Big Bang"-style transition which has 
at least attempted to put in place all the prerequisites for a successful 
transition "at one stroke". 
Why has the transition performance in China been so different? The 
gradualist school gives credit to the evolutionary and experimental nature of 
China's reform, suggesting that gradual reform is easy to initiate and flexible 
to experiment with, and less costly to overcome the status quo, while the "Big 
Bang" school emphasizes China's favourable initial conditions, such as a 
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large agricultural labour force, low subsidies to the population, and a strategy 
of rapid export growth of labour-intensive manufactures, suggesting that 
China's rapid economic growth has occurred in spite of the gradualist reform. 
However, it was argued that neither of these two schools of thought can 
convincingly explain China's experience. While the gradualist school takes 
more of a political economy stance, the "Big Bang" school is based in 
macroeconomics. . Neither of them has actually dealt with how firms have 
responded to the market mechanisms, and how markets have actually 
evolved through firms' participation. As firms form the real entities in markets, 
responding to market signals and reform policies, the objective of this thesis is 
to understand China's gradualist economic reform and its significant economic 
growth in terms of enterprise performance and the ways in which markets 
have evolved through firms' participation, especially in relation to entry, exit, 
and growth. 
7.2 China's Enterprise Reform, and Enterprise Performance 
7.2.1 China's Economic Reform: A Two-Stage Process 
Markedly different from the "Big Bang"-style transition in CEE and FSU 
countries, China has taken on a gradual transition path. Here the goals of 
reform are achieved by a "dual-track system", in which the elements of a new 
system are developed side by side with the old unreformed system, and if 
things go well, by reforming the old system in line with the positive 
developments emerging from the new components of the economy. It reduces 
central planning slowly rather than eliminating it completely, permitting the 
coexistence of the planning and market mechanisms, and a two-tier price 
system. This thesis has recorded how this gradual process can be divided into 
two stages by the some landmark CCP congresses. 
The "reform and opening up" policy proposed in The Third Plenum of The 
Eleventh Chinese Communist Party Congress (CCPC) on December 18-22, 
1978 marked the beginning of China's gradualist reform. The reforms have 
since proceeded by using an experimental method, which established reforms 
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in a few sectors and cities, before implementing them at a national level. The 
Fourteenth CCPC held in September 1992 is another landmark in the process 
of China's transition. In this congress, for the first time, the building of a 
"socialist market economy" was endorsed as China's goal of reform. This 
congress thus established a rather rough division into stages of the reform 
process as a whole. The initial stage from 1978-1992 was characterised by 
retaining the dominance of the planning mechanism whilst trying to establish a 
balance between planning and the market. The second stage, from 1993, 
involved an explicit goal of establishing a "socialist market economy" to 
replace the old planning system. The reforms in this stage recognized that the 
phase of dual track development may have reached its conclusion, and the 
reforms have comprehensive, coherent and radical features. 
7.2.2 Enterprise Reform: Decentralization and Promoting Competition 
The thesis has demonstrated the significance - in the Chinese context - of 
different types of enterprise. SOEs have been the core of China's economic 
reform. These enterprises were the foundation of the socialist economy and 
were at the heart of the heavy industry development strategy. The problem of 
economic efficiency is most acute in the state sector. Its sheer size - in 1980 
it employed 76% of the urban labour force, utilized 82% of aggregate 
investment in fixed asset, and produced more than 80% of gross industrial 
output - meant that any reform without improving SOE performance would fail. 
At the beginning of reform, tight political control and the consequent lack of 
managerial and worker incentives were considered responsible for low 
efficiency in SOEs (CCPC, 1978). Therefore, an early target of SOE reform 
was to enliven the state sector by separating the state from enterprise 
management, and to make SOEs become "independent and energetic 
productive and managerial units" (Xue, 1979). This has been achieved 
sequentially through the profit-sharing scheme and management 
responsibility contract system, delegating managerial autonomy to SOEs, and 
allowing SOEs to share profits with the state (CCPC, 1982,1987; Wu and 
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Reynolds, 1988). Since 1993, ambiguous property rights and lack of proper 
corporate governance have been identified as being responsible for 
continuing poor SOE performance, hence setting up a modern company 
system has been established as the goal of enterprise reform, and this has 
been achieved through corporatization and privatisation. 
Another important aspect of China's enterprise reform is the encouragement 
of new entries by non-SOEs. Initially, non-SOEs were encouraged to fill the 
market niches left by central planning and to work as a `beneficial complement 
to SOEs. In effect, they acted as an economic and social `cushion', absorbing 
workers from the old state sector as it went through the difficult process of 
restructuring (McMillan and Naughton, 1992; CCPC, 1982,1987). Gradually, 
as they grew in size, they began to create competition and drive market 
development, leading to a decline in state control and monopoly, and have 
eventually become the engine of China's economic growth. 
7.2.3 Enterprise Performance: Improving Productivity and Falling 
Profitability 
Two decades of efforts to reform China's state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
have clearly delivered beneficial results, such as a reduction in the scope of 
planning, expansion of managerial authority and the role of market forces, 
improvements in market orientation, efforts to pursue innovation, etc. These 
changes have enabled China's SOEs to partially overcome the traditional 
flaws of public enterprises. One indicator of such improvement is total factor 
productivity (TFP) for state industry. Research has generally found modest 
long-term improvements (despite lagging behind non-SOEs). However, SOE 
financial performance has declined dramatically during the reform period. 
Between 1978 and 1996, the pre-tax profit-asset ratio declined from around 
25% in 1978 to 6.5% in 1996, and the share of loss-making SOEs has been 
rising steadily since 1985, reaching an all-time high in 1996. The decline of 
profitability has reduced SOEs' fixed asset investment through retained 
profits, making them more reliant on bank loans. This has led to a continuous 
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rise in SOE liabilities, indicating that many SOEs operate continuously at a 
loss. Furthermore, loss-making SOEs are a heavy drain on the economy, and 
the financial sector in particular. The SOE has therefore been considered by 
some economists to be a de-stabilizing factor for the whole economy. 
However, it was argued that neither productivity nor profitability is a good 
indicator of enterprise performance, especially in the context of transition 
economies. For example, declining profitability can be the result of increased 
competition, which is a desirable outcome of transition economies, and 
improved productivity could mean greater allocation distortion, when firms are 
not profit-maximizers, which is common in transition economies. Furthermore, 
productivity improvement does not distinguish between the improvement due 
to X-efficiency and improvement due to technology change. While X-efficiency 
is important for short- term economic growth at the initial stage of transition, 
technological change is more important for the long-term success of economic 
reform. Therefore, a proper indicator for enterprise performance is needed. 
7.3 Summary of Research Results 
7.3.1 Enterprise Efficiency, Ownership, and Competition 
As efficiency improvement is a major objective of economic reform, is 
considered a survival condition for firms in a competitive environment, and 
further, is central to firm's long-term growth (Bain, 1969), chapter 4 has 
assessed enterprises' technical efficiency as an indicator of their performance 
by applying the technique of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). DEA is a 
mathematical programming approach for evaluating firms' efficiency through 
constructing a non-parametric piece-wise frontier and measuring firms' 
performance against the constructed frontier. The efficiency index thus 
calculated captures not only firms' static (short- term) efficiency, but also 
firms' tendency to catch up with technological advance over time. In addition 
to calculating enterprise efficiency, the effects of enterprise reform, ownership 
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type, increased competition, and various other firm- specific, and industry- 
specific factors were also investigated in chapter 4. 
Similar to research carried out by others, we have found that SOEs' 
performance measured by the efficiency index is generally lower than that of 
non-SOEs. However, in terms of the effects of economic reform, we have 
found that there is a general tendency for the divergence of enterprise 
efficiency from technology frontier rather than a convergence of firms' 
efficiency to technology frontier which is to be expected from a competitive 
market. We suspect that there are two factors underlying the divergence of 
technical efficiency from technology frontier: the entry of more efficient firms, 
paralleled with the survival of inefficient and value- destroying firms, especially 
inefficient state-owned firms. However, this can only have been sustained as 
long as growth remained strong. 
By estimating the effects of enterprise reform, ownership, and increased 
competition on firms' static efficiency, we find that the effect of ownership 
upon firms' static efficiency is not conclusive. While COEs are generally more 
efficient and more productive than SOEs, the ownership effect of foreign 
ownership, and domestic private ownership are not clear. However, the 
subsequent study of firms' dynamic behaviour to catch up with technology 
advance suggests that this difference in firm efficiency may have resulted 
from the differences in their speeds to catch up with the technology advance, 
with SOEs being the slowest. 
One conclusion emanating from the above analysis is that economies is that 
China's enterprise reform, characterised by profit retention policies, does have 
a positive effect upon improving a firms' efficiency at the initial stage of 
reform; however, this positive effect phased out in the later stages of reform. 
As for performance wages and bonuses, their effects are complicated and 
need to be designed properly to achieve a positive effect upon efficiency 
improvement. Meanwhile, the market competitive process seems to be 
working, but not always effectively. New firm entry pushes out the 
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technological frontier, but incumbent firms, especially SOEs, are slow to 
respond, which we suspect that the lower exit rate of SOEs may account for. 
7.3.2 Entry, Exit, and the Dynamics of Productivity Growth 
In chapter 5, we investigated the micro dynamics of entry, exit, and 
productivity growth, based upon an examination of aspects of the competitive 
selection process in an important sector of Chinese manufacturing. An 
important element of the investigation was to look for changes resulting from 
the latest stage of reform. These dynamic processes may be becoming 
increasingly important for the continuing growth of manufacturing as the 
agricultural sector as a source of surplus labour begins to decline. In 
particular, this chapter investigated the actual patterns of firms' entry and exit, 
analysing the post-entry and pre-exit behaviour of Chinese enterprises, as 
well as decomposing the contribution to aggregate productivity growth of new 
entry, exits, and surviving firms. 
Our analysis suggests that the pattern of entry and exit in this Chinese 
manufacturing industry is to a large extent consistent with the findings in 
advanced market economies, indicating that the competitive selection process 
is taking shape in China. One feature of this process that we need to note is 
that new firm entries have contributed substantially to both output growth and 
productivity growth. However, exiting firms, unlike their counterpart in 
advanced economies, have contributed only slightly to the growth of output 
and productivity. This is despite the fact that the exit rate is similar to the entry 
rate, while old firms are still an important stabilizing element in determining 
the trend of output and productivity growth. 
Our analysis also suggests that it is insufficient to analyse the competitive 
process from the point of view of new firms' entry and incumbent firms' growth 
alone. Indeed the substantial rate of turnover or `churning' amongst 
enterprises that we observe in this sector means that a study of exit is just as 
important as that of entry. Moreover, the rate of churning appears to have 
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increased substantially in the latest phase of reform. In fact, our productivity 
deconstruction suggests that exiting firms do contribute to productivity 
improvement especially among small firms. 
7.3.3 Firm Exit Behaviour and Economic Reform 
The analysis in chapter 5 indicated the importance of understanding exit 
behaviour in more detail. Accordingly, Chapter 6 specifically investigated 
firms' exit and its determinants in China's manufacturing industry. Exit is as 
important as entry. On one hand, the exit of inefficient firms will release 
scarce resources, reduce social wastage and mobilise social resources, 
facilitate the prospects for new firms entering the industry and structural 
adjustment, and promote entrepreneurship; on the other hand, it poses a 
credible threat to incumbent firms, as firms failing to be sufficiently competitive 
in the market face the threat of bankruptcy-induced market exit. 
In Chapter 6, a risk model was developed for firms' exit probabilities in order 
to investigate the determinants of firms' exit in China's manufacturing industry. 
Our estimation suggests that the exit behaviour of COEs and small firms has 
been increasingly subject to the discipline of market forces, especially after 
1992. However, our analysis suggests an entirely different role for SOEs. 
Conventional enterprise performance indicators are not good predictors of 
their demise and we can find no evidence that things have changed since 
1992. While their role in the economy is declining as other sectors have 
established faster growth rates, SOEs' continuous privileged status does not 
yet appear to have come under serious threat and we do not as yet find 
convincing evidence that competitive selection is actually providing a 
sufficiently important substitute for corporate governance mechanisms based 
on ownership. This may represent a considerable challenge for the future. 
280 
7.4 General Discussion 
Over the past two decades, China's gradual enterprise reform has achieved 
considerable improvements in the state sector, such as a significant reduction 
in state share, although the state still accounts for more than 25% of gross 
industrial output and is still dominant in the financial and utility sectors. 
Furthermore, the gradual reform of SOEs has provided a cushion for reforms 
in other areas, and has provided an anchor for economic growth, avoiding the 
result of "disorganisation". However, the effect of enterprise reform on SOE 
performance is controversial. Turning SOEs into profitable businesses whilst 
dismantling their non-commercial responsibilities remains an enormous 
challenge. This thesis investigated first the impact of enterprise reform and 
increased competition on enterprise efficiency, and then looked beyond the 
"within-firm" effects of economic reform and market competition, investigating 
whether economic reform has facilitated a dynamic competitive market 
selection process. Our analysis suggests that China's SOE reform 
characterised by gradually expanding managerial autonomy has been 
relatively successful in providing short-term incentives to improve enterprise 
performance. However, this positive effect seems to be short- lived. This is 
related to the fact that expanding managerial autonomy has released the 
agency problem that the central planning system had managed to constrain. 
Managers, and decentralised governmental agencies at various levels, are all 
eager to exert extractive authority over firms' assets but none are willing to be 
held responsible for firms' financial well-being. Encouraging the entry of non- 
state firms and the resulting increased market competition, other significant 
components of China's enterprise reform, have to some extent provided 
monitoring and long-term incentive for enterprises. However, the functioning 
of market competition has not always been effective for SOEs. In particular a 
credible bankruptcy threat has not fully materialised, due to the slower pace of 
SOE reform, and especially in the pace of ownership-related reform. In other 
words, unless China's SOE reform is extended to include some serious 
discussion of constraints, rather than just freedom and autonomy, the 
institution of the modern corporate system will not, by itself, cause a 
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fundamental transformation in the economic behaviour of corporatized SOEs, 
even facing increased competition arising from the entry of new private firms. 
The problem will thus remain: corporatized SOEs that operate within an 
environment characterized by the absence of both clearly defined and 
securely protected property rights and by a truly functional market. Moreover, 
this will also have a significant impact upon non-SOEs. As in order to support 
those inefficient SOEs, subsidies and preferential loans have to be provided, 
which makes efficient non-SOEs subject to heavy taxes and makes it more 
difficult for them to get external funding to finance their investments, and this 
in turn could crowd out efficient firms, and distort the effective functioning of 
markets. 
China's WTO entry will make China more integrated into the global economy 
and bring about new opportunities for China's economic growth, such as 
improving China's export prospects and increasing foreign direct investment. 
However, this positive economic prospect is subject to several economic 
challenges, which have been intensified by the WTO accession. These 
challenges include: rising unemployment and consequent social instability, 
the weak financial sector, rising inequality, and the deterioration of SOEs' 
financial performance . 
Can China confront these challenges and sustain its 
rapid economic growth by taking advantage of the WTO accession? Or should 
we look forward to "the coming collapse of China"? . The answer to these 
two 
questions actually lies in the present and future of China's enterprises, as the 
above challenges are directly or indirectly related to the performance of 
enterprises, especially that of the SOEs. The problem of rising unemployment 
may worsen, as more SOEs are forced into bankruptcy due to increased 
foreign competition and the cutting of soft loans to SOEs by the banking 
sector. The income gap will be widened as workers are laid off. Subjecting 
domestic banks to foreign competition will put pressure on them to improve 
efficiency. In order to strengthen the banking sector, the key challenge for the 
government is to tackle the problem of non-performing loans to SOEs, which 
will not be solved unless SOEs' performance improves. All this suggests that 
SOE reform will still be a huge challenge for the Chinese government. As 
gradual enterprise reform seems to have reached its end, and market 
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competition does not seem to be substituting corporate governance 
mechanisms based on ownership, more radical reform based on ownership 
and property rights is needed. 
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